This pay-to-vote system would be universally decried as unconstitutional but for one thing: each citizen at issue was convicted, at some point in the past, of a felony offense. A state may disenfranchise felons and impose conditions on their reenfranchisement. But the conditions must pass constitutional scrutiny. Whatever might be said of a rationally constructed system, this one falls short in substantial respects.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has already ruled, in affirming a preliminary injunction in this very case, that the State cannot condition voting on payment of an amount a person is genuinely unable to pay. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020).
So the reason for the disenfranchisement is the criminal behavior. That's OK (legally). They can impose conditions on reinstating voting (generally rational basis - nearly impossible for the state to lose), but the conditions cannot create arbitrary classes - and must pass constitutional muster. A long line of cases establishes that making the right to vote contingent on wealth is subject to strict scrutiny.
The court said heightened scrutiny applies because the system creates “a wealth classification that punishes those genuinely unable to pay fees, fines, and restitution more harshly than those able to pay—that is, it punishes more harshly solely on account of wealth—by withholding access to the ballot box.” Jones, 950 F.3d at 809.
A strict scrutiny standard is nearly impossible for the state to win, which led to the result that requiring ex-felons to pay fines
they are unable to pay is unconstitutional. (This is the part of the holding that is being publicized)
But - they reverted to rational basis (nearly impossible for the state to lose) for requiring ex-felons to pay fines they are able to pay - but choose not to pay. (This is the part of the holding that is being ignored). This almost certainly results in a disp.arate impact based on race (given the general economic status of whites v. blacks), but the court did not buy that argument:
A racially disparate impact is relevant to the question whether race was a motivating factor, but in the absence of racial motivation, disparate impact is not enough.
It found that since the law was aimed at increasing the electorate in a way that disproportionately increased the number of blacks who were able to vote that there was no evidence of a racial motivation connected to the requirement to pay all amounts owed as to the constitutional amendment passed by popular vote. As to SB7066 (the legislature's implementation of the amendment) it called it a closer question that could be decided either way - but on balance, the court determined the legislature was not motivated by race.
Disclaimer: I have not read the entire 125 page opinion. I searched it for the support for the holding that troubled me (and to answer your question). So there may well be details I've missed.
It's here if you want to plow through it:
https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=00000172-48d3-dc3e-aff6-4cdf397b0000
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