https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/kadyrovs-ukraine-gamble/
A series of bizarre theatrics involving Russian President Vladimir Putin’s close circles preceded his decision to invade Ukraine on February 24. In a recorded message broadcasted on February 21, members of the Security Council were visibly nervous. Even Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu looked unsettled when Putin raised the alert level of Russia’s strategic arsenal. These public reactions have confused Russia watchers, who had assumed that Putin’s actions came from him working more closely with the hawkish members of his inner circle. The decision to invade clearly caught them unprepared.
While Shoigu had one type of reaction, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has once again taken on the role of Putin’s “footsoldier.” From day one, he has actively participated, committing a significant number of his personal army, the kadyrovtsy, to the war. Estimates range from a few hundred to a few thousand sent to Ukraine during the first days, with more committed as the war continues. Kadyrov’s chosen role as Putin’s enforcer in Ukraine is no surprise, as the Chechen ruler participated in Russia’s Syria campaign. But this large commitment is unprecedented. What is driving Kadyrov’s decision? Just as the Russian political command assumed that the invasion would be a low-risk operation, Kadyrov thought it would be a low-risk effort to accomplish several things, inside and outside of Chechnya.
Kadyrov’s Mercenary War?
At a first look, Chechnya was fairly stable before the invasion. The opposition operated mostly abroad, and there were few signs that the local armed insurgency would re-ignite. However, below the surface, the Chechen ruler faces many challenges, and a “short victorious war” could have served as a win for Kadyrov.
Chechnya’s economy is certainly in Kadyrov’s calculations. On February 28, Kadyrov met with Russia’s Ministers of Finance, Anton Siluanov, and Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov. The purpose of the meeting was not reported, but the circumstances suggest that it had to do with the war. Ever since the Kremlin put the Kadyrov family in power, Chechnya has been heavily dependent on federal transfers to finance its budget. These transfers have helped to finance Chechnya’s uneven reconstruction and Kadyrov’s despotic regime. In particular, the money finances Kadyrov’s private army and prevents the Chechen economy from collapsing, which could prompt rebellion against his rule. But there were signs that this arrangement was under strain even before the new round of sanctions were imposed against Russia for the invasion. The December Berkat market protest, against high rental prices for a stall in the market, may have jolted Grozny. Kadyrov’s despotic regime over Chechnya makes protests a rare occurrence as intimidation and persecution of activists make it impossible for civil society to speak up. Indeed, Kadyrov expressed concerns about the state of the Chechen economy in January, stressing that Chechnya’s economy could not go without federal support. So, it is possible that the meeting was to gain new subsidies in exchange for Chechnya’s participation in the war.
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