Paul Wolfowitz On Counterinsurgency In Iraq
After 9/11, there were people like Richard Clarke, who was at the National Security Council, who said that there were people - and he specifically mentions you and your boss Donald Rumsfeld - who immediately started diverting attention away from al Qaeda toward Iraq. That you viewed this as an opportunity to deal with what you regarded as the unfinished business of Iraq…
No one was arguing to divert attention from al Qaeda and Afghanistan. That was clearly part of the problem. The question was whether Iraq was also part of the problem. And we could spend an entire show going into the historical detail. But I think the important thing is to say, well, we had this experience. Was there a way to avoid this war? Was it necessary? And what did we learn from it? And I think it's important that the reason this has been so painful and lasted so long and cost 4,000 American lives – and I've spent a lot of time with wounded soldiers and their families and with families of the fallen. I understand the pain involved, or at least, well, as best as someone who hasn't experienced directly can.
But the reason it was so difficult and lasted so long is it took us so long to understand that we were dealing with an insurgency, that to deal with an insurgency, you need a counterinsurgency strategy. Instead, we were out trying to kill terrorists. But the essence of counterinsurgency, which is known to people as the surge, but it wasn't primarily about putting in more troops – it was primarily about using them in a different way – is that you have to get the population on your side. And you can't get the population on your side unless you undertake to protect them, because taking on these killers is dangerous.
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http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/16/wolfowitz-on-counterinsurgency/