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Responsiveness in an Era of Inequality: The Case of the U.S. Senate
The rest of this article is behind a journal paywall. (Wouldn't want the poor getting at this information now, would we?)
Responsiveness in an Era of Inequality: The Case of the U.S. Senate
Thomas J. Hayes
Political Research Quarterly 2013 66: 585
Conclusion
This article examined the nature of unequal responsiveness in the U.S. Senate in an era for which wealth and income inequality has grown exponentially. I find strong support for unequal responsiveness in the Senate during the period of the 107th through 111th Congresses. For multiple issues, and across a number of recent Congresses, the results differ from previous findings regarding biased responsiveness, most specifically the findings of Larry Bartels (2008), who found responsiveness to middle- and upper income groups. My analysis, which examines Senator behavior on a large number of votes, shows evi- dence of responsiveness to only the wealthy, a distinct problem for any democracy. In some ways, this suggests oligarchic tendencies in the American system, a finding echoed in other research (e.g., Winters and Page 2009). The results consistently show that those with more means have, at the very least, a thumb on the scale when it comes to responsiveness. The results do not show the same for those at the bottom of the economic ladder.
My findings are a call for more research in the area of wealth inequality and representation. There has been a tradition in the study of American politics of treating economic class (e.g., Income) as a control variable, rather than as something more. This largely stems from the idea that Americans do not identify along class lines, at least not to the extent as citizens in European democracies. My results caution against this traditional approach, as I consistently find a clear bias in responsiveness toward the wealthy. Although Americans might not easily identify along class lines, this does not mean that politicians representing these citizens do not respond to them in this manner. If equal responsiveness is a fundamental practice in a democratic society (e.g., Dahl 1971), my findings question the degree to which this occurs.
Thomas J. Hayes
Political Research Quarterly 2013 66: 585
Conclusion
This article examined the nature of unequal responsiveness in the U.S. Senate in an era for which wealth and income inequality has grown exponentially. I find strong support for unequal responsiveness in the Senate during the period of the 107th through 111th Congresses. For multiple issues, and across a number of recent Congresses, the results differ from previous findings regarding biased responsiveness, most specifically the findings of Larry Bartels (2008), who found responsiveness to middle- and upper income groups. My analysis, which examines Senator behavior on a large number of votes, shows evi- dence of responsiveness to only the wealthy, a distinct problem for any democracy. In some ways, this suggests oligarchic tendencies in the American system, a finding echoed in other research (e.g., Winters and Page 2009). The results consistently show that those with more means have, at the very least, a thumb on the scale when it comes to responsiveness. The results do not show the same for those at the bottom of the economic ladder.
My findings are a call for more research in the area of wealth inequality and representation. There has been a tradition in the study of American politics of treating economic class (e.g., Income) as a control variable, rather than as something more. This largely stems from the idea that Americans do not identify along class lines, at least not to the extent as citizens in European democracies. My results caution against this traditional approach, as I consistently find a clear bias in responsiveness toward the wealthy. Although Americans might not easily identify along class lines, this does not mean that politicians representing these citizens do not respond to them in this manner. If equal responsiveness is a fundamental practice in a democratic society (e.g., Dahl 1971), my findings question the degree to which this occurs.