Matter will be created from light within a year, claim scientists

[warrior1]

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/05/18/matter-will-be-created-from-light-within-a-year-claim-scientists/


Researchers have worked out how to make matter from pure light and are drawing up plans to demonstrate the feat within the next 12 months.

The theory underpinning the idea was first described 80 years ago by two physicists who later worked on the first atomic bomb. At the time they considered the conversion of light into matter impossible in a laboratory.

But in a report published on Sunday, physicists at Imperial College London claim to have cracked the problem using high-powered lasers and other equipment now available to scientists.

“We have shown in principle how you can make matter from light,” said Steven Rose at Imperial. “If you do this experiment, you will be taking light and turning it into matter.”

snip

Tea, Earl Grey, hot.

[longship]

1. Next step... Star Trek transporter.

Unfortunately, there's that bothersome continuity problem, arguing that maybe Dr. McCoy was correct all this time.

[Erich Bloodaxe BSN]

2. Interesting discussion at that link.

The 'me' typing this instinctively wants to proclaim that 'I am me', and that any copy, even an atomically exact copy wouldn't be 'me', but I can't come up with any scientific rationale to backstop that claim, only a sort of supernatural 'soul' idea.

Seems to me there were several sci-fi authors who played around with this. Niven had the puppeteer teleporter plates, and another author (Clarke, maybe?) had some sort of setup where the morality of sending 'duplicates' of yourself to dangerous situations was examined. The original 'you' continued to live safely at home, maybe even getting paid to teleport a 'duplicate you' to some distant, inimical location to do some required work. The kicker, of course, was that to the 'you' that arrived was an exact copy, and so to him, it was as if he'd stepped onto the plate in safety, but was now trapped in danger. And even if he somehow managed to 'send' a copy back somewhere safe, he himself was still stuck in the dangerous place. Which obviously made for a lot of bad blood between the original and the 'copies', who felt betrayed.

[longship]

3. Well, Dr. Novella is a clinical neurologist professor.

His arguments that "consciousness is what the brain does" are fairly compelling.

He has even argued such a thing, in the recent afterlife debate.
"The mind is the brain, full stop."

Sorry, DUers. I didn't mean to highjack this thread with such a diversion. I just found it an interesting aside. I say that as this post takes it even further aside.
I guess an operative question might be, "is there any continuity in the thread?"

[NuclearDem]

5. If the matter were directly transported and simply reassembled at the destination point

I imagine it would be like experiencing death and then being revived. The exact same physical form experiencing a temporary stop in consciousness would feel the same consciousness after it's restarted.

Though with that line of thought, I suppose a copy would be the same, if consciousness is defined as the total of all the brain's activity, and "you" is defined as the memories and "data" stored in the brain.

[Orrex]

7. Geekily, I wrote about this very issue way back on DU2

And, for those who are still reading at this point, I'd like to address the "Transporter equals murder" mentality: nonsense! This view depends upon a misconception that the person who steps into the Transporter beam undergoes a cut-and-paste process, which is incorrect. Instead, the person is disassembled, transmitted, and reassembled at the destination point. That's why it's difficult to copy someone via Transporter; you're working with the original from start to finish.

Imagine a technology that allows you to cut a person into 100 pieces and then reassemble that person later without harm. So Louise steps up to be cut to bits in New York City, you put her bits into a suitcase, and carry her to Los Angeles where you unpack and reassemble her. One Louise in, one Louise out, and while she's in transit she's in de facto suspended animation. The same goes for the Transporter, except that you're cut into zillions of pieces, and the suitcase is the Pattern Buffer. One Data in, one Data out. Simple! And the number of pieces is determined by the Transporter's resolution (again, quantum vs. molecular).

Additional hardcore geekiness for anyone who's interested.

[smallcat88]

13. I like that explaination!

Makes a lot more sense than cut-and-paste. Probably more scientifically valid, too.

[tblue37]

44. A science fiction story by James Patrick Kelley:

"Think like a Dinosaur"
http://worldtracker.org/media/library/English%20Literature/K/KELLY,%20James.Patrick/James%20Patrick%20Kelly%20-%20Think%20Like%20a%20Dinosaur.pdf

(It deals with the issue of what happens to the original of the individual being copied.)

[longship]

12. But the question is whether it is a matter of disassembly and reassembly...

...or one of destruction and recreation from a model.

Therein lies the continuity problem. Science fairly well states that the mind is what the brain does. So, when the brain is deconstructed and transported as some form of transmission to appear at another location, is there anything remotely resembling continuity of what we would call mind? Is it not a fact that the physical brain is taken apart only to be reconstructed at the destination? If that is how it works, how is that any different from killing the person at one location and creating a duplicate at another location?

The argument is not whether such a thing can work -- this is science fiction, after all. It is if it could work, how can one reconcile the technology with what we already know about the brain?

In other words, was Dr. McCoy right all along? When Bones refuses to get into the transporter, was he correct? But it may be worse. It's not that his atoms would be splattered across space, it's that he would die and a duplicate would be created at the destination. But here's one which may bake your noodle... How would anybody be able to tell the difference?

I think current neuroscience says unequivocally, yes, McCoy is right.

[NuclearDem]

18. Definitions are important here.

If what we're defining as "mind" is the total of the brain's cognitive faculties, i.e. what the brain does, and we're working with the assumption that this phenomenon transports the same matter across a distance and reassembles it exactly, then would it not to stand to reason that the same brain would mean the same mind?

If we had someone in a hospital lying dead on an operating table (dead meaning the brain no longer functioning), it would seem to follow if that person's brain were restarted and able to resume functioning, it would be the same mind, just one interrupted in consciousness by death.

So, entirely for the sake of argument since I can't imagine this is even remotely possible, wouldn't it be the case where the same person had their brain reduced to millions of pieces, perfectly preserved, would be the same person when those same pieces are reassembled perfectly and the biochemical processes restarted to function as they had been before death?

Or if we had an entirely synthetic "brain", like a computer with the same capabilities of a fleshy brain. If it were possible to translate and transfer the "data" stored as memory and allow it to function as it had in fleshy form, but with entirely synthetic parts, would that not also be the same mind?

[longship]

20. The issue is, as Novella argues...

...that without continuity of the physical brain, there is no continuity. Because every way we study the brain and consciousness, consciousness is a product of the physical brain. The extent to which the brain is impaired is the extent to which consciousness is impaired. And such experiments are repeatable, over and over again, whereas credible evidence to the contrary is totally absent.

The argument is simple. If you take apart a brain, even to reconstruct it elsewhere, there cannot be continuity of self because there is no physical continuity of the physical brain. QED.

It all flows from the hypothesis that the mind is what the brain does, which is a pretty damned good hypothesis given all the evidence.

[Orrex]

21. Suppose a person suffers brain damage altering the composition of the brain

Does that eliminate continuity of the mind? Who is the objective observer who gets to say?

An electroshock patient loses 10 years of memories. What of the mind?
A stroke victim loses the power of speech. What of the mind?
An Alzheimer's sufferer loses mental and physical capacity? What of the mind?

I'm down with the idea that "the mind is what the brain does," but I see no reason to conclude that interruption of a brain's capacity necessarily destroys the mind.

[longship]

23. A damaged brain is still the same physical brain.

And a mind separate from the brain is totally a non-starter. It is not even wrong. There is absolutely no credible evidence to support such a hypothesis.

If you have to destroy the brain to move "the mind" elsewhere, you destroy the mind.

Again, it all flows from the very well supported hypothesis that the mind is what the brain does.

[Orrex]

27. Given that the atoms of your brain aren't the same ones from a year ago...

Can you be said to have any continuity at all?

Again, it all flows from the very well supported hypothesis that the mind is what the brain does.

That's special pleading and a semi-meaningless platitude. Even if true, the fact "the mind is what the brain does" doesn't require that the brain continue uninterrupted.

"Beating" is what the heart does, but it doesn't stop being a heart, nor does "beating" stop being "beating" if the heart is stopped and restarted.


Lest you misunderstand me, I am definitely not asserting that the "mind" is separate from the brain.

[longship]

28. Sorry, Orrex.

One thing we can be pretty damned sure of is that when one steps into the transporter room and is beamed up, what arrives at the destination pad has no physical continuity with what left the transmitting pad. The information may transmit, but that is not ones body, let alone ones brain.

If the mind is what the brain does -- so far no evidence to the contrary -- then there is a simple, even trivial, conclusion. If I wanted to continue living I would not step into that transporter room.

I love the very long discussion at Dr. Novella's Blog (in my first post here). So many do not get the crucial point of the argument and make all sorts of special pleadings themselves.

It is an interesting topic, as I am sure you would agree (not that transporters will be constructed any time soon, if ever -- but that's a different topic altogether).

[Orrex]

29. But that doesn't quite answer the question

Given that your atoms are being replaced continuously, then you're basically being sent through a transporter 24 hours a day. Why is this method of atomic relocation/replacement acceptable, but the transporter is not?

[longship]

30. Because the discontinuity at the transporter.

Regardless that your atoms are being replaced, one by one, throughout your life, there is a continuity that on a day by day basis, the vast proportion of atoms -- or more properly, cells -- remain. Our lives are not so much atoms, but cells.

When one wholesale replaces all of ones cells with another collection of cells at another location, in no way can one be considered to have been transported, but instead inevitably conclude that one has been destroyed and created anew at an alternative location.

Question: Would you willingly walk into the transporter room?

I would never do so.

[Orrex]

32. That's an arbitrary threshold, begging the question

On what basis do you accept atomic replacement while rejecting cellular replacement, since the former leads necessarily to the latter?

Unless you can demonstrate that the incremental replacement over time is fundamentally different from the wholesale disassembly/reassembly, then there's no logical basis for accepting that objection.

In essence, you're saying "I reject the transporter because it's different from the day-to-day replacement of atoms, which I accept because it's different from the transporter." That's circular.

Question: Would you willingly walk into the transporter room?

I would never do so.

Assuming an acceptable baseline of safety, why wouldn't I? On what basis can I be said to be the person I was an hour ago, when I was 40 miles away from where I am now? Other than philosophically, how might I distinguish my pre-transport self from my post-transport self?

If I accept that the mind is a phenomenon emergent from the structure of the brain, then why should "continuity" have any bearing on self? Why must continuity be the defining trait? If I awaken from a two-month vegetative state, am I the self from three months before? If not, then who am I? And how would that discontinuity differ from that presumed to result from the transporter?

[longship]

35. Well, it is the wholesale replacement part, atomic or cellular, that is the difference.

When one is deconstructed at one location and reconstructed at another, that is equivalent to being killed and recreated new. Whatever the new person is at the new location, it won't be the same you, the one destroyed at the old location. The thing is, if the transporter makes an exact copy, nobody would know the difference. However much like the other, it cannot be the same person.

That's the continuity problem.

It's really simple. And I would never step into the transporter room.

[Orrex]

36. Nope, that's argument by assertion

When one is deconstructed at one location and reconstructed at another, that is equivalent to being killed and recreated new.

That's argument by assertion, and it still doesn't distinguish between incremental replacement and wholesale disassembly/reassembly.

The thing is, if the transporter makes an exact copy, nobody would know the difference. However much like the other, it cannot be the same person.

That's meaningless. What is the distinction between an exact copy of a now nonexistent original and the original itself?


It's only simple if we assume outright that the continuity problem is the answer.

[longship]

37. Well, those are the questions.

Is there a continuity problem?

How could one determine if there was?

Neurologist Steven Novella apparently thinks there is. That's good enough for me. (I know. Argument from authority fallacy. But given those questions seem to be unanswerable, it's all one has.)

I put this forth here because I thought it would be fun to toss around.

[Orrex]

38. I agree that it's fun!

As I posted upthread, I've entertained this topic for quite a while.

I'm curious as to what, exactly, made Novella decide that continuity is the be-all-and-end-all of the discussion. If he has specifics to support his assertion, then that's one thing, but if he's simply declaring it, then it can only be accepted as testimony.

If you were transplanting a brain and had to do it one hemisphere at a time, would the reassembled brain be the same self as the pre-surgery self?

[longship]

40. Well, I would say that he has plenty of specifics.

Given that he is a clinical neurologist. Read the article at the link in my first post up thread. It also has a very fascinating and long discussion in the comments. And Steve joins in on the comments a bit, too.

Steve's position is simple. Every way one can test it, the mind is what the brain does. If one deconstructs a brain to reconstruct it elsewhere, that specific mind has ceased to exist. Whatever mind the new brain has, it is not the same as the other one.

Yes, the brain you have today likely has few cells in common with the one you were born with. But the fact that there was some continuity throughout your life means that one never notices it. You are a different person than the one born some years ago. But there is a continuity in that it is all within a single body.

If you destroy that body to create a duplicate elsewhere, is it still you?

Steve argues no, it is not the same person. The issue is that in one case there is continuity, and the other (transporter), there isn't.

[Orrex]

42. Again, though, continuity is an arbitrary standard

Why must that be the limit, rather than something else? I accept that he believes this, and I'll read through the comments when I can, but unless he can point to a specific reason, then it remains testimony.

Yes, the brain you have today likely has few cells in common with the one you were born with. But the fact that there was some continuity throughout your life means that one never notices it. You are a different person than the one born some years ago. But there is a continuity in that it is all within a single body.

That's just reasserting the same claim, though. And if I'm "a different person than the one born some years ago," then what's the value of continuity anyway?

It could as readily be argued that the self/mind is that which can claim identity beyond another's power to refute it. That's no less arbitrary a standard, and IMO it's in some ways superior because it preserves agency in the individual.

I'm also not convinced that we need to set the brain or mind on a pedestal in this way. Yes, it's enormously complex, but it doesn't necessarily follow that it retains a meaningful and irreproducible uniqueness in one iteration rather than another.

Also, regarding the transporter, what happens if the transport itself is incremental? Imagine that, rather than complete disassembly and complete reassembly, it reassembles at the target point while still disassembling at the origin. When is continuity interrupted in that case? It's rather like having one of those "tornado tubes" made of a pair of 2-liter bottles. You invert the bottles, and the water flows from top to bottom. At the beginning it's 100% in the top bottle, at the halfway point it's 50/50, and at the end it's 100% in the bottom, never having lost continuity.

If the transporter disassembly/reassembly is incremental in that way, when does the interruption occur?

[longship]

43. You pose good questions.

I suspect that the interruption happens in space, not time. But that might just be the Dr. McCoy in me.

Maybe this is why such topics generate such frankly interesting discussions.

But at some point in the dialog, maybe one should just shrug and say, "I don't know."

Regardless, I do not step into the transporter room.

It comes down to this:

Is there continuity?
If yes, how would you test your hypothesis?

[longship]

47. But the transporter replaces all your atoms, and cells, all at once...

...and reproduces them in a different location. It is not called "The Continuity Problem" by accident. The issue is the continuity of ones brain, which is the origin of the mind. If ones brain is deconstructed and recreated in another location (along with the rest of ones body) the continuity is broken.

Again. Read Novella's article. He is an expert on this issue.

[Orrex]

48. Not sure why you answered twice, but...

What if the deconstruction/recreation were instantaneous, with no interruption between brain-at-point-A and brain-at-point-B?

It needn't even be literally instantaneous; it need only happen faster than the interrupted brain can register, like on the order of 1/100 of a second.

I'll read the article, as I stated above, but nothing posted here suggests that Novella's embrace of the continuity problem is definitive or unassailable. It remains as arbitrary as saying "you're not the same brain after the full moon that you were before."

[tblue37]

45. In my post #44 above, I give this link to

a science fiction story by James Patrick Kelley:

"Think like a Dinosaur"
http://worldtracker.org/media/library/English%20Literature/K/KELLY,%20James.Patrick/James%20Patrick%20Kelly%20-%20Think%20Like%20a%20Dinosaur.pdf

It deals with the issue of what happens to the original of the individual being copied. In this story, the original is left behind when the transporter copies her and sends her duplicate to another world. But the original is then--um--extra. Redundant, you see.

[NuclearDem]

22. Sure, I see what you're getting at.

I guess I'm having a hard time separating the idea of the brain's continual function (WRT the biochemical processes which constitute consciousness) with the continual existence of the brain as an organ.

Since I'm sure that made absolutely no sense, I guess I only see the complete eradication of "self" or "mind" constituted by the complete loss of the "data" stored as memory by the brain. If consciousness was temporarily interrupted by the interruption of brain activity, but was then restarted with the brain with no loss of data, I don't see how that constitutes an eradication of "self" or "mind."

[longship]

24. Question: Would you step into the transporter room?

I wouldn't.

Best regards.

[NuclearDem]

25. I'll just take the shuttle.

[longship]

26. Me, too.

Might even meet Dr. McCoy on board. That would be very cool itself.

He might even have a blast of bourbon on hand.

[X_Digger]

39. By that same token, however..

Is the 'brain' that I have today the same 'brain' I have six weeks from now? Some cells have been replaced, and even in cells that don't typically get replaced, the protein sheaths and composite bits have been replaced.

If you're getting hung up on physicality, don't let the processes of cellular repair get in the way.

[longship]

41. Again, it is about continuity.

No matter how many cells have been replaced, it is still you.

Stepping into the transporter room, all your cells are replaced by a duplicate set of cells at a different location. How can that still be you?

Of course, there likely will never be transporters. The whole idea is frankly preposterous, but a very effective SciFi plot device to move things along quickly and serve as a bridge between scenes. When one has less than an hour to tell a story, such things help.

[arcane1]

6. Reminds me of the movie "The Prestige"

Though I don't want to post any spoiler alerts

[tblue37]

46. A marvelous--yet horrifying--movie. nt

[AtheistCrusader]

11. If you duplicate me to the last atom, my duplicate and I would immediately begin to

diverge as distinct individuals, because our perceptions of the universe are different due to the fact we cannot simultaneously occupy the same space and time. Different experiences builds uniqueness.

[ChairmanAgnostic]

17. talk about split personalities.

No amount of big pharma drugs can cure that.

[Orrex]

19. I can attest to this

We did it to one of our roommates in college. He and his clone diverged wildly almost from the get-go.

[freshwest]

4. Appreciate the article. With TBIs there is strangeness straight to the core. Thanks. n/t

[CrispyQ]

10. Cool article. Thanks

Loved the hybrid brain part at the end. Will check your other link too.

[AceAcme]

8. I certainly hope they will find a way to monetize this process

light into matter into mega profits -- for the exclusive benefit of the elite corporations who will hold all future patents on light and matter.

No Money? No light or matter for you. And no damn soup either.

[Nye Bevan]

9. Please remember to leave the light-to-matter converter turned off when not in use.

This is particularly important on sunny days.

Acme Light-to-Matter inc. will not be responsible for the removal or disposal of excess matter created when the device is inadvertently left switched on.

[smallcat88]

14. Not religious, but spiritual

Gave up on organized religion a long time ago but I still believe in my soul. The science? Nothing is ever truly destroyed. Matter and energy are interchangeable. Our bodies contain energy so what happens to it when your body dies? My current, personal theory - our souls are light/energy/consciousness. I'm open to new theories/interpretations, unlike religious fundamentalists I don't claim to know everything.
But by extension, I already believe that all matter had to come from energy/light to begin with. (Chicken and the egg? My best guess is energy probably came first.) No idea how this would impact the whole transporter debate - but matter from light, yeah, I think that's inevitable. Can't wait for the right-wing nuts to freak out over it - man playing god, messing with the natural order, all that stuff.

[DetlefK]

15. Even if they get it to work, it will never be used to replicate matter:

1. Not enough energy available.

Let's say, we have a nuclear bomb of a caliber of 10 kt TNT. That's 4.184*10^13 J of energy.

Let's say, we have a carbon-atom. Its mass is equal to roughly 12*939 MeV = 1.8051*10^-9 J.
12g of carbon are equal to 6.022*10^23 carbon-atoms.
That means, 12g of carbon is equal to 1.087*10^15 J or the explosion of 250 kt TNT.



2. Conserved quantum-numbers.

We start out with light, which means that the lepton- and the baryon-numbers are overall zero. That means, for every particle we create, we create an anti-particle.

[MattBaggins]

16. Tea. Earl Grey. Hot

[PoliticAverse]

31. It takes a great deal of energy to make matter. n/t

[Tanuki]

33. What's the matter? nt

[AverageJoe90]

34. Holding my breath on this one.

This honestly seems like it would be a truly amazing development, but I'm a little skeptical, TBH. I guess we'll just have to wait and see how things develop from here.....