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Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region Forums"Anyone Who Says Russia is Losing in Ukraine Doesn't Understand How the Game Is Played"
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. His think piece excerpted below is a useful antidote to overly optimistic assessments.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/04/no_bluff_putin_russia_ukraine_obama_tom_friedman
Who's winning the battle for Ukraine? Despite continued signs of trouble in Ukraine's eastern provinces, some pretty prominent people have recently offered a decidedly upbeat interpretation of events there. The first was U.S. President Barack Obama, who, during his commencement speech at West Point last week, cited the Western response to the crisis as a telling example of successful multilateral diplomacy. In his words, "the mobilization of world opinion and international institutions served as a counterweight to Russian propaganda, Russian troops on the borders, and armed militias." It's not over, he warned, but this effort "has given a chance for the Ukrainian people to choose their future."
<snip--he mentions Thomas Friedman's May 27 column claiming Putin "blinked" and "pretty much got everything wrong," and concedes that there is a grain of truth in such assessments, but...>
Putin still sees this matter as a net win. Just consider what Putin has achieved in the past few months.
First, he has put the idea of a further NATO expansion on the back burner for a long time, and maybe forever. Russia has opposed NATO's march eastward ever since it began in the mid-1990s, but Russia was not in a position to do much about it. The brief 2008 war between Russia and Georgia was Putin's first attempt to draw a red line, and that minor skirmish dampened enthusiasm for expansion considerably. This time around, Putin made it abundantly clear that any future attempt to bring Ukraine into NATO or even into EU membership will be met with firm Russian opposition and will probably lead to dismemberment of the country.
Second, Putin has restored Russian control over Crimea, an act that was popular with most Crimean residents and most Russians as well. The takeover entailed some short-term costs (including some rather mild economic sanctions), but it also solidified Russian control over its naval base in Sevastopol and will allow Russia to claim oil and gas reserves in the Black Sea that may be worth trillions of dollars. The United States and Europe can try to block development of these reserves by tightening sanctions even more, but they are more likely to let sanctions ease off once the situation in Ukraine cools. And if Russia eventually decides to start exploiting these areas, is the United States going to send the 6th Fleet to stop it?
Third, Putin has reminded Ukraine's leaders that he has many ways to make their lives difficult. No matter what their own inclinations may be, it is therefore in their interest to maintain at least a cordial relationship with Moscow. And Ukraine's new president, Petro Poroshenko, got the message. As he told Lally Weymouth of the Washington Post before his election, "Without a direct dialogue with Russia, it will be impossible to create security." Since taking office, he has made it clear that he wants to expand Ukraine's economic ties to Europe -- something crucial to any hope of reforming its troubled economy -- but he also intends to improve relations with Russia as well.
Fourth, Friedman's tale of a "revived" NATO is wishful thinking at best and pure fiction at worst. The alliance did deploy a few warplanes to the east to reassure its Baltic members, and Obama offered the usual verbal affirmations and pledged $1 billion in miscellaneous defense measures during his visit to Poland this week. But the Poles seem less than reassured and continue to demand more U.S. protection; what they seem to want is a big NATO military base on their territory. The crisis also reminded observers that NATO expansion was never based on serious calculations of interest and capability: The United States and its allies simply assumed the Article 5 pledge to defend NATO's new members would never have to be honored. I don't think Russia has the slightest intention of expanding anywhere else, but doubts about the wisdom of NATO's earlier expansion have never been greater.
<snip>
Purveyor
(29,876 posts)riderinthestorm
(23,272 posts)Comrade Grumpy
(13,184 posts)1000words
(7,051 posts)Comrade Grumpy
(13,184 posts)Demo_Chris
(6,234 posts)Tommy_Carcetti
(43,198 posts)The sheer notion of that level of extortion one nation imposes on its smaller neighbor is quite alarming.
Now people might understand why so many Ukrainians were so upset when Yanukovych spurned the EU in favor of Russia last year. They despise the notion of Ukraine being subjugated as a vassal state. Westerners talking about whatever implications the EU or IMF might bring just don't understand that.
pampango
(24,692 posts)Putin wants to restore international respect (fear of?) Russia. He has been very effective at pursuing Russian national interests, even expanding its national boundaries which is something American hawks can only dream of.
Ever since Vladimir Putin invaded Crimea, American pundits have strained to understand his view of the world. Putins been called a Nazi; a tsar; a man detached from reality. But theres another, more familiar framework that explains his behavior. In his approach to foreign policy, Vladimir Putin has a lot in common with those very American hawks (or neocons in popular parlance) who revile him most.
1. Putin is obsessed with the threat of appeasement
To Kristol, McCain, and their ilk, the United States is a nation perennially bullied by adversaries who are tougher, nastier, and more resolute than we are. ... In his (Putin's) view, its Russia that has been perennially bullied by tougher and nastier countriesin particular, America and its NATO allies. They have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact, he explained in a speech announcing Russias incorporation of Crimea. They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner. But now, finally, the era of appeasement is over. Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from, Putin said. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.
2. Putin is principledso long as those principles enhance national power
For Putin, an anti-Russian government in Kiev is illegitimate regardless of how it takes power. For many American hawks, the same is now true for a pro-Chávez government in Latin America or an Islamist government in the Middle East. ... In the United States, both hawks and doves like to claim that theyre promoting cherished principles like democracy and freedom. The difference is that doves are more willing to acknowledge that these principles can undermine American interests. For most hawks, by contrast, the fight for democratic ideals must serve American power.
3. Putin doesnt understand economic power
This indifference to the economic aspects of statecraft was a defining feature of the Bush administration, where treasury secretaries played a marginal foreign-policy role ... Seeing economics as separate from foreign policy issues is precisely what Clinton decried in the 1990s, and its the weakness in Putins strategy today. But its a weakness that many American hawks share. For decades now, Kristol and McCain have insisted that America relentlessly expand its global military footprint and relentlessly boost its defense budget. Ive never seen either make a serious effort to explain how this should be paid for.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/vladimir-putin-russian-neocon/284602/
Like American hawks Putin sees a strong and assertive military as a symbol of national power. "For Putin, too, overcoming appeasement requires overcoming the soft, unmanly culture that made Russia unwilling to fight. The fall of the Soviet Union, he argued last year, was a devastating blow to our nations cultural and spiritual codes that led to primitive borrowing and attempts to civilize Russia from abroad.
Like American hawks if Putin likes a government he supports into matter how it came to power. If he does not like it, it matters little how it came to power.
Like our hawks he cares little about economics and the quality of people's lives. Pressuring or invading weak neighbors - Granada, Panama, Georgia, Ukraine - is more their style since it enhances national power and prestige, at least in the eyes of fellow hawks.
Putin has been very effective in pursuing Russia's "national interest". If he has been similarly successful at enacting new domestic social legislation or progressive taxes, I have missed it. What he has done domestically is sign repressive legislation against gays, dissidents and separatist movements within Russia. IOW, he has been very effective from a "hawk" point of view but he is no liberal.