Why Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Neocons Hate the Iran Deal
Last edited Tue Jul 14, 2015, 07:55 PM - Edit history (1)
Why Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Neocons Hate the Iran Deal
Hint: It has nothing to do with the deal.
(Snip)
What worries these critics most is not that Iran might enrich its uranium into an A-bomb. (If that were the case, why would they so virulently oppose a deal that put off this prospect by more than a decade?) No, what worries them much more deeply is that Iran might rejoin the community of nations, possibly even as a diplomatic (and eventually trading) partner of the United States and Europe.
European leaders, especially Federica Mogherini, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, and Philip Hammond, Great Britain’s finance minister, have said that the deal holds out hope for the reopening of broad relations with Iran—and that is precisely these critics’ fear.
The fear is hardly without reason. The lifting of sanctions, which this deal will trigger in the next few years, will certainly enrich Iran. This might embolden the government’s expansionist tendencies and its support of militant movements across the Middle East—or it might moderate the country’s stance, as the population (much of it literate and pro-Western) interacts more with the rest of the world and the reigning mullahs die off. There is some basis for this hope of transformation. How long can the mullahs sustain their cries of “Death to America” and their claims of Western encirclement—the rationale for their oppressive domestic policies—when the country’s president and foreign minister, clearly with the approval of the supreme leader, are shaking hands and signing deals with the Great Satan’s emissaries? Nonetheless, the hope is a gamble, and one can’t blame Israelis for refusing to stake too much on its payoff.
(snip)
What Netanyahu and King Salman want Obama to do is to wage war against Iran—or, more to the point, to fight their wars against Iran for them. That is why they so virulently oppose U.S. diplomacy with Iran—because the more we talk with Iran’s leaders, the less likely we are to go to war with them. Their view is the opposite of Winston Churchill’s: They believe to war-war is better than to jaw-jaw.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2015/07/the_real_reason_israel_saudi_arabia_and_neocons_hate_the_iran_deal_they.html
= new reply since forum marked as read
but I don't think the author of this article is who it is 
with the ability to comprehend what I read. If thats clever then I confess
oh yes I'm an old man and with age comes a don't give a flying fuck attitude about saying what needs to be said
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Why Assad may be helping Islamic State’s offensive
Al-Monitor recorded regime airstrikes against 17 rebel-held villages and towns in Aleppo’s northern countryside from May 31 to June 11. In contrast, IS-controlled towns in Aleppo’s northern countryside were spared any regime air raids.
Among the towns bombed by regime aircraft, four were part of a direct front line between the rebels and IS, among them Marea, Tlalin and Tell Qara, while 13 others formed part of a network of supply routes and staging areas for rebels on their way to fight IS, such as Tell Rifaat, Herbel and Ihras.
The intensity of the bombing that Aleppo’s northern countryside was subjected to, in conjunction with IS’ attack, seemed to further confirm that these were not regular regime strikes against areas outside of its control as shown in the map below. What’s even more important was the fact that villages that had not been targeted for a considerable period of time were now bombed by the regime in conjunction with IS’ attack on rebel forces in Tlalin, for example, which had not been bombed since July 2014, and Herbel, which had been spared since August 2014.
Despite the fact that IS must be benefiting from these strikes, it cannot be said that Assad and IS are allies. The regime has fought IS before, incurring heavy losses in materiel and troops in August and September of 2014, when IS attacked the Tabaqa military airport and the Shaer oil field. What then drives Assad to help IS on the battlefield?
There are two main reasons. The first is the region’s importance to the rebel forces. Aleppo’s northern countryside is considered to be one of the largest rebel strongholds with access to Turkey, as well as the rebels' only gateway to the city of Aleppo.
On Feb. 17, the regime tried hard to isolate the northern countryside from the rest of the areas that are under rebel control to blockade the city of Aleppo by attacking the towns of Hardatneen, Retyan and al-Mallah. But, regime forces were met with stiff resistance by the rebels, who considered the battle to be a matter of life and death. As a result, 300 regime troops were killed, according to statements made to Al-Monitor by the former military commander of al-Jabha al-Shamiya (Shamiya Front), Lt. Col. Abu Bakr.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/syria-aleppo-regime-army-assad-support-isis-marea-tlalin.html
