WaPo oped: The long view with Russia

[MBS]

Anne Applebaum on the Ukraine crisis:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-long-view-with-russia/2015/02/08/cdd7a6a4-aee8-11e4-abe8-e1ef60ca26de_story.html

In an ordinary year, not all that much happens at the annual Munich security conference. . . But this is not an ordinary year.
This year, the normally staid audience laughed out loud at the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, who seemed, at one point, to question the legality of German unification. Some of the room also applauded loudly when Angela Merkel, the German chancellor — just back from an apparently fruitless peace mission to Moscow — restated her view that “there is no military solution” to the conflict in Ukraine. But when Malcolm Rifkind, the former British foreign secretary, asked her how she would stop Russia without military force, another part of the audience applauded. Even watching online, the conundrum in the room was clear: Everyone agrees that the Russians were lying, and no one believes Russian promises of a cease-fire. But nobody agrees on what to do about it.

Clearly, the real debate about Ukraine and Russia has yet to begin, by which I don’t just mean the “should we arm Ukraine?” debate. This is an appealing discussion, not least because it appears to pit the United States (Mars) against Europe (Venus). But fundamentally, it’s a red herring. The armaments debate is an argument about short-term tactics, not long-term strategy — and it ignores the real nature of the Russian game. . . .For Russia, the point of the war is not to achieve a victory. The point is to prevent the emergence of anything resembling a prosperous, European Ukraine because such a state would pose an ideological threat to Putinism. Following this logic, even a German-brokered cease-fire will bring not “peace” but rather a so-called “frozen conflict,” following an old KGB design . .. which is why the argument about “arming Ukraine” is almost beside the point. . .

What the West needs now is not merely a military policy but a comprehensive, long-term strategy designed to reinforce Ukrainian statehood and integrate Ukraine into Europe over many years. We could begin training not only the Ukrainian military but also the security services, which were devastated by the previous Ukrainian president. We could push far more forcefully for economic reform and support it with real financial commitments. We could treat this as a very long-term project, as Merkel suggested Saturday, build a Berlin Wall around Donetsk in the form of a demilitarized zone and treat the rest of Ukraine like West Germany. We could recognize the real danger Russia poses to Europe, not only as a source of violence but also as a source of political and economic corruption. We could impose much harsher, much deeper sanctions. We could cut Russia out of the international payments system. We could enforce our own laws and stop turning a blind eye to Russian money laundering, most of which takes place in European capitals. The city of London and the gnomes of Zurich might pay a price for the loss of Russian clients. But that price will still be far lower than the potential costs of doing nothing.

For what is the alternative? Ukraine collapses and Putin is emboldened, as he was after his invasion of Georgia in 2008. He begins planning the next “frozen conflict.” If he does so in a NATO state, perhaps Lithuania or Estonia, a much wider and even more damaging European conflict would follow. We don’t want a new Cold War — but even that would be preferable to a new world war. And if we don’t come up with a serious strategy to prevent one, that’s what we’ll get.

[swilton]

1. The framing

should be NOT how do we stop Russian aggression. But WHY is NATO on Russia's doorstep - and furthermore, why do we need NATO?

[Igel]

2. That's not framing.

That's defaulting on providing a frame and allowing people to come up with their own. Presumably one that you manipulate them into. (All framing is essentially PR.)

The problem is that the history is palpable, and we have no trouble recognizing the same sort of thing in anti-American attitudes in Central and South America, not to mention the Caribbean. American meddling, coup-backing, economic imperialism, and the odd actual invasion or brief occupation leads to that kind of attitude, no? However, that's been fairly subdued compared to Russian meddling in East/Central Europe and the Baltics.

There we've had out-and-out occupation, forced resettlement, population transfers, forced assimilation, century-long repression of independence movements, partitions, annexations. Not to mention all the economic consequences.

Given that Russia since the 1600s has tended to meddle in the area, usually to the detriment of the local populations and the aggrandizement of the Russian rulers and some of the Russian population, surely their desire to have some sort of defense can be understood. We easily understand it when we look at animosities towards the US for far slighter infractions of sovereignty and national or ethnic dignity. We also understand it when it comes to SE European attitudes towards Turkey. Or any imperial colonial satrapy towards the formerly oppressive power (provided we have a clue about the history involved--getting a clue often means getting past what's ideologically convenient, as in the case of India and Muslims or Arabs and Persians).

There are only two players in the area currently. Russia and NATO. If Russia's the enemy, the oppressor quondam et futurus as far as they're concerned, then NATO if not a friend is at least the lesser of two evils. Notice that for the most part those most adamantly in favor of helping Ukraine are former co-oppressed nations. (With the Jobbik-folk and Czech Zeman being more pro-Russian, mostly because they really don't like the EU.)

Those areas that actively like Russia tended to have their nationalistic and religious aspirations assisted as Russia supported their nationalist aspirations in the 1800s even as Russia was mostly working to weaken and destabilize the Ottoman Empire. (Notice that in the Balkans it was the Turks that occupied, forced converted populations, and generally all-around oppressed the local populations, but this time for over 500 years.) That would be fellow Orthodox ethnicities, such as Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs.

[MBS]

3. " those most . . .in favor of helping Ukraine are former co-oppressed nations"

Exactly.

[davidpdx]

4. Two things I find interesting

1) That Lavrov continues to say idiotic things like Germany's reunification may not be legal.

2) The idea that the conflict might end if the eastern side of Ukraine were walled off. I don't necessarily agree with the idea because a) it still doesn't solve the long-term problem and b) it essentially gives Russia more of what it wants.

[MBS]

5. Lavrov has been particularly bizarre

and he seemed to have turned on a dime after the invasion of Crimea. I'd always thought of him as charming and urbane -- sure, that was just a surface impression, gleaned from videos and photos, so what do I know?
But after Crimea, just watching (on CSPAN) his body language at a press conference in London , Lavrov seemed uncharacteristically awkward, reading his talking points, looking down, speaking in Russian (even though his English seems fluent), reading straight from his paper, his fingers fidgeting with the podium. . it made me wonder what he was really thinking deep down.

Around the same time (Dec 2013 I think) , Kerry described a post-Crimea phone call with Lavrov -- with whom he once seemed to have a friendly working relationship -- as "Kafkaesque".

And, as you noted, the bizarre statements keep coming. (Does he really believe this stuff? I keep wondering).
Kafkaesque does seem to be the apt word. This entire past 14 months or so has been Kafkaesque. The continuing disinformation campaign by the Russians is particularly disturbing to me. . . kind of like Fox News on a global scale.

I've assumed that by "wall", they had in mind a kind of DMZ, not necessarily a physical structure.
In any case, as you said, whether wall or "zone", it doesn't solve the long-term problem, and, so far, Putin is indeed pretty much getting his way.
This remains as dangerous and complicated and tangled and consequential a situation as ever.

[yurbud]

6. the end of the Cold War could have been the end of World Wars...bankers and corporations don't want

that.

They would rather risk a nuclear war than be pulled from the teat of our tax dollars for defense spending or know that a handful of countries in the world don't obey their orders to the letter.

Putin is no angel, but given over a decade of blatant lies, and the swatch of chaos and destruction Washington has sown in the last decade, I'm not buying the new Cold War against an "enemy" with a military a sixth as big as ours who is doing on his border about what our government does wherever it damn well pleases.