The Paris attacks

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On 13 November Paris and the northern suburb of Saint-Denis were plunged into mourning by a series of shootings and bombings that claimed at least 130 lives. Those responsible for the attacks, many of them young French Muslims, claimed to be motivated by France’s military intervention in Syria against ISIS (Daesh in Arabic). Two days later, Paris launched fresh airstrikes on ISIS positions in Syria, mainly in the organisation’s “capital”, Raqqa. The French government and the rightwing opposition are now in agreement on the need for more airstrikes on Syria. They are also united on the urgency of pursuing a relentless “war” at home.

The only issue on which there seems to be some debate is the makeup of the international coalition against ISIS. Should it include Russia or not? Should it include Iran? Or the Syrian government? France’s foreign policy — the credibility of which has been undermined by hypocrisy and clumsiness — seems to be leaning towards making the alliance as broad as possible. Former president Nicolas Sarkozy, ex prime minister François Fillon and former foreign minister Alain Juppé already take this position. Though just a few months ago they were all insisting that President Bashar al-Assad must go as a precondition for any deal, they have now given up that demand.

France’s military intervention was decided unilaterally, without public debate and with parliament playing no more than a cosmetic role, amidst the sort of media conformity usually seen in wartime. It raises some fundamental questions.

The first relates to the “coalition”, which is all the broader because the war aims of its members differ, considerably in some cases. Some participants (including Russia, Iran and Hizbullah) want first and foremost to keep the Assad regime in power, even if it is hated by much of Syria’s population. Others (Turkey and Saudi Arabia in particular), which showed indulgence towards ISIS until it turned against them, are keen to ensure that Assad is toppled. This fundamental lack of agreement is bound to lead to more trouble if these allies of convenience are victorious against ISIS. Will it be necessary to intervene all over again to separate (or destroy) some of the former coalition members? The atrocities committed by ISIS have been extensively documented, including by ISIS itself. Even so, the organisation found a welcome in some Sunni regions of Syria and Iraq, whose inhabitants have been exploited or tyrannised by Shia militias. However harshly they are being treated at present, people in these regions will not necessarily welcome liberation by their former persecutors.

http://mondediplo.com/blogs/parisattacks

[TBF]

1. Excellent article

bearing in mind that it is difficult to tell France to hold back, reflect, and not defend herself.

We recall that the US did not respond to 9/11 immediately and still made very bad choices.

I'm not sure what the complete answer is. The middle east is a very volatile situation and has been for some time.

I think the first step in that region should be the US trying to broker a 2-state solution between Israel and Palestine (and threaten to take away funding if folks will not come to the table to negotiate). But that is just one of the issues. The folks in that region have had conflicts for a very long time and we (the US) have done nothing to help it with our constant quest for oil and other resources in the region.

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2. Paris Attacks: Governance, Not Airstrikes, Will Topple ISIS in Syria

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The West needs to better understand not only the conditions that gave rise to ISIS and its antecedents in Iraq and Syria, but also what sustains the group and allows it hold and govern territory, generate revenue, recruit from local communities, appeal to disenfranchised Europeans and plan and execute increasingly complex and sophisticated terrorist attacks.

Although ISIS is widely seen as a death cult, it has, in a similar vein to the Taliban, brought with it a brutal and ruthless order to the areas it governs. It has, in effect, and in record time, established a government with ministries that serve the population and deliver services. It has worked with local communities to ensure that basic services continue, shops carry products, taxes are collected and law and order – however brutally administered − is maintained. It is very difficult to imagine an organization that could develop such governing capacity in a relatively short space of time, especially when the international community has spent decades trying to build institutional capacity in the region. Moreover, it has begun a state-building project – a project that has eluded both regional governments and the international community since 2003− in Iraq, Libya and Yemen.

It has managed to do so by drawing on the structures of the Baath party, among other things, and tapping into strongly felt local grievances, notably political exclusion, primarily in Iraq and Syria. In doing so, ISIS has presented itself as the only alternative to the existing order, which holds appeal to those permanently outside the political process. While the West abhors ISIS, it offers marginalized Iraqi Sunnis an alternative to ‘Shia-dominated’ Baghdad, dispossessed Syrians an alternative to Assad and his barrel bombs, and European discontents the prospect of living in the ‘caliphate’. In all, somewhat perversely, it offers both hope and certainty, which is in very short supply elsewhere in the region. And this is where the West should focus its attention.

The only way to undermine ISIS in Syria and Iraq is to make sure that those living under its control can see credible and durable alternatives within their reach. It is important to bear in mind that ISIS conquered its territory and although the population had little choice other than to yield, in time, it may well begin to resist. In other words, the challenge to ISIS needs to come from within – not its leadership, strategists, ideologues or foreign fighters, but from the population it governs. The ISIS leadership has been credited with understanding local community relations and successfully navigating complex tribal networks, often through brutal means, to win over its population.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/paris-attacks-governance-not-airstrikes-will-topple-isis-syria