The Irony of Ukraine
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The analysis appears sound, but the irony is richfor the description of Putins mistakes is a decent summary of not just the earlier Soviet experience in Afghanistan but also much of U.S. national security policy over the last several decades, including the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Washington has repeatedly launched military interventions with extravagantly unrealistic expectations, overestimated its own capabilities and underestimated its opponents, believed it would be loved rather than hated, and thought it could put its favorites into office and then get away easily. And time and again, after running up against the same harsh realities as Putin, it has tried to bull its way forward before ultimately deciding to reverse course and withdraw.
Yes, American motives were nobler. Yes, American methods were less brutal (most of the time). Yes, there were many other differences between the conflicts. But on a strategic level, the broad similarities are striking. This means there are several important lessons to be learned from recent American military historybut only if that history is looked at from the enemys perspective, not Washingtons. Because it was the enemies who won.
The United States is used to thinking of itself as the alpha military power, attacking and conquering and controlling the action. In the Ukraine war, however, its on the other side, trying to stymie and counterpunch and wear down the alpha until exhaustion sets in. Playing defense is easier and cheaper than playing offense, but it takes more time and requires a different mindset. In this context, the United States failure to conquer several countries recently is helpful. Washington can just switch playbooks and use the strategies and tactics that gave it the most trouble. Among other things, that means winning ugly: planting endless improvised explosive devices, neutralizing collaborators, and frustrating not just the invasion but any hopes of stable occupation.
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This problem, at least, has a simple solutionbegin war planning with a plausible vision of a stable postwar situation and reverse engineer a strategy to get there. Make the wars end your intellectual starting point, in other words, so theres no way you can avoid thinking about it or having it drive everything else. In 2003, the Bush administration considered postwar Iraq to be Phase IV of the conflict. Is anybody surprised its harried policymakers never got to the fourth item on their to-do list?
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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2022-03-29/irony-ukraine