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Arizona asks court to approve "Kafkaesque" treatment of due-process claim from man on death row
https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/11/arizona-asks-court-to-approve-kafkaesque-treatment-of-due-process-claim-from-man-on-death-row/ARGUMENT ANALYSIS
Arizona asks court to approve “Kafkaesque” treatment of due-process claim from man on death row
By Alexis Hoag-Fordjour
on Nov 2, 2022 at 6:42 pm
During Tuesday’s oral argument in Cruz v. Arizona, the justices considered whether a state procedural rule prevents John Cruz, who was sentenced to death, from obtaining relief on his federal due-process claim in state post-conviction. To answer this question, the court must determine if Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g) provides an adequate and independent state-law ground for refusing to recognize Cruz’s federal right. Rule 32.1(g) is a procedural mechanism that allows Arizona petitioners to challenge their conviction or sentence when there is a “significant change in the law” that would impact their case. The justices’ questions explored two main areas: state authority to limit post-conviction review; and Arizona’s determination of a “significant change in the law” for 32.1(g) purposes.
As background, a Pima County jury convicted Cruz of capital murder in 2005. During his sentencing hearing, Cruz requested to inform the jury that if they spared him the death penalty, he would be ineligible for parole. In doing so, he referenced a 1994 Supreme Court case, Simmons v. South Carolina, which held that jurors must receive such information to rebut an inference that the defendant posed a danger in the future. The court held that such information was part of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. However, in line with Arizona’s view of Simmons, Cruz’s trial judge refused his request. The jury returned a death sentence. Cruz unsuccessfully appealed his Simmons claim in state post-conviction proceedings. Then, in 2016, when the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Arizona, instructing Arizona courts to apply Simmons, Cruz renewed his appeal. This time, he pointed to Rule 32.1(g), explaining that Lynch constituted a significant change in the law.
Justice Clarence Thomas posed the first question, asking Cruz’s lawyer, Neal Katyal, whether there was even a federal issue for the court to decide given that Arizona was simply applying state procedural law. Although Katyal quickly addressed the issue, the question signaled Thomas’s inclination to rule against the petitioner. In a somewhat similar vein, Chief Justice John Roberts denied that Arizona was acting with any hostility in applying its procedural rule, and mused that Arizona was simply limiting post-conviction review, which was perfectly within the state’s purview. Justice Samuel Alito then interrupted Katyal’s response to the chief justice with a hypothetical. When Katyal pointed to a deficiency in Alito’s speculative scenario, the justice interjected: “I meant to make that part of my hypothetical too.” Rather than clarify the issue before the court, the opening questions, including inquiries from Justice Neil Gorsuch, communicated the justices’ unwillingness to engage with the relatively straightforward facts of the case: the appropriateness of Arizona relying on a state law to prevent Cruz from seeking reversal of a death sentence that violates federal law.
[...]
Comments from Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett seemed to indicate that they too may be receptive to Cruz’s arguments. Barrett described Kanefield’s efforts to downplay the significance of the change in the law as “kind of artificial” and “hair splitting.” Toward the end of argument, Kavanaugh noted that other states had declined to file friend-of-the-court briefs in support of Arizona’s position.
[...]
Arizona asks court to approve “Kafkaesque” treatment of due-process claim from man on death row
By Alexis Hoag-Fordjour
on Nov 2, 2022 at 6:42 pm
During Tuesday’s oral argument in Cruz v. Arizona, the justices considered whether a state procedural rule prevents John Cruz, who was sentenced to death, from obtaining relief on his federal due-process claim in state post-conviction. To answer this question, the court must determine if Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g) provides an adequate and independent state-law ground for refusing to recognize Cruz’s federal right. Rule 32.1(g) is a procedural mechanism that allows Arizona petitioners to challenge their conviction or sentence when there is a “significant change in the law” that would impact their case. The justices’ questions explored two main areas: state authority to limit post-conviction review; and Arizona’s determination of a “significant change in the law” for 32.1(g) purposes.
As background, a Pima County jury convicted Cruz of capital murder in 2005. During his sentencing hearing, Cruz requested to inform the jury that if they spared him the death penalty, he would be ineligible for parole. In doing so, he referenced a 1994 Supreme Court case, Simmons v. South Carolina, which held that jurors must receive such information to rebut an inference that the defendant posed a danger in the future. The court held that such information was part of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. However, in line with Arizona’s view of Simmons, Cruz’s trial judge refused his request. The jury returned a death sentence. Cruz unsuccessfully appealed his Simmons claim in state post-conviction proceedings. Then, in 2016, when the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Arizona, instructing Arizona courts to apply Simmons, Cruz renewed his appeal. This time, he pointed to Rule 32.1(g), explaining that Lynch constituted a significant change in the law.
Justice Clarence Thomas posed the first question, asking Cruz’s lawyer, Neal Katyal, whether there was even a federal issue for the court to decide given that Arizona was simply applying state procedural law. Although Katyal quickly addressed the issue, the question signaled Thomas’s inclination to rule against the petitioner. In a somewhat similar vein, Chief Justice John Roberts denied that Arizona was acting with any hostility in applying its procedural rule, and mused that Arizona was simply limiting post-conviction review, which was perfectly within the state’s purview. Justice Samuel Alito then interrupted Katyal’s response to the chief justice with a hypothetical. When Katyal pointed to a deficiency in Alito’s speculative scenario, the justice interjected: “I meant to make that part of my hypothetical too.” Rather than clarify the issue before the court, the opening questions, including inquiries from Justice Neil Gorsuch, communicated the justices’ unwillingness to engage with the relatively straightforward facts of the case: the appropriateness of Arizona relying on a state law to prevent Cruz from seeking reversal of a death sentence that violates federal law.
[...]
Comments from Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett seemed to indicate that they too may be receptive to Cruz’s arguments. Barrett described Kanefield’s efforts to downplay the significance of the change in the law as “kind of artificial” and “hair splitting.” Toward the end of argument, Kavanaugh noted that other states had declined to file friend-of-the-court briefs in support of Arizona’s position.
[...]
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