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How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? An Incredible Credible Deterrent!
A recent series of posts from Martin Hellman's blog
http://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2012/06/13/an-incredible-credible-deterrent/
An Incredible Credible Deterrent
Posted on June 13, 2012
Much is made of the need for our nuclear deterrent to be credible. Otherwise, it would be useless. An exchange on September 16, 1980, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has much to say about that quest:
Posted on June 13, 2012
Much is made of the need for our nuclear deterrent to be credible. Otherwise, it would be useless. An exchange on September 16, 1980, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has much to say about that quest:
Senator Glenn: I get lost in what is credible and not credible. This whole thing gets so incredible when you consider wiping out whole nations, it is difficult to establish credibility.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown: That is why we sound a little crazy when we talk about it.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown: That is why we sound a little crazy when we talk about it.
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 1
Posted on June 14, 2012
The logical inconsistency – and danger – of nuclear deterrence should be obvious, but it still forms the foundation of our national security strategy. Yet, once an international crisis has occurred where neither side can back down without losing face, for nuclear deterrence to work:
The problem is the same one faced by two adolescents playing “chicken.” They drive toward one other at high speed, and the loser is the first one who behaves rationally and swerves to avoid a collision.
Posted on June 14, 2012
The logical inconsistency – and danger – of nuclear deterrence should be obvious, but it still forms the foundation of our national security strategy. Yet, once an international crisis has occurred where neither side can back down without losing face, for nuclear deterrence to work:
- we must be irrational enough for our adversary’s threats not to deter us, yet
- our adversary must be rational enough that our threats will deter them.
The problem is the same one faced by two adolescents playing “chicken.” They drive toward one other at high speed, and the loser is the first one who behaves rationally and swerves to avoid a collision.
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 2
Posted on June 15, 2012
Deterrence’s demand for irrationality is spelled out clearly in a 1995 USSTRATCOM report, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence”:
While the report is correct in these statements, it overlooks what would happen if both sides in a nuclear standoff were to follow its recommendations. How safe is it to have such a strategy as the foundation of our national security?
Posted on June 15, 2012
Deterrence’s demand for irrationality is spelled out clearly in a 1995 USSTRATCOM report, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence”:
Because of the value that comes from the ambiguity of what the US may do to an adversary if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially “out of control” can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary’s decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the US may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries.
While the report is correct in these statements, it overlooks what would happen if both sides in a nuclear standoff were to follow its recommendations. How safe is it to have such a strategy as the foundation of our national security?
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 3
Posted on June 17, 2012
President Nixon believed that irrationality played an important role in nuclear deterrence: “If the adversary feels that you are unpredictable, even rash, he will be deterred from pressing you too far. The odds that he will fold will increase and the unpredictable president will win another hand.” [1] As with the first two parts in this series (see links below), this thinking overlooks what happens if both sides succumb to such thinking.
A friend of mine who worked on these issues in the State Department thinks I am crazy to worry about a Russian-American confrontation escalating to war because, in his words, “The Russians are too cautious. They know the horror of war in a way that we do not.” He may be right, but I hate to bet the lives of my children and grandchildren on the Russians being more rational than we – especially as a new generation comes to power there, for whom the devastation of World War II is but a distant memory.
Posted on June 17, 2012
President Nixon believed that irrationality played an important role in nuclear deterrence: “If the adversary feels that you are unpredictable, even rash, he will be deterred from pressing you too far. The odds that he will fold will increase and the unpredictable president will win another hand.” [1] As with the first two parts in this series (see links below), this thinking overlooks what happens if both sides succumb to such thinking.
A friend of mine who worked on these issues in the State Department thinks I am crazy to worry about a Russian-American confrontation escalating to war because, in his words, “The Russians are too cautious. They know the horror of war in a way that we do not.” He may be right, but I hate to bet the lives of my children and grandchildren on the Russians being more rational than we – especially as a new generation comes to power there, for whom the devastation of World War II is but a distant memory.