On This Day: 1,400+ soldiers attempt coup by assassinating series of Japanese gov't officials - Feb. 26, 1936
(edited from Wikipedia)
"
February 26 incident
The February 26 incident was an attempted coup d'état in the Empire of Japan on 26 February 1936. It was organized by a group of young Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) officers with the goal of purging the government and military leadership of their factional rivals and ideological opponents.
Although the rebels succeeded in assassinating several leading officials (including two former prime ministers) and in occupying the government center of Tokyo, they failed to assassinate Prime Minister Keisuke Okada or secure control of the Imperial Palace.
Their supporters in the army made attempts to capitalize on their actions, but divisions within the military, combined with Imperial anger at the coup, meant they were unable to achieve a change of government. Facing overwhelming opposition as the army moved against them, the rebels surrendered on 29 February.
Unlike earlier examples of political violence by young officers, the coup attempt had severe consequences. After a series of closed trials, nineteen of the uprising's leaders were executed for mutiny and another forty were imprisoned. The radical Kōdō-ha faction lost its influence within the army, while the military, now free from infighting, increased its control over the civilian government, which had been severely weakened by the assassination of key moderate and liberal-minded leaders.
[Factions within the army]
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had a long history of factionalism among its high-ranking officers. By the early 1930s, officers in the high command had become split into two main informal groups: the Kōdō-ha "Imperial Way" faction, and the Tōsei-ha "Control" faction.
The Kōdō-ha emphasized the importance of Japanese culture, spiritual purity over material quality, and the need to attack the Soviet Union (Hokushin-ron), while the Tōsei-ha officers supported central economic and military planning (total war theory), technological modernization, mechanization and expansion within China.
The Kōdō-ha was dominant from 1931 to 1934, occupying most significant staff positions.
The "young officers" [seek a purge]
A number of lesser-privileged [IJA] officers formed the young, highly politicized group often referred to as the "young officers".
The young officers believed that the problems facing the nation were the result of Japan straying from the kokutai (an amorphous term often translated as "national polity", it roughly signifies the relationship between the Emperor and the state).
To them, the "privileged classes" exploited the people, leading to widespread poverty in rural areas, and deceived the Emperor, usurping his power and weakening Japan. The solution, they believed, was a "Shōwa Restoration" modeled on the Meiji Restoration of 70 years earlier. By rising up and destroying the "evil advisers around the Throne", the officers would enable the Emperor to re-establish his authority. The Emperor would then purge those who exploited the people, restoring prosperity to the nation.
Almost all of the young officers' subordinates were from poor peasant family or working class, and believed that the young officers truly understood their predicaments and spirits.
The loose-knit young officers group varied in size, but is estimated to have had roughly 100 regular members, mostly officers in the Tokyo area.
Despite its relatively small size, the Kokutai Genri-ha faction was influential, due in no small part to the threat it posed. It had sympathizers among the general staff and the Imperial Family. The faction had also managed to secure irregular funding from zaibatsu leaders who hoped to shield themselves.
Planning and manifesto
The uprising was planned in a series of meetings held between 18 and 22 February. The plan decided upon was relatively simple. The officers would assassinate the most prominent enemies of the kokutai, secure control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, then submit their demands (the dismissal of certain officers and the appointment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki).
They had no longer-term goals, believing that those should be left to the Emperor.
The young officers believed they had at least tacit approval for their uprising from a number of important IJA officers after making a number of informal approaches.
The young officers prepared an explanation of their intentions and grievances in a document entitled "Manifesto of the Uprising".
Now, as we are faced with great emergencies both foreign and domestic, if we do not execute the disloyal and unrighteous who threaten the kokutai, if we do not cut away the villains who obstruct the Emperor's authority, who block the Restoration, the Imperial plan for our nation will come to nothing [...] To cut away the evil ministers and military factions near the Emperor and destroy their heart: that is our duty and we will complete it.
Seven [high-ranking government official] targets were chosen for assassination for "threatening the kokutai".
The Righteous Army
From 22 February on, [...] seven leaders managed to convince eighteen other officers to join the uprising with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were informed on the night of 25 February, hours before the attacks started.
The soldiers themselves, 70% of whom were less than a month out of basic training, were not told anything before the coup began, though many were (according to the officers) enthusiastic once the uprising began.
Including officers, civilians and men from other units, the total size of the Righteous Army was 1,558 men. An official count of 1,483 was given at the time.
The coup leaders adopted the name "Righteous Army" for this force and the password "Revere the Emperor, Destroy the Traitors". Allies were to display a three-sen postage stamp when approaching the army's lines.
[Attack]
The rebel troops, divided into six groups, assembled their troops and left their barracks between 03:30 and 04:00 [on Feb. 26]. The attacks on [leaders] Okada, Takahashi, Suzuki, Saito, the Ministry of War and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters occurred simultaneously at 05:00. The attack on Okada consisted of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment.
The troops surrounded the Prime Minister's Residence and forced its guards to open the gates. Upon entering the compound and attempting to find the prime minister. He was taken into hiding by his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzō Matsuo. Matsuo, who was said to have resembled Okada, was then discovered and killed by the troops. Okada escaped the next day, but this fact was kept a secret.
160 men seize[d] control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War itself and the General Staff Office. Once this had been accomplished, they read their manifesto aloud.
At approximately 10:00, sixty men and traveled from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a prominent liberal newspaper. Charging into the building, the officers forced the newspaper employees to evacuate while yelling that the attack was "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper".
1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard assembled 135 men and marched to Takahashi's personal residence. There he split his men in half and took one group to attack the residence while having the other stand guard outside. After the men smashed their way into the compound, confused servants led Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima to Takahashi's bedroom. There, Nakahashi shot the sleeping Takahashi with his pistol while Nakajima slashed him with his sword. Takahashi died without waking.
1st Lieutenant Naoshi Sakai led 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Saitō's private residence in Yotsuya. A group of the soldiers surrounded the policemen on guard, who surrendered. Five men, including Sakai, entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife Haruko on the second floor in their bedroom. They shot Saitō, who fell to the ground dead. His wife covered him with her body and told the soldiers, "Please kill me instead!" They pulled her off and continued to fire at Saitō.
Captain Teruzō Andō led 200 men of the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Suzuki's private residence. They surrounded and disarmed the police on guard, then a group entered the building. After Suzuki was discovered in his bedroom, he was shot twice. Andō then moved to deliver a coup de grace with his sword, when Suzuki's wife pleaded to be allowed to do it herself. Believing Suzuki to be mortally wounded, Andō agreed. He apologized to her, explaining that it was done for the sake of the nation.
As [soldiers] attempted to enter the front of the [Watanabe] residence, they were fired upon by military police stationed inside. The soldiers then forced their way in through the rear entrance, where they encountered Watanabe's wife standing outside their bedroom on the second floor. Shoving her aside, they found Watanabe using a futon for cover. Watanabe opened fire with his pistol, whereupon one of the soldiers fired a burst at him with a light machine gun. Takahashi then rushed forward and stabbed Watanabe with his sword. Watanabe's nine-year-old daughter, Kazuko, witnessed his death as she hid behind a table nearby.
Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters [seized]
Captain Shirō Nonaka took nearly a third of all the rebels' troops, 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to attack the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, located directly south of the Imperial Palace, with the goal of securing its communication equipment and preventing the dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. They met no resistance and soon secured the building.
Government response and suppression of the uprising
With Saitō dead and Suzuki gravely wounded, the Emperor's chief remaining advisors were Kōichi Kido, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper; Kurahei Yuasa, Minister of the Imperial Household; and Vice-Grand Chamberlain Tadataka Hirohata. These officials met after learning of the attacks from Suzuki's secretary. They took a hard line, advising the Emperor that he should demand that efforts be concentrated on suppressing the uprising and that he must not accept the resignation of the current government, as doing so would "effectively be granting victory to the rebel army". It was after hearing this advice that Hirohito hardened his position.
Kawashima met with the Emperor at 09:30 after his meeting with the rebel officers at the Ministry of War. He read the officers' manifesto and demands aloud and then recommended the Emperor form a new cabinet to "clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense." The Emperor refused and demanded that Kawashima suppress the uprising. When the remaining members of Okada's government, unaware that he was alive, attempted to resign that afternoon, Hirohito told them he would not allow it until the uprising had been suppressed.
Despite the Emperor's order to Kawashima that the uprising be suppressed, Araki proposed that a message be drafted to the rebels. This message, which came to be known as the "Minister of War's Proclamation", has become a point of controversy (it was issued in Kawashima's name because of the unofficial nature of the SMC meeting). Araki and other participants argued later that it had been intended to persuade the officers to surrender. Others interpreted it as an endorsement of the uprising.
Martial Law
Two other developments deepened the rebel officers' impression that their uprising had succeeded. Kashii, acting as commander of the Tokyo garrison, ordered a state of "wartime emergency". This had the effect of formally placing the rebel troops within the chain of command. The officers were encouraged by the act and convinced that they were on the verge of success. The second positive development was the declaration of martial law.
Despite [these] developments, the position of the Righteous Army was less secure than it seemed. Most significantly the Emperor and his court officials had taken a hard line towards the uprising. In addition, the rebels also faced important opposition within the military as well.
Reinforcements [were called in] from outside Tokyo.
By the afternoon of 27 February forty warships were stationed in Tokyo Bay and the navy's land forces had been dispatched to defend naval installations in the city.
Negotiations and stalemate
[Various negotiations ensue].
The Emperor had, by the end of 27 February, become increasingly impatient with the failure of the Army to suppress the uprising as he had ordered on the previous day. The Navy's quick response satisfied him but the Army's hesitation was inexplicable to the Emperor. He summoned Honjō throughout the day, demanding to know if the rebels had been suppressed. When Honjō spoke in defense of the officers' motives, the Emperor angrily replied "killing my ministers is tantamount to strangling me with cotton wool" and added that the rebels deserved no leniency. At one point, Hirohito became so impatient he threatened to assume personal command of the Imperial Guard and order them to attack the rebels himself.
The General Staff and Martial Law Headquarters decided to release the imperial command at 05:00 on the 28th. At 08:00 the rebel officers' nominal superior, Major Kofuji, was told to inform the officers of the imperial command and order them to return to their units.
When 10:00 passed without any word of movement by the rebel officers, they approved the use of force. However, when Hori and Kofuji came to see Kashii at 10:40, the three agreed that it was too early to enact the imperial command. It has also been suggested that a lack of preparedness on the part of government forces was another factor. Either way, the action was delayed.
Yamashita visited the Ministry of War at 12:00 and told the rebel officers that the issuance of the imperial command was merely a matter of time and that they should "take responsibility". Hori joined the group at 12:30 and confirmed Yamashita's words. Shortly after, Kurihara, speaking for the group, asked that an Imperial messenger be sent. He said that the officers would commit suicide and the NCOs would take the soldiers back to their barracks.
[Request for Imperial suicide order denied]
Yamashita, joined by Kawashima, immediately went to the Imperial Palace, where he informed Honjō of the officers' request for the Imperial Command for their suicide, perceived to be the only honourable way out for them. Honjō, thinking this was a good solution for all parties concerned, asked his majesty that the request be granted, but to his surprise, the Emperor flatly refused. His fury was such that he blurted "If they want to die, do as they wish. Do it on their own. An Imperial Command is out of question".
[Final stages]
Soon after, at 16:00, Martial Law Headquarters announced that force would be used and the rebel troops were removed from Kofuji's command at 18:00. At 23:00 orders went out to begin preparations at 05:00 on 29 February for a general attack.
By the morning of 29 February, the Righteous Army, consisting of less than 1,500, was surrounded by more than 20,000 loyal government troops and 22 tanks. The general attack was planned for 09:00. By 05:30 all civilians in the surrounding areas had been evacuated.
Realizing the hopelessness, by noon all the officers except Andō had released their soldiers. Finally, at 13:00, Andō ordered his men to leave and unsuccessfully attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head. The rest assembled at the Ministry of War. There they met Yamashita and Ishiwara, who suggested that they commit suicide. They allowed the men to keep their sidearms and left. Colonel Nobutoki Ide, a member of the General Staff and Nonaka's former commander, came to the building and called for Nonaka to come outside. Shortly afterwards, Nonaka shot himself. Isobe claimed that Nonaka was forced to commit suicide in an attempt to pressure the rest of the officers to do the same. The final rebel officer to commit suicide was Kōno, still hospitalized from the failed attack on Makino, who stabbed himself with a knife a week later. The remaining officers were arrested by military police at 18:00. They were all stripped of their rank.
[Trials]
The only significant military figure to be tried for involvement in the uprising was Mazaki, charged with collaborating with the rebel officers. Although his own testimony showed him to be guilty of the charge, he was found not guilty on 25 September 1937. This has been attributed to the influence of Fumimaro Konoe, who had become prime minister in June.
Fifteen of the officers were executed by firing squad on 15 July at a military prison in Shibuya. The execution of Muranaka and Isobe was delayed so that they could testify at Kita and Nishida's trial. Muranaka, Isobe, Kita and Nishida were executed by firing squad at the same location on 14 August 1937.
Change of government
Despite the failure of the coup, the February 26 Incident had the effect of significantly increasing the military's influence over the civilian government.
"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_26_incident
---------------------------------------------------------
On This Day: Lithuanian largest mass suicide in history to avoid death/slavery by Christian crusaders - Feb. 25, 1336
https://www.democraticunderground.com/1016373206
On This Day: "Single most important" decision in Supreme Court history issued - Feb. 24, 1803
https://www.democraticunderground.com/1016373172
On This Day: First major slave revolt in South America starts; grows to 3,000 - Feb. 23, 1763
https://www.democraticunderground.com/1016373130
On This Day: Great White Fleet returns home from world-wide trip to demonstrate U.S. power - Feb. 22, 1909
https://www.democraticunderground.com/1016373046
On This Day: Russians invade ill-prepared Sweden to take Finland - Feb. 21, 1808
https://www.democraticunderground.com/1016373022
= new reply since forum marked as read
