The Unbearable Lightness of Being CIA General Counsel ( Scott Horton )
In the months following 9/11, it seems Washington just couldnt say no to the CIA. The agencys budget shot through the ceiling. Suddenly the CIA not only commanded private armies, it even had a state-of-the-art air force! Between 2006-2007, the CIA drove a proxy war, mobilizing Ethiopias army to invade Somalia. It was perhaps the most audacious war the CIA ever triggered. But it hardly raised a stir in Washington, where reinvigorated secrecy ensured that hardly anyone knew about itand where to this day few analysts even understand what the CIAs little war, in which thousands of innocent civilians perished, was about. The CIA also bore core responsibility for a nine-year-long drone war in Pakistan: 300 strikes with more than 3,000 fatalities, almost all of this in an area that U.S. military strategists describe as the core of the battlefield in the current war. It also ran, jointly with the military, drone campaigns in Yemen and Somalia. None of this is what the authors of the National Security Act had in mind with the words covert operation. In fact, virtually the only people in the world from whom these activities were kept secret were American voters.
Throughout this period, the dapper and good-natured John Rizzo was the CIAs senior career lawyer. One would hope to find in his memoir a deep account of the policy battles that led to the CIAs transformation, and particularly the legal issues. There is no other time in American history when the public has been riveted by legal policy issues as luridly appealing as those that emerged in 2004-2007. Gruesome accounts of homicide and torture in secret prisons run by the American government rocked the world. The scandal opened with now-iconic photographs from Abu Ghraib, and spread as stories emerged from Bagram, Camp Nama, the CIAs Salt Pit prison north of Kabul, its secret prison near Rabat, Morocco, and Guantánamo. President Bush insisted that we do not torture. But an avalanche of secret U.S. legal documents quickly showed otherwise.
John Rizzo was at the center of this storm.
Company Man offers an interesting collection of vignettes from a 35-year career in the agency, but its essence is a rationalization of the CIAs decision to operate black sites and use torture. Rizzo chronicles the steps that led to these decisions and then to back away from them. We discover, for instance, as John Kiriakou first revealed, that the key decisions about the use of waterboarding, mock burial, the cold cell, longtime-standing, sleep deprivation and similar techniques, were taken by the CIA both to the Justice Departments Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and to the White House. They were ultimately reviewed and approved by the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee (consisting of key cabinet officers, the national security advisor, the president and vice president). Only two members of the NSC openly voiced reservations: Condoleezza Rice didnt like enforced nudity. Colin Powell objected to sleep deprivation. (Kiriakou, a former CIA case officer and analyst, is currently serving a prison term for what he revealed.)
Donald Rumsfeld, who once stormed out of a party when asked about war crimes, didnt want to be in these meetings. John Ashcroft was mostly silent. But Dick Cheney stood tall for torture and was a forceful dissenter from President Bushs late 2006 decision to eliminate it. One curiosity: in his recent biography, Bush proudly took responsibility for the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques, but Rizzo doesnt recall that Bush was ever actually briefed on them.
remainder: http://washingtonspectator.org/index.php/Book-Review/the-unbearable-lightness-of-being-cia-general-counsel.html#.UzVyhFf535M