A Crossroads for Socialism: Cuba in Transition (Introduction)

[Judi Lynn]

A Crossroads for Socialism: Cuba in Transition (Introduction)
Nicholas Partyka I Geopolitics I Analysis I April 24th, 2014

The following is Part One of a multi-part project entitled, "A Crossroads for Socialism: Cuba in Transition." This series of analyses, observations, and dispatches of Cuba focuses on the country's unprecedented, post-Fidel transition. With a heavy reliance on macroeconomic, geopolitical, and foreign policy analysis, Hampton contributor Nicholas Partyka seeks to pinpoint the nuanced economic, political, and social changes that are occurring on the island nation, and how these changes are impacting everyday Cubans.

Given the coverage (or maybe, more correctly, the lack thereof) of Cuba in the US media today one might be forgiven for offering the following as mildly shocking news to some readers; the Cuban revolution has not been defeated, and it is not over. Cuba garners little attention in the US media, and has for some time been something of an off-the-radar topic in US foreign policy discussion; save perhaps a few perfunctory lines in a party platform every four years. The times when Cuba does grab attention are either in the role of foil for US espionage, aka "development" efforts (see the recent ZunZuneo case), or as "a rouge state run by a power-mad tyrant" (see the case of the North Korean-owned and bound ship loaded with Cuban ex-Soviet weaponry and sugar). In light of this context, it seems like Cuba today is mainly forgotten by the American public, hostage to a few extremists in congress, and an easy target for politicians scoring political points. The public might have this misconception that the Cuban revolution has failed, and that its transformative project has run its course; and most would likely believe that it has little to show for itself after fifty plus years. However, let me assure you at the outset: The Cuban revolution has neither been defeated, nor is its work over. The series of analyses and dispatches in this forthcoming project will elaborate on what I mean by this.

Along these lines, let me give an important disclaimer before getting into anything substantive. This will not be a travel blog where I present an image of the "stereotypical Cuba" - of the Cuba you think you know, and are comfortable with. I am going to pass over, save these few lines, in silence the tropical splendor of Cuba. I'm not going to spend time talking about how Havana is full of old American cars from the 1950s. First of all, I don't care at all about cars, and as I'm not a baby boomer, I don't get nostalgic about them. Second, there is a very good reason why these cars are still on the road - the Cubans have had little choice but to keep them running. This series will not be about beaches, restaurants, and cool little places to hear and dance to lively Cuban music.

I should add to my disclaimer that I do not know everything about Cuba. I don't even speak Spanish terribly well. What I present here are my impressions, analysis and insight based on my experiences in Cuba and with the Cuban people, as well as my studies of its history, economy, and society. I would not be comfortable calling or presenting myself as a Cuba expert. Nonetheless, the serious attention I've given to the study of Cuba's political and economic history - as well as my personal experiences from within the country - provides a good enough reason to be allowed serious consideration.

At this point, I should say something about who I am so that the reader can have some context for the views and analysis I give, and also to give the reader some insight into the basis of the claims and arguments I will advance. I am a PhD candidate in the Philosophy Department at University at Albany SUNY. I am finishing up my dissertation on the political consequences of capitalist work organization. My specialty in philosophy is political-economy. I have studied (for more than twelve years at the graduate and undergraduate level) economic and political institutions and their interactions, both contemporarily as well as historically, in the US and many other countries. Related to this work, but not officially, I have been a life-long student and avid reader of history, with special interest in geo-politics and US foreign policy.

More:
http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/cuba-project-introduction.html#.U3lx02cU_mI

[Judi Lynn]

1. The US Blockade of Cuba: Its Effects and Global Consequences

The US Blockade of Cuba: Its Effects and Global Consequences
Nicholas Partyka I Geopolitics I Analysis I May 2nd, 2014

The following is Part Two of a multi-part project entitled, "A Crossroads for Socialism: Cuba in Transition". This series of analyses, observations, and dispatches of Cuba focuses on the country's unprecedented, post-Fidel transition. With a heavy reliance on macroeconomic, geopolitical, and foreign policy analysis, Hampton contributor Nicholas Partyka seeks to pinpoint the nuanced economic, political, and social changes that are occurring on the island nation, and how these changes are impacting everyday Cubans.

It is not possible to discuss almost any aspect of life in Cuba without talking about the US blockade of the island. That the US has an 'embargo' against the island is one of the few things that Americans might know about Cuba. This policy of economic warfare against our hemispheric neighbor has been in place for more than five decades now. In this dispatch, I want to focus on the US blockade policy. We will look briefly at why it exists, its aims, its status under international law, and what its main effects are. Though many Americans may know that there is an "embargo" (though "blockade" is more accurate), few likely know how it works and what its costs are. Attempting to remedy this situation will be the point of this part of the series.

On New Year's Eve 1958, Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba. The next day, the revolutionary government took control of the country. For the better part of a year, the US foreign policy establishment did not know what to make of Fidel Castro and his revolution. Relations remained cordial until Fidel announced the implementation of a set of Agrarian Reform laws. These laws aimed to put land in the hands of poor farmers who had been largely excluded from land ownership under the old regime. Many of the lands nationalized under Fidel's measures belonged to US citizens or companies; e.g. King Ranch. Other nations also had property nationalized in Cuba in the wake of the revolution, but only the US refused compensation, which the Cubans offered.

In a somewhat ironic twist, the Cubans offered compensation for nationalized property on the basis of the property's value as determined by the most recent pre-revolutionary Cuban tax assessments. Now, this would only be a problem for US owners of Cuban property to be nationalized if those owners felt that there was too large a discrepancy between the value of the compensation offered and the market value of that property. This kind of situation would be likely to come about if US owners had massively underreported the value of their Cuban property to Cuban tax officials (perhaps with official blessing of the regime at the time). The response of the US to these compensation matters also has nothing to do with the fact that the then-sitting CIA Director, Allen Dulles, sat on the Board of Directors for at least one large US firm to have property nationalized in Cuba, namely the infamous United Fruit Company.

Before the revolution, underreporting taxable value saved money in taxes and thus put more of it back in the owner's pocket. After the revolution however, this meant that those owners would lose out in a compensation package offered by the new Cuban government as the value of the compensation offered would be substantially less than what the property would be worth on the market. US owners of Cuban property wanted to both receive the real value of their property, but also not thereby tacitly admit what Castro and the Cuban revolution had accused them of, namely taking advantage of Cuba and Cubans for their own private gain. This is a classic example of one not being able to have one's cake and eat it too. The refusal of the US to acknowledge this had lead to the lion's share of the trials and tribulations that have arisen as the US and Cuba attempt to normalize relations.

More:
http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/cuba-project-part-two.html#.U3lxZmcU9Ms

[flamingdem]

2. Bookmarking

to read w/ my good glasses!

[hack89]

3. Things will improve once the Castros are out of the picture

Their deaths will open both sides to change. I bet within 10 years Cuba will be a vibrant multiparty democracy. With such a young population change will be sudden as the old guard gets swept aside.