The Real Reason China Won't Let Russia Lose - General David Petraeus - The Global Gambit - Pyotr Kurzin

[TexasTowelie]

China’s posture in today’s conflicts isn’t about loyalty or alignment — it’s about leverage.

Its relationship with Russia remains deeply transactional. Beijing does not see Moscow as an equal, and it never has. But it also does not want Russia to lose. Not because of shared values, but because a prolonged war serves Chinese interests: tying down Western attention, draining US and European resources, and offering a live laboratory for modern warfare.

China has become the central enabler of Russia’s war machine. Early improvisation — stripping household appliances for chips — has given way to systematic supply. Components, magnets, electronics, and dual-use technologies now flow steadily, sustaining Russian production capacity. This support is not ideological. It is calculated.

The irony is that Beijing was initially irritated by the invasion. Ukraine was a major economic partner, a critical grain exporter, and part of China’s broader commercial strategy. The war disrupted that. But once the conflict settled into attrition, the strategic logic shifted. A long war became useful.

At the same time, China is watching closely — and learning. Not just from Russia’s failures, but from American capabilities. US operations abroad, including high-risk special forces actions, demonstrate levels of integration, execution, and resilience that no other military currently matches. These are not clean, effortless successes. They are complex, contested, and dangerous — and precisely for that reason, instructive.

Beijing is also confronting its own internal weaknesses. Rapid shipbuilding and advances in autonomous systems coexist with persistent leadership instability. Regular purges of senior officers raise a basic question: how much confidence can a system have in its own command structure when it keeps removing it?

The broader takeaway is that this is not a world neatly divided into spheres of responsibility. The United States remains globally active, despite repeated claims of retreat or isolationism. Campaign rhetoric has not translated into strategic withdrawal.

What is emerging instead is a far more fluid environment — one where major powers are probing, learning, adapting, and exploiting conflict wherever it appears. China is not backing Russia out of solidarity. It is extracting value from chaos, studying its rivals, and preparing for a future where endurance, adaptation, and operational competence matter more than slogans or alignment.