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Foreign Affairs
Related: About this forumWhy Tehran's Two-Tiered Internet Is So Dangerous
https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/24/tehran-internet-tiered-connectivity-shutdown/Authoritarian regimes elsewhere are taking note.
Why Tehrans Two-Tiered Internet Is So Dangerous
[2026.02.27] Iran is slowly emerging from the most severe communications blackout in its history and one of the longest in the world. Triggered as part of Januarys government crackdown against citizen protests nationwide, the regime implemented an internet shutdown that transcends the standard definition of internet censorship. This was not merely blocking social media or foreign websites; it was a total communications shutdown.
Unlike previous Iranian internet shutdowns where Irans domestic intranet -- the National Information Network (NIN) -- remained functional to keep the banking and administrative sectors running, the 2026 blackout disrupted local infrastructure as well. Mobile networks, text messaging services, and landlines were disabled -- even Starlink was blocked. And when a few domestic services became available, the state surgically removed social features, such as comment sections on news sites and chat boxes in online marketplaces. The objective seems clear. The Iranian government aimed to atomize the population, preventing not just the flow of information out of the country but the coordination of any activity within it.
This escalation marks a strategic shift from the shutdown observed during the 12-Day War with Israel in mid-2025. Then, the government primarily blocked particular types of traffic while leaving the underlying internet remaining available. The regimes actions this year entailed a more brute-force approach to internet censorship, where both the physical and logical layers of connectivity were dismantled.
The ability to disconnect a population is a feature of modern authoritarian network design. When a government treats connectivity as a faucet it can turn off at will, it asserts that the right to speak, assemble, and access information is revocable. The human right to the internet is not just about bandwidth; it is about the right to exist within the modern public square. Irans actions deny its citizens this existence, reducing them to subjects who can be silenced -- and authoritarian governments elsewhere are taking note.
The current blackout is not an isolated panic reaction but a stress test for a long-term strategy, say advocacy groups -- a two-tiered or class-based internet known as Internet-e-Tabaqati. Irans Supreme Council of Cyberspace, the countrys highest internet policy body, has been laying the legal and technical groundwork for this since 2009.
In July 2025, the council passed a regulation formally institutionalizing a two-tiered hierarchy. Under this system, access to the global internet is no longer a default for citizens, but instead a privilege granted based on loyalty and professional necessity. The implementation includes such things as white SIM cards: special mobile lines issued to government officials, security forces, and approved journalists that bypass the states filtering apparatus entirely.
Unlike previous Iranian internet shutdowns where Irans domestic intranet -- the National Information Network (NIN) -- remained functional to keep the banking and administrative sectors running, the 2026 blackout disrupted local infrastructure as well. Mobile networks, text messaging services, and landlines were disabled -- even Starlink was blocked. And when a few domestic services became available, the state surgically removed social features, such as comment sections on news sites and chat boxes in online marketplaces. The objective seems clear. The Iranian government aimed to atomize the population, preventing not just the flow of information out of the country but the coordination of any activity within it.
This escalation marks a strategic shift from the shutdown observed during the 12-Day War with Israel in mid-2025. Then, the government primarily blocked particular types of traffic while leaving the underlying internet remaining available. The regimes actions this year entailed a more brute-force approach to internet censorship, where both the physical and logical layers of connectivity were dismantled.
The ability to disconnect a population is a feature of modern authoritarian network design. When a government treats connectivity as a faucet it can turn off at will, it asserts that the right to speak, assemble, and access information is revocable. The human right to the internet is not just about bandwidth; it is about the right to exist within the modern public square. Irans actions deny its citizens this existence, reducing them to subjects who can be silenced -- and authoritarian governments elsewhere are taking note.
The current blackout is not an isolated panic reaction but a stress test for a long-term strategy, say advocacy groups -- a two-tiered or class-based internet known as Internet-e-Tabaqati. Irans Supreme Council of Cyberspace, the countrys highest internet policy body, has been laying the legal and technical groundwork for this since 2009.
In July 2025, the council passed a regulation formally institutionalizing a two-tiered hierarchy. Under this system, access to the global internet is no longer a default for citizens, but instead a privilege granted based on loyalty and professional necessity. The implementation includes such things as white SIM cards: special mobile lines issued to government officials, security forces, and approved journalists that bypass the states filtering apparatus entirely.
TL;DR of the rest. Basically, access to information is granted by loyalty. It also breaks any "swarm" dynamics of the general population that remains headless. It differs from China's great "Firewall" in that China has built internal equivalents, this builds on top of existing protocols as a proxy to grant/deny based on loyalty.
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Why Tehran's Two-Tiered Internet Is So Dangerous (Original Post)
Lithos
16 hrs ago
OP
We'd be delusional if we didn't think that this is being contemplated in the US.
erronis
16 hrs ago
#1
erronis
(23,662 posts)1. We'd be delusional if we didn't think that this is being contemplated in the US.