Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy

[rug]

This is a shortened version of an essay originally appearing in New Eastern Europe Issue 3(VIII)/2013 “Why Culture Matters”. For the full article please see the print edition here.

2013-08-04
Alicja Curanović

Religious diplomacy allows a state to use certain aspects of religion and religious symbols in international affairs. The instrumentalisation of religion for political aims has a long and rich tradition in Russia, which is evidenced in Russia’s foreign policy today.

In April 2012 a scandal broke out surrounding a photo of the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church – Patriarch Kirill – wearing a gold Swiss Breguet watch worth 30,000 dollars. The Church had altered the photograph using Photoshop in an attempt to hide this luxurious accessory, until some sharp-eyed bloggers were quick to point out the reflection on the table, sparking a public debate about the role of the Church and its influence in the public sphere.

Contrary to feelings which may arise as a result of news collected by the Russian media, the significance of the Patriarchate of Moscow in the Russian public sphere should not be reduced to the luxuries of its leader, nor this 30,000-dollar watch. Nor should it be reduced to the Pussy Riot issue or even the declaration of commitment to the Orthodox Church by key Russian politicians, including Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev.

Let’s be partners

The growing activity of the Orthodox Church is a part of a wider phenomenon – beginning with the mid-1990s rapprochement between the state and selected religious institutions in Russia, and the majority of the former Soviet republics. Gradually, cooperation mechanisms (called social partnership) were created in the public sphere, primarily in education and welfare. This social partnership was meant to give a stronger role to Russia’s “traditional” religions – those religious institutions granted a privileged status by the authorities in Russia: the Orthodox Church (represented by the Russian Orthodox Church – ROC), Islam, Buddhism (only the Gelug school) and Judaism. The intensity of cooperation of the Kremlin with a given “traditional” religion depends on the number of its followers. Therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church (41 per cent of Russians) holds the most powerful position; while Muslim institutions, the muftiates (6.5 per cent), Buddhists living mostly in Buryatia and Kalmykia (0.5 per cent), and Jewish organisations play a much smaller role.

http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/897

[dimbear]

1. It's quite a nice watch, and unless I'm being toyed with, aptly named:

http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=&imgrefurl=http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article3375611.ece&h=520&w=780&sz=78&tbnid=drHOih3gieQtPM:&tbnh=86&tbnw=129&zoom=1&usg=__-_-AfG-Vy0Gftt9ZSWvC3GB1li0=&docid=trkyMpBeAyEW9M&sa=X&ei=dPH-UabbDoKo9gTpjIGgBQ&ved=0CDsQ9QEwBA&dur=12086

That model is called "Le reveil du Tsar" or the Czar's wake-up call.

I don't make this stuff up. Somebody else may have done.

[xfundy]

2. What a shock. Religious "leaders"

living in luxury.

Buy me a plane, God'll give you a car. Give me money, Baby Jeebus will give you money. Come listen to my BS, get HEEEEEEaled of whatever ails you, especially if it's money.

Jesus saves, but he always needs MONEY.

The scam is as old as time itself. Especially among Catholics and every other christer denomination.

GAWD needs money, m'friends! He's a-cryin' for it!

Just more hogwash. Time to throw the hog out with the holy water.