Army kills controversial social science program

[Judi Lynn]

Army kills controversial social science program

Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY 9:21 p.m. EDT June 29, 2015

A program that put social scientists on battlefields to help troops avoid unnecessary bloodshed and improve civilians' lives, an Army spokesman said Monday. The initiative, known as the Human Terrain System, had been plagued by fraud and racial and sexual harassment, a USA TODAY investigation found.

HTS, which spent at least $726 million from 2007 to 2014 in Iraq and Afghanistan, was killed last fall, Gregory Mueller, an Army spokesman, said in an email. Commanders in Afghanistan, where the U.S. combat mission ended last year, no longer had a need for the advice of civilian anthropologists. "The HTS program ended on September 30, 2014, as there was no longer a requirement for HTS teams in theater," Mueller said in a statement.

Several months earlier, Army Secretary John McHugh had praised the program, saying the information the teams provided was "actionable and useful for decision-making."

Social scientists criticized the program from the outset. A key concern for them was the militarization of their field and the potential that their work would be used to target insurgents, a violation of their ethical code not to hurt those they study.

More:
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/29/human-terrain-system-afghanistan/29476409/

[Judi Lynn]

1. The Rise and Fall of the Human Terrain System

June 29, 2015
The Rise and Fall of the Human Terrain System

by Roberto J. González


The most expensive social science program in history–the US Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS)–has quietly come to an end. During its eight years of existence, the controversial program cost tax payers more than $725 million. The Pentagon distributed much of the funding to two large defense firms that became the HTS’s principal contractors: BAE Systems and CGI Federal.

HTS supporters frequently claimed that the program would increase cultural understanding between US forces and Iraqis and Afghans–and therefore reduce American and civilian casualties. The program’s leaders insisted that embedded social scientists were delivering sociocultural knowledge to commanders, but the reality was more complex. HTS personnel conducted a range of activities including data collection, intelligence gathering, and psychological operations. In at least one case, an HTS employee supported interrogations in Afghanistan (Weinberger 2011).

The program also served a more insidious function: It became a propaganda tool for convincing the American public–especially those with liberal tendencies–that the US-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan were benevolent missions in which smart, fresh-faced young college graduates were playing a role. It appeared to demonstrate how US forces were engaged in a kinder, gentler form of occupation. Department of Defense photos portrayed HTS personnel sitting on rugs while drinking tea with Afghan elders, or distributing sweets to euphoric Iraqi children. Here was a war that Americans could feel good about fighting.

When HTS was first announced in late 2006, I followed its development with concern. Along with many other anthropologists, I opposed the program because of the potential harm it might bring to Iraqi and Afghan civilians–and to future generations of social scientists who might be accused of being spies when conducting research abroad.

More:
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/06/29/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-human-terrain-system/

[AuntPatsy]

2. Bookmarking, kicking