George W Bush's Lie-bury

[Octafish]

13. Four shore.

This person wrote the condensed version:

EXCERPT...

(August 20, 2001 or after): Radical Fundamentalist Unit Delays Advising FAA of Moussaoui Case

At a meeting attended by Mike Maltbie of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU), RFU chief Dave Frasca, FBI agent Rita Flack, and an FAA representative who is familiar with the Moussaoui case, a decision is made not to advise the FAA about the Moussaoui investigation at this point because Moussaoui and Al-Attas are presumably in custody. (Al-Attas is bailed out of custody on August 20) (US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 134, 149-150 pdf file; US Department of Justice, 3/1/2006 pdf file) Al-Attas is suspected of involvement in terrorism at this point and investigators believe he and Moussaoui may be involved in a plot against the US that involves the hijacking of an airplane (see August 17, 2001 and August 24, 2001). The FBI will eventually warn the FAA, but it will fail to mention that its Minneapolis office believes Moussaoui intends to hijack an airliner (see September 4, 2001).

SNIP...

September 4, 2001: FBI Dispatches Vague Message to US Intelligence Community About Moussaoui Investigation

FBI headquarters dispatches a memo to the entire US intelligence community summarizing what has been learned about Zacarias Moussaoui. The memo, written by Mike Maltbie, an agent in the FBI's Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU), reports that the FBI has become suspicious of Moussaoui because he took flight simulation training for a 747 jet, a course normally taken by airline pilots. Moussaoui, who has no flying experience, paid cash for the training, the memo also notes. It also says that Moussaoui has radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs and has been linked to Chechen militants. However, the memo does not include a threat assessment or indicate that some FBI investigators believe Moussaoui is part of a yet unknown plot to hijack an airplane and use it in a terrorist attack. As a later congressional inquiry will report, the memo fails to "recommend that the addressees take any action or look for any additional indicators of a terrorist attack, nor (does) it provide any analysis of a possible hijacking threat or provide any specific warnings." (US Congress, 9/24/2002; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 175-6 pdf file) Several days earlier, Maltbie blocked the release of a memo from the FBI's Minneapolis field office that was addressed to the FAA and did contain a threat assessment (see August 29-September 4, 2001). When the FAA receives the FBI memo, it decides not to issue a security alert to the nation's airports in response. An FAA representative later explains to the New York Post, &quot Moussaoui) was in jail and there was no evidence he was connected to other people." (New York Post, 5/21/2002) The FBI memo contrasts sharply with an internal CIA warning sent out on August 24. That memo, which was based on less information, warned that Moussaoui might be "involved in a larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe to the US" (see August 24, 2001). (US Congress, 9/18/2002) It turns out that prior to this time, al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam had started cooperating with investigators. He had trained with Moussaoui in Afghanistan and will willingly share this information after 9/11. The FBI dispatch, with its notable lack of urgency and details, fails to prompt the agents in Seattle holding Ressam to question him about Moussaoui. Had the connection between these two men been learned before 9/11, presumably the search warrant for Moussaoui would have been approved and the 9/11 plot might have unraveled (see Late August-Early September 2001). (Sunday Times (London), 2/3/2002)

CONTINUED...

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