The presumption that blanket data mining is effective against terrorism.

[MichaelMcGuire]

Director of the Foundation for Information Policy Research (C Bowden) describes how blanket data retention is unlikely to be effective. I know hes talking with the (RIP) Act 2000 in mind.

I wonder how far removed it is from other such blanket data retention programs?


"surveillance via ISP and telephone traffic data can easily be evaded by using pre-paid (or stolen) mobile phones and web-based e-mail from public terminals to avoid identification. Organized criminals already routinely use the former, and reports of the modus operandi of the 9/11 terrorists indicate they used the latter. Web-based e-mail services can be provided via any website and will leave no trace with the ISP. They can be set-up on any computer with an always-on connection (domestic broadband is ideal), and there are thousands of examples large and small."

Even with the use of:

"compel logging and retention extends beyond ISPs and telephone companies"

However even with:

"such drastic measures would not eliminate possibilities for undetectable communication. The stealthy techniques of steganography (information hiding) allow messages to be camouflaged in sound, pictures, or other routine content in ways analogous to hiding a pebble on a shingle beach."

Brings up the question if these types of blanket data retention is next to useless against terrorism what is it for?

http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=dltr

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