Fine words, so just curious. My understanding is that she hasn't. I do understand that as a representative of the present administration she may not be in a position to do that in a speech to an international organization in that capacity.
In my usual "it made me think of this" way
...
In Canada, the constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms governs the actions of the federal and provincial governments (legislation, policies), and federal and provincial human rights legislation governs the private sector (housing, employment, stores and restaurants, etc.). The usual grounds are covered: race, religion, sex, ethnic group, national origin, marital status, and also disability status, and Quebec throws a few more in.
The constitutional Charter had already been interpreted as prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation although it is not an "enumerated" ground, because the list of prohibited grounds in the constitution is not framed as exhaustive.
Alberta's provincial human rights legislation did not prohibit private-sector discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. In 1998, Delwin Vriend and a group of gay and lesbian rights advocacy organizations challenged this omission. They won in the Supreme Court of Canada.
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1998/1998canlii816/1998canlii816.html
6 majority judges:
... Far from being rationally connected to the objective of the impugned provisions, the exclusion of sexual orientation from the Act is antithetical to that goal. With respect to minimal impairment, the Alberta government has failed to demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis for excluding sexual orientation from the IRPA. Gay men and lesbians do not have any, much less equal, protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under the IRPA. The exclusion constitutes total, not minimal, impairment of the Charter guarantee of equality. Finally, since the Alberta government has failed to demonstrate any salutary effect of the exclusion in promoting and protecting human rights, there is no proportionality between the attainment of the legislative goal and the infringement of the appellants equality rights.
1 concurring judge
... Section 15(1) is first and foremost an equality provision. Its primary mission is the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration. A s. 15(1) analysis should focus on uncovering and understanding the negative impacts of a legislative distinction (including, as in this case, a legislative omission) on the affected individual or group, rather than on whether the distinction has been made on an enumerated or analogous ground.
Integral to an inquiry into whether a legislative distinction is discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15(1) is an appreciation of both the social vulnerability of the affected individual or group, and the nature of the interest which is affected in terms of its importance to human dignity and personhood. Section 15(1) is engaged when the impact of a legislative distinction deprives an individual or group who has been found to be disadvantaged in our society of the laws protection or benefit in a way which negatively affects their human dignity and personhood. ...
(edit: to sum it up, it is a violation of the constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a provincial government
not to prohibit private-sector discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.)
How obvious is it all?
It's about human dignity.