Talking to an Irish friend recently, I got a splendid take on the euro-crisis. As he pointed out, there are two sides to the growing European sovereign debt crisis. Yes, the feckless peripheral countries on the fringe engaged in an ill-judged splurge on property and their governments borrowed and spent with abandon.
But the banks holding the savings of the core members — including most of Germany's supposedly stodgy but actually reckless state banks — were happy to fuel the binge. They may also have counted on an implicit guarantee from their governments. Although bailing out the improvident Greeks might strike voters as a bad idea, letting Germany's state banks go to the wall would be far worse.
<snip>
Even if Europe gets through the current crisis, politicians need to face up to what it tells us about the euro-venture. The crisis is a result of predictable behaviors. The peripheral countries are populated by optimistic younger citizens. The richer countries are populated by older people concerned who want to put the memory of a poorer, hard-working past behind them and enjoy an affluent old age.
<snip>
But remove the currency markets and you take away the constant credit rating service the currency markets provided. You also took away the explicit need to provide for the currency risk. To replace all that the banks ought to have undertaken keener credit analyses, probably resulting in higher margins on loans to the peripheral countries. Why didn't they?
<snip>
http://blogs.hbr.org/hbr/hbreditors/2011/06/who_fixes_the_euro.html