Reply #7: Geesh, I think you got this well under control. [View All]

[Old and In the Way]

I mean, you worry about a simplistic 2 sentence, poorly constructed response stymie you....you obviously know how to Google.

Here's a good start, though:

http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/usiraq80s90s.html

U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 - 2 August 1990
Prepared by Nathaniel Hurd.
15 July 2000 (updated 12 December 2001 by Nathaniel Hurd and Glen Rangwala).
Before 1980
• Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. In late 1979 the State Department (SD) put Iraq on its list of States sponsoring groups categorized by the SD as "terrorist."<1>
1980
• The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) asserted in a report that Iraq has been ‘actively acquiring’ Chemical Weapons capacities since the mid-1970s.<2>
1982
• Despite intelligence reports that Iraq still sponsored groups on the SD's terrorist list, and "apparently without consulting Congress", the Reagan Administration removed Iraq from the State terrorism sponsorship list in 1982.<3> The removal made Iraq eligible for U.S. dual-use and military technology.<4>
1983
• A SD report concluded that Iraq continued to support groups on the SD’s terrorist list.<5>
• Iraq reportedly began using chemical weapons (CW) against Iranian troops in 1982, and significantly increased CW use in 1983. Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, said that reports of Iraq using CWs on Iranian military personnel "drifted in" at the year’s end.<6> A declassified CIA report, probably written in late 1987, notes Iraq's use of mustard gas in August 1983, giving further credence to the suggestion that the SD and/or National Security Council (NSC) was well aware of Iraq's use of CW at this time.<7>
• Analysts recognized that "civilian" helicopters can be weaponized in a matter of hours and selling a civilian kit can be a way of giving military aid under the guise of civilian assistance.<8> Shortly after removing Iraq from the terrorism sponsorship list, the Reagan administration approved the sale of 60 Hughes helicopters.<9> Later, and despite some objections from the National Security Council (NSC), the Secretaries of Commerce and State (George Baldridge and George Shultz) lobbied the NSC advisor into agreeing to the sale to Iraq of 10 Bell helicopters,<10> officially for crop spraying. See "1988" for note on Iraq using U.S. Helicopters to spray Kurds with chemical weapons.
• Later in the year the Reagan Administration secretly began to allow Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt to transfer to Iraq U.S. howitzers, helicopters, bombs and other weapons.<11> Reagan personally asked Italy’s Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti to channel arms to Iraq.<12>
1984
• The SD announced on 6 March that, based on "available evidence," it "concluded" that Iraq used "lethal chemical weapons" (specifically mustard gas) in fresh fighting with Iran.<13> On 20 March, U.S. intelligence officials said that they had "what they believe to be incontrovertible evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran and has almost finished extensive sites for mass-producing the lethal chemical warfare agent".<14>
• European-based doctors examined Iranian troops in March 1984 and confirmed exposure to mustard gas.<15> The UN sent expert missions to the battle region in March 1984, February/March 1986, April/May 1987, March/April 1988, July 1988 (twice), and mid-August 1988. These missions detailed and documented Iraq’s CW use.<16>
• According to the Washington Post, the CIA began in 1984 secretly to give Iraq intelligence that Iraq uses to "calibrate" its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. In August, the CIA establishes a direct Washington-Baghdad intelligence link, and for 18 months, starting in early 1985, the CIA provided Iraq with "data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography...to assist Iraqi bombing raids." The Post’s source said that this data was essential to Iraq’s war effort.<17>
• The United States re-established full diplomatic ties with Iraq on 26 November,<18> just over a year after Iraq’s first well-publicized CW use and only 8 months after the UN and U.S. reported that Iraq used CWs on Iranian troops.
1985
• In 1985 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to put Iraq back on the State terrorism sponsorship list.<19> After the bill’s passage, Shultz wrote to the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Howard Berman, cited the U.S.’ "diplomatic dialogue on this and other sensitive issues, " claimed that "Iraq has effectively distanced itself from international terrorism," and stated that if the U.S. found that Iraq supports groups practicing terrorism "we would promptly return Iraq to the list."<20> Rep. Berman dropped the bill and explicitly cited Shultz’s assurances.<21>
• Iraq’s Saad 16 General Establishment’s director wrote a letter to the Commerce Department (CD) detailing the activities in Saad’s 70 laboratories. These activities had the trademarks of ballistic missile development.<22>
1986
• The Defense Department’s (DOD) Under Secretary for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, informed the Commerce Department’s (CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration in November that intelligence linked the Saad 16 research center with ballistic missile development.<23> Between 1985 and 1990, CD approved many computer sales to Iraq that go directly to Saad 16. CD approved over $1 million worth of computer equipment for sale to Saad 16 after Commerce received the above-mentioned November letter from DOD.<24> As of 1991 Saad 16 reportedly contained up to 40% U.S.-origin equipment.<25>
1988
• The CD approved exports in January and February to Iraq’s SCUD missile program’s procurement agency. These exports allowed Iraq to extend SCUD range far enough to hit allied soldiers in Saudi Arabia and Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv and Haifa.<26>
• On 23 March, London’s Financial Times and several other news organizations reported from Halabja, located in Iraqi Kurdistan, that several days prior Iraq used CWs on Halabja’s Kurds.<27>
• In May, two months after the Halabja assault, Peter Burleigh, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of northern Gulf affairs, encouraged U.S.-Iraqi corporate cooperation at a symposium hosted by the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum. The U.S.-Iraq Business Forum had strong (albeit unofficial) ties to the Iraqi government.<28>
• The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent a team to Turkey to speak to Iraqi Kurdish refugees and assess reports that Iraq "was using chemical weapons on its Kurdish population."<29> This report reaffirmed that between 1984 and 1988 "Iraq repeatedly and effectively used poison gas on Iran," the UN missions’ findings, and the chemical attack on Halabja that left an estimated 4,000 people dead.<30>
• Following the Halabja attack and Iraq’s August CW offensive against Iraqi Kurds, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed on 8 September the "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988" the day after it is introduced.<31> The act cuts off from Iraq U.S. loans, military and non-military assistance, credits, credit guarantees, items subject to export controls, and U.S. imports of Iraqi oil.<32>

<snip>

This follows on through to the day before Bush1 declared war on Hussein.

Completely documented with footnotes and US government publications