Reply #6: This ability to update software AFTER "certification", [View All]

[gristy]

described in the 2nd article as happening in Georgia in 2002 is one of the key problems, if not THE key problem. Not only is it very difficult to make sure that the software on each voting machine and the software that tabulates the votes is certified, it just ISN'T POSSIBLE to secure all these machines to ensure that their software is not changed after certification. And you can't even certify all the machines; you can only certify a small sample.

Sorry - this personal revelation is certainly not new to many DUers.

Not only can you not ensure that the software on these machines is fair and correct, it is much worse than that. It is virtually impossible to KEEP bad software OFF of these machines. It's like money in a bank. Everything has to be under lock and key ALL the time. The minute you turn your back with the vault unlocked (i.e., the machines stored in a warehouse or wherever), we will be robbed, if we hadn't been already.

These damn machines are so obviously fraudulant.