A question regarding the US v Miller decision. [View All]

[hansberrym]

If Miller did not have standing to bring a second amendment defense in the lower court case which was decided in his favor, why didn't the Supreme Court simply say so and end the case right there instead of overturning and sending it back to the lower court for further hearings on the basis of whether or not a sawed-off shotgun was any part of the ordinary military equipment?

Since the Supreme Court reviewed the case without finding any lack of standing on Miller's part, the logical conclusion is that Miller did in fact have standing in the eyes of the Supreme Court to bring a Second Amendment challenge. Furthermore the history provided by the Court in US v. Miller showing that the militia meant every able bodied man, and that each man was to supply his own weapon, further illustrates the court's view on whether the second amendment applied to individuals, as opposed to the states only, or to the people in a collective sense only.

It could not have escaped the Supreme Court's attention that Mr. Miller was not a state, nor was he the people in a collective sense. He was obviously a private individual who successfully challenged a conviction on second amendment grounds in a lower court and had won in the lower court. If the Supreme Court had actually interpreted the second amendment to refer only to a collective or state's right as the Ninth Circuit claims in Silveira, then the Supreme Court surely would have ruled that Miller had no standing to bring the second amendment challenge in the first place and would have overturned the lower court ruling on that basis.


From US v. Miller:
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. ‘A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline.’ And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time. Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. 2, Ch. 13, p. 409 points out ‘that king Alfred first settled a national militia in this kingdom’ and traces the subsequent development and use of such forces.(end quote from Miller) (my emphasis)




Note how differently the Ninth Circuit defines the militia and treats the issue of standing.



From SILVEIRA v. LOCKYER:

22 SILVEIRA v. LOCKYER
B. Appellants Lack Standing to Challenge the Assault
Weapons Control Act on Second Amendment
Grounds.
<2> Appellants contend that the California Assault Weapons
Control Act and its 1999 revisions violate their Second
Amendment rights. We unequivocally reject this contention.
We conclude that although the text and structure of the
amendment, standing alone, do not conclusively resolve the
question of its meaning, when we give the text its most plausible
reading and consider the amendment in light of the historical
context and circumstances surrounding its enactment we
are compelled to reaffirm the collective rights view we
adopted in Hickman: The amendment protects the people’s
right to maintain an effective state militia, and does not establish
an individual right to own or possess firearms for personal
or other use. This conclusion is reinforced in part by
Miller’s implicit rejection of the traditional individual rights
position.16 Because we hold that the Second Amendment does
not provide an individual right to own or possess guns or
other firearms,17 plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the
opinion. Instead, we would be required to call for en banc review. See
Morton v. De Oliveira, 984 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1993) (“nly the
court sitting en banc may overrule a prior decision of the court.”). Because we reaffirm Hickman here, however, an en banc call by the panel is not necessary.
16Although Miller is consistent with both the limited individual rights position and the collective rights view, for reasons we explain below we continue to adhere to the collective rights view we adopted in Hickman.
17We concluded in Hickman that because the individual plaintiff had no legally protectable interest under the Second Amendment, he lacked constitutional standing to bring a claim under that provision. Other courts have addressed Second Amendment claims on the merits, rather than under the rubric of standing doctrine. See, e.g., Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 710 (offering an informed discussion not only of the standing issue but also of some of the amendment’s possible applications). Although in every case we are required to examine standing issues first, see

(end quote)