Reply #40: On What Is Going Through Sharon's Head, Ma'am [View All]

[The Magistrate]

This seems to me a combination of dither and force of habit. Sharon's policy has been always to strike at Arafat in response to the acts of Hamas, and for two reasons. First, because it was much easier initially to target the openly established facilities of the Palestine Authority than the clandestine networks of Hamas, and second, in the hope of goading the Palestine Authority into taking action against Hamas. This was the general policy of Israel in the old days of border infiltrations, particularly prior to Suez, and at least in the case of Jordan, it did have some of the desired effect.

However, this seam is rather played out. Arafat refused to take such action, and fairly early in the current wave of hostilities, Sharon inflicted such damage on the capabilities of the Palestine Authority that it was left unable to reliably suppress Hamas even had Arafat belatedly chosen to do so. Sharon is thus left, really, with only the one option of forcibly supressing Hamas himself, since he is clearly unwilling to negotiate or make any political concessions that might largely de-fang it through reducing the support it enjoys among ordinary Arab Palestinians.

To do this will require a full-bore invasion of Gaza, and it has been my own expectation for more than a year Sharon will do this. Sharon, remember, has invaded Gaza before: he was in charge of suppressive operations there after the initial wave of guerrilla activities following the '67 war. Such an operation will not be a pretty spectacle, though it will have a fair chance of success, defined strictly as liquidating the greatest proportion of the leadership and armed militants of Hamas. Its political consequences will be harsh, rather akin to those of the Lebanon invasion Sharon led under Begin. Sharon probably has some sense of this, though he will greatly under-rate it, being a believer first and foremost in force, with little understanding of other forms of power, but he will have, it seems to me, a rather hazy sense that a trap he does not quite comprehend is opening before him.

A thunderous threat against Arafat allows him to delay this final move, while appearing to his political supporters to be doing something important. It allows time for a popular clamor to build on the right for great actions, and that there is coming to be such is evidenced by the recent editorializing of the Jerusalem Post. This will steel him towards the policy of fimally engaging Hamas directly, in a major way, on the ground. Actually moving to expell Arafat may trigger a wave of violent expression among Arab Palestinians en masse that will further strengthen his resolve in the matter, but this is not really necessary. Other than this, there is no good to be had by expelling Arafat, or by threatening to do so. Neither thing will change the political impasse, nor alter the military factors. It is a stupendous side-show. The question is: when will the invasion of Gaza commence?