Reply #13: Special action needed today. Call these CA legislators re: McPherson [View All]

[Peace Patriot]

Here are the Assemby Members who will be questioning Bruce McPerson today. Call these, your own reps, and others. As an appointed Republican, replacing an elected Democrat, McPherson will be beholden to Schwarzenegger (and the Bush Cartel) rather than the voters. My line is: An appointed Republican Sec of State is guilty until proven innocent. The CA legislature needs to get an UNEQUIVOCAL committment from McPherson on...

1) protection of the "Accessible Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail" (AVVPAT) requirement; 2) protection of Californians' paper ballot option; 3) rigorous enforcement of all existing electronic voting system standards; 4) strengthening of those standards; 5) investigation of conflicts of interest and "revolving door" employment; 6) elimination of all secret, proprietary software and other non-transparent, insecure or unreliable components of our election system (& development of open source); and 7) prevent special elections until the AVVPAT requirement is in force throughout California (June '06).

Cindy Montañez, Chair Dem-39 [phone]
[e-mail]

Dave Cogdill, Vice Chair Rep-25 [phone]
[e-mail]

Joe Baca Dem-62 [phone]
[e-mail]

John J. Benoit Rep-64 [phone]
[e-mail]

Joe Coto Dem-23 [phone]

Mervyn M. Dymally Dem-52 [phone]
[e-mail]

Betty Karnette Dem-54 [phone]
[e-mail]

Michael N. Villines Rep-29 [phone]
[e-mail]

Here are some specific questions that McPherson should be asked (these came from Don Goldmacher):

1.    Do you believe that Direct Recording Electronic voting machines without auditable paper trails are subject to potential fraud and  error with no way to ascertain if that has occurred or fix it?
 
Only acceptable answer: yes.
 
2.    Are you aware that Secretary Shelley forbid the use of DRE machines without auditable paper trails commencing in 2006?
 
Again, only acceptable response: yes.
 
3.    Will you honor the letter and spirit of Secretary Shelley's mandate re DRE machines?
 
Again, only acceptable response: yes.
 
4.    Will you work to ensure that any special election called by the Governor in 2005 is run according to the standards concerning electronic voting machines that are mandated for 2006?
 
Again, only acceptable response: yes.
 
5.    How can a loser of a close election be reasonably expected to have confidence in the process when unverifiable computers are used?
Answer: she or he can't have confidence in such a result.
 
6.    The California Elections Code requires hand count of a random selection of the ballots as a check against machine technology.   How is that possible with the use of voting machines that do not produce an auditable paper trail?  Isn't it the case that such machines during a recount can only give the same information they gave the first time; and how does that constitute a recount as required by state law?
 
Answers: With no paper trail there is no possibility of a meaningful recount, as the machines can only spit out the same information no matter how many times we ask them; thus they cannot comply with the one percent recount provision of state law.
 
7.    Will you pledge to require at least that a random sample of these voter verified paper ballots be hand  counted in full view of public observers and compared with the electronic results?  And that a full publicly observed hand count be done if there is discrepancy?
Answer: must be yes to both.
 
Background to the questions:
 

Not only the paperless DREs but also the electronic scanners that scan and count the paper ballots, such as the absentee ballots in Alameda County, have been known to make mistakes.  In Alameda County thousands of votes intended for Bustamente were mistaken counted for an obscure candidate.  Only because someone noted that the obscure candidate would be expected to receive at most hundreds of votes was a hand count of the actual paper ballots done.  We have never received a satisfactory explanation for why this mistake occurred.  This occurred using tested and certified equipment.   There is no reason to assume that other undetected mistakes did not occur.

DREs have been shown to produce phantom votes (more votes recorded than voters), despite the fact that manufacturers and elections officials say this is impossible.

The banks that purchase ATM technology from these firms demand and receive full information about the technology they are buying.  Why should the public be expected to accept less when their sacred democracy and elections are at stake?  Aren't our votes as important as money?  Yet the state accepts the argument that the companies can keep the source code of their programs secret.  Any new SecState should pledge to require full public disclosure of all technology and processes used in elections.