Reply #10: The problem with this is.... [View All]

[Stunster]

....that there is no material explanation of morality.

Or of consciousness.

Or of why there are any laws of physics or laws of nature in the first place.

Here's some material from an email exchange I had back in March about all this. My bits are without the indents:

******************************************
I mean, it would be just weird for them
> > to exist, especially given the fact that the
> > universe is an awful lot older than the human
> > race.
>
> That's a bit of a subjective relative judjement. Why is it 'weird'?

Well, it's weird because the only examples of anything real which are (arguably) *not* completely reducible to the physical, are persons, or minds and their contents. We encounter physical things all the time, and we encounter minds or persons all the time (at least our own). We simply *don't* encounter *freestanding* abstract entities. When we encounter abstract entities, they are always encountered as the contents of minds.

Moral obligation, for example, isn't something we bump into *independently* of personhood. Mathematical or logical relations, for example, are never found 'out there'. They're only ever found 'in here', meaning, as part of our mental contents. The physical things which obey those relations *are* 'out there'. But the relations
themselves, like all abstract entities, however, *don't* occupy spacetime. They only occupy minds. We don't find physical things
or mental contents as weird as non-physical things which aren't mental contents either. In fact, we never ever encounter such things.

So if that's what moral properties are--non-physical things which don't occupy spacetime OR minds, they would be very weird indeed.
So, that's why.

> Is it any more weird than the idea that some rational
> intelligent 'creator' created all this for the sake of some
> apocalyptic sleepover.

We are familiar with personhood. It is wonderful and amazing, but not *weird* precisely because we're intimately familiar with it. Mind and its characteristic content are 'givens' of human existence--utterly basic, fundamental, and logically prior to our knowledge of anything else in existence. Hence, if we postulate that the creator is a mind, this would strike us as less weird than there just being abstract entities eternally existing but not essentially occupying any mind. We are familiar with physical things, and with minds and their (abstract) contents. Relative to those things, a non-physical thing which is not a mind and not essentially the content of any mind, is weird.

> Atheists, of course, generally claim
> > that moral properties are created or generated
> > in some way by human beings. But that human
> > beings would have such a capacity would be itself
> > quite, quite remarkable.
>
> That's a matter of opinion not an argument against.


I didn't say the mere fact of it was an argument against. It's an explanandum, something which cries out for explanation. Now, if we ask which explanans is more plausibly abduced for this explanandum, then we can proceed to present an argument.

The capacity to generate moral concepts and grasp moral properties is something which theism can readily account for given theism's fundamental ontology, but for which materialism can't *as* readily
account, given *its* ontology.

There is nothing it is 'like' to be a chair--there is nothing it feels like to be a chair. Chairs have no experiences, and have zero capacity to engage in morality. And yet chairs and humans are made of precisely the same physical stuff (quarks and electrons), exist in the same spacetime framework, and are subject to the same forces of nature (strong, weak, electromagnetic and gravity). So it *is* remarkable from a materialist perspective that such *fundamentally different properties* as having and not having moral capacities can be true of humans and chairs. It is remarkable too from a theist perspective, but more to be *expected* and more *comprehensible* within that perspective.

>And anyway there
> are lots of remarkable things in the world, it's an amazing place.
> Although I'd put my amazement down to my ignorance.

I presume you accept the science and reality of gravity. The science says it is the curvature of space. You can't see the curvature of space. However, in a sense, you can feel it.

But what is a feeling? Can you see or touch a feeling? Does it have a smell or taste or sound? I don't believe so. So why is it
a good and legitimate thing (if it is) to make an inference to the best explanation in the case of gravity, but not in the case of feelings, or the contents of consciousness more generally? It seems to me that it is legitimate and reasonable to make abductions to account for feelings, consciousness, moral perception---in short all the operations of the mind. In fact, given that these are so constant and intimate to our experience of existence, it would seem that they are
the first things we should try to explain and come to a full understanding of. Placing ad hoc, artificial or arbitrary limits on
rational inquiry is a Bad Thing. Philosophical theology is a legitimate part of the continuum of that inquiry, and should be allowed to flourish.

There is another reason why the theistic inference seems more reasonable than an inference to the non-physical existence of abstract moral properties, and that is that it *coheres much better* with the personal, spiritually and morally transformative experiences which many people have had. A very common element of these experiences is that they bear a strong analogy to *interpersonal, mutual knowledge and love*. They *don't* commonly have the content of being an encounter with an abstract, causally inert, impersonal entity. I would consider it likely that, as a matter of causal genesis of ideas, it is
these experiences which initially suggest and give rise to the concept of theism, and thus make it make it mentally and socially--socially, because the experiences are communicated to others--available for the relevant abductive inference.

>> But then
> > it's terribly, terribly hard to see and explain
> > in detail how humans generate objectively binding
> > moral norms (indeed, I would argue impossibly hard.)
>
> I'd agree.

As I've got older, I've found the argument from morality to be more and more persuasive. I used to think that one could account for
moral reasoning naturalistically. But I came to the conclusion that this can only be done at the expense of moral objectivity and universality. Morality can be interpreted naturalistically, but only if we accept that morality is subjective and relative. I am not willing to accept that because I experience morality as something which is binding on me not because of any human subjective and/or
relative judgements, but quite objectively and quite independently of subjective human judgement. Like Immanual Kant, I am profoundly
moved by two things: the starry skies above me, and the moral law within me. I interpret them both as pointing to God.

Theism, in short, *makes sense* to me. Atheism doesn't.


> Having read this I think the point remains, if abduction involves heavy
> doses of induction as the above passage points out then we're still
looking
> for some other universe creations for you to be able to induce the
fact that
> there is some design in the creation of this one. The last piece about
> underdetermination is crucial too.


First, I think you're misunderstanding the point about underdetermination. What it's referring to is the fact that often (always, in fact) the empirical data underdetermine the conclusion--that is, the data do not select one hypothesis to the exclusion of all others. Alternative hypotheses are always possible, consistent with the data, and the question of which hypothesis to
select is determined in the final analysis not by the empirical data, but by considerations of simplicity, scope, coherence with other accepted theories, etc.

This is a point about the way science itself is done in general; it's not a special point about the theistic hypothesis. For example, the hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics is consistent with all known data, yet is accepted by only a small minority within the physics community.

Now to the point about induction. An inductive inference is one in which one infers a conclusion from repeated prior examples of the phenomena which the conclusion predicts. Your objection would be valid
IF the theist was arguing that there was going to be another universe created because this one had been created, and it would be valid as an objection because the validity of inductive inferences REQUIRES that
that there have been (generally speaking) MANY prior examples of the predicted phenomenon, whereas in this case there is just one known case of the 'phenomenon' in question (the creation and existence of the universe) occurring. But of course, the theist is claiming NO
SUCH THING! The theist is not claiming that because one universe has come into being, there is going to be another one coming into being. That would be an invalid induction. But it's not one that the theist is guilty of making. So for you to point out that there is only
one known case of a universe having been created is completely irrelevant.

But of course, the theist IS making SOME inductions. The theist is noting that there are many, many examples of the mathematical ordering of nature; many, many examples of the functioning of rational
minds; many, many examples of the experience of free will, and of moral obligation; many, many examples of the experience of love, goodness, beauty; many, many examples of religious experience,
and so on. And the theist is concluding that these phenomena will continue to characterize the existence and nature of the universe, that these properties will continue to be observed in future. This
strikes me as a series of valid inductive inferences.

But then the theist make ANOTHER inference, this time not inductive, but abductive. The theist asks what is the best available explanation of this set of inductively established phenomena. What would, with
the best degree of simplicity, scope, rational elegance, etc, ACCOUNT for this richly diverse and inductively very well established set of phenomena; and the theist postulates, as it were, the theistic hypothesis as explaining these phenomena more powerfully, simply,
adequately and beautifully than any competing, non-theistic hypothesis. The theist argues, for instance, that *naturalism* systematically FAILS to account for the phenomena of consciousness,
morality, and remarkable mathematical order of physical nature, etc. The theist argues, for instance, that *Platonism*, while accounting for the *nature* of these phenomena, systematically fails to account
for their causal generation (since there are no known examples of pure abstracta, such as Platonic Forms are supposed to be, causing anything). And the theist argues that the phenomena associated with reason and value require that the ultimate explanatory reality be
a) pre-eminently endowed with reason and value (since nothing devoid of reason and value can cause reason and value--"nemo dat quod non habet" as the Romans used to say); and b) pre-eminently endowed with causal power. An ultimate explanatory reality endowed with (a) and (b) gives us a first working idea of the concept of God. And this is all by way of abductive, not inductive, inference.

Further refinements of the concept of God are generated by careful logical analysis. But the initial work is done by abductive inference relative to a range of inductively established phenomena.

I'll save a reply to your other comments for a later time, but let me just say that Hume, whom you cite, of course believed, and said, and wrote, that it WAS valid to infer the existence of a deity from the
existence and apparent order of the universe. It's amazing how many people seem to be ignorant of this!

Of course, Hume was not a theist, but a deist. He thought an argument from design made deism rationally credible, but not theism. What's the
difference? Well, the basic one is that in theism God is conceived as an infinite perfect spirit, whereas in deism God is not infinite and not perfect. There are many reasons why deism has generally had it rough since the late 18th century and now has very few defenders. But Hume, at least in his published writings, accepts the validity
in principle of the deistic, though not the theistic, inference. So I'm not sure you would want to rely entirely on him, since he actually argues for a point that is actually contrary to the one you're
arguing for in this thread. You're arguing that the inferential step is itself faulty. Hume argues that the step itself is not faulty, but the content of the conclusion should be deistic rather than theistic.

I included a large chunk of a reply to you regarding the precise
nature of what Peirce was getting at in my last reply, but somehow or
other it did not show up in the post once I sent it! Aaaaaaaarrrrrrrrghhh!

I'll try to summarise what I typed, but I'm pretty annoyed that I've
lost it, because it was good. ;-)

The basic idea is that induction is to do with predicting what we will
observe in the future on the basis of what we have observed in the
past, whereas abduction is to do with explaining what we observe. The
example I wrote about was gravity. Again, I'll try to summarise.

We observe apples falling from trees, avalanches sliding down mountainsides, the tides going in and out in step with the phases of
the Moon, the sun coming up, etc. We can predict that we'll continue
to observe similar phenomena in future. This is a valid inductive
inference, because we have many many prior observations to base it on.

But, Peirce would say, we *also* make an abduction. We don't *just* say that the tide will go out, that apples will fall, that the sun will come up. Yes, we do make these inductive inferences. But, and
this is what Peirce and contemporary philosophers of science think
science typically does, we advance as the best explanation of all
these repeated observations of diverse phenomena a powerful, simple,
elegant and cogent theorised reality: in this case, gravity.

But strictly speaking, we don't *inductively* infer the existence of
gravity, because we don't see gravity, literally speaking. Induction
has to do with saying what we are going to observe on the basis of
what we have observed in the past. But we can't see Newton's 'force
of gravity'. We can't see Einstein's 'curvature of space'. These are
not observable, even in principle.

No, we postulate gravity to explain what we do observe, but we don't
actually observe gravity. *This* is not induction, but (to give it
another name since it's another kind of reasoning), abduction.

Sure, we do validly infer that the sun will come up, the tide will go
out, the apple will fall and the avalanche will slide down the
mountainside. We *predict* these future events on the basis of past
observations of similar events. That's induction. Gravity? That's
abduction. I hope this clarifies the difference.

Ok, the theist inductively infers that the universe will continue to
exhibit these various properties and various phenomena. On the basis
of many, many past observations and experiences, the theist predicts
that the universe will continue to contain experiences of moral
obligation, goodness, love, beauty, and religious experiences; the
apparent phenomenon of free will; that it will continue to exhibit
profound mathematical ordering in the detailed workings of physical
objects and processes. Etc. The theist then puts forward as the best
explanation of these phenomena the theistic hypothesis. Furthermore,
the theist argues that competing non-theistic hypotheses
systematically fail to explain adequately these phenomena. Naturalism
fails to do the job because it cannot explain how phenomena associated
with reason and value can be generated by things which are devoid of
reason and value ("nemo dat quod non habet", as the Romans used to
say). As even non-religious philosophers have readily admitted, the
difficulties for naturalism are notorious and huge, for instance in
terms of even accounting naturalistically for consciousness (see
McGinn, Chalmers, et al).

The theist argues that Platonism fails because, while it does account
for the *nature* of the phenomena to be explained, it systematically
fails to account for how they could be causally generated (since we
know of no examples of pure abstracta, such as Platonic Forms are
supposed to be, causing anything).

At one point you say that you don't see that the effects need to be
explained theistically. Well, of course you can CLAIM that they don't
need to be. But that won't establish that they can be explained
non-theistically. Adequately explained, that is. And even if you did
adequately explain them, that wouldn't show that your explanation was
best, since the theistic one might have superior scope and simplicity,
for example. The theist in fact argues that theism is a powerful
explanans with a very wide scope--it explains a lot of diverse
phenomena, positing just one reality. The nature of this posited
explanans (God) is such as to quite naturally lead us to *expect* that
the explananda would have the character and properties they do
(consciousness, free will, moral value, reason, etc), and much more
naturally would lead us to expect that than the non-theistic
alternative explanations do. That theism is a *simpler* explanation
than naturalistic explanations is also argued for, though I would
concede that the issues here are subtler.

Anyhow, I hope you can see that theists abduce the existence of God,
they don't induce it. They do induce that the future will be like the
past, up to a point in terms of human experiences (we might not always
be here), and fully in terms of the operation of the universe
according to rationally intelligible mathematical laws. The nature of
the physical world and the nature of human experience are inductively
established sets of facts. We abductively infer God, conceived
theistically, as the best explanation of these sets of facts.