Computer experts to review voting machines

[Algorem]

http://www.cleveland.com/newsflash/cleveland/index.ssf?/base/news-19/112470537418430.xml&storylist=cleveland

8/22/2005, 7:12 a.m. ET
The Associated Press

COLUMBUS, Ohio (AP) — A county elections board has asked a team of computer experts to test its recently purchased touch-screen voting machines to ensure the devices' programs are sound.

The San Francisco-based Election Science Institute said it will run simulations of what the machines would handle during an election. Critics worry the electronic machines could be susceptible to fraud through computer hacking or programs within the machine that could alter votes.

The Franklin County Board of Elections has agreed spend $15.1 million for more than 4,500 touch-screen voting machines from Election Systems & Software Inc., with the Omaha, Neb.-based company set to deliver the devices by May.

The institute, already reviewing the elections board's performance during the 2004 presidential vote, will point out any problems to ES&S and the county, and offer advice on how to fix them...

[endarkenment]

1. waste of time.

Assume the worst case: a vendor implemented backdoor fraud access point allows the vendor to sell votes to the highest bidder. The vendor is not going to enable this feature while the systems are being tested for accuracy.

Until these systems are completely open for inspection of hardware and software implementation, and have rigorous and verified anti-tampering safeguards, and provide a verifiable vote audit trail, they are not safe to use. Better yet, there is simply no justification for any purchase of these expensive and unverifiable systems when optical scan paper ballot systems are inexpensive, fast, accurate, and auditable. This whole thing is one big corrupt effort to dispose of open and fair elections.

[I Have A Dream]

2. I agree.

All this will do is put a veneer of legitimacy over a rotten core.

I'm sure that some of the people who have set this up have good intentions. However, these "experts" should be the first to tell them that any testing done beforehand given the current setup is worthless. I won't hold my breath waiting for this though.

[suston96]

3. Parallel elections are the answer.

Any electronic device can be "recalibrated". And they were!

The touch screens or whatever other electronic device that don't have a paper trail?

Parallel elections. Have them anyway and at random, especially in suspicious states and precincts.

[I Have A Dream]

4. I'm not sure what you mean by parallel elections.

Would you please explain?

Thanks.

[suston96]

6. A citizen's audit

Go here: http://rawstory.com/news/2005/Citizens_Request_Recount_IN_SAN_DIEGO_MAYO_0818.html

******

The Citizens Audit Parallel Election (CAPE) asked voters exiting polls to vote again and sign a log book attesting to the accuracy of their second vote. Sealed parallel election ballots were counted at KGTV's studio with a TV camera crew filming the counting process.

Nearly 50 percent of all voters participated in the parallel election, which included five polling places representing 11 precincts. The sample included more conservative than liberal precincts, with participation as high among Republicans as among Democrats. The tandem election results showed what most feel to be startling results.

"There is a shift of four percent of the vote, consistently," Joe Prizzi, (engineer and physicist,) reported at a press conference held by CAPE in front of City Hall. Frye received 50.2 percent of the votes cast in the parallel election - enough for an outright victory if those results reflect the outcome citywide. CAPE also found that the official count added approximately 2 percent to each of Frye's two Republican opponents, Jerry Sanders and Steve Francis.

In addition, CAPE examined the only other ballot measure, a proposition over a war memorial cross on public land. The proposition's vote total also appeared to have been padded by 4 percent in the official election tally, which was certified Friday August 19 by San Diego County's newly appointed Registrar of Voters, Republican Mikel Haas.

[AndyTiedye]

10. Not Necessarily

Some of these machines are so badly coded that they screw up badly even
under black-box testing.

We have managed to keep the Diebold Republican Electing Machinez out
of some places due to such failures under test.



Of course, "passing" such black-box testing is no assurance against
back-doors for fraud.

[endarkenment]

12. Good point - but dangerous.

Yes the test can catch poor quality, but passing can then be used to claim validity. Its a double edged sword.

[MetaTrope]

5. Are they also going to test the central servers where votes are tabulated?

:shrug:

[suston96]

7. Stalin speaks

Joseph Stalin is supposed to have said:

Never mind the voters. Get to the vote counters.

He was right.

Somebody is always getting to the vote counters - both the human ones and their vote counting machines.

[go west young man]

8. No printed vote count. No fair election.

[Festivito]

9. Like asking a rough carpentar to assess the quality of a finished house.

He can't see through the sheet rock. He may tell you that he sees no problem at the moment. However, as the house settles problems he would have noticed looking at the rough framing can develope that are beyond his client-limited ability to see.

This "test" is a ruse.

A CS is hired to CHECK THE CODE. One does not hire a computer scientist to test the system. The system test belongs to the people who generally count the vote.

[RSchewe]

11. Voter verified paper ballots are needed. Electronic interface is ok but..

the machine should print out a voter verifiable paper ballot (braille for the blind). No electronic ballots. Undeniable voter intent must be recorded. There should be a receipt as well and a paper backup. The software must be open source as well. Total transparency is paramount, doubt must be eliminted completely or the system will always be suspect.