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Yes, fiscal discipline is a recent memory, and it can be attained again without granting any President more power. But this is especially the case when dealing with a president who has repeatedly shown himself ready, indeed, eager, to push past the Constitutional limits on his power. Giving such a president more power calls into serious question what the hell supporters of this are thinking.
Moreover, the Presidential veto is a powerful weapon, and Congress has evolved a mechanism (lumping things together) to protect their power from it -- and also to enable compromise bills to pass. This confronts the President with the choice of vetoing a bill entirely because he doesn't like part of it, or signing it whole. Furthermore, Congress takes a risk putting things into a bill that might cause it to be vetoed. And if we had a President who vetoed abusive bills, then maybe lawmakers would take this threat seriously, and therefore modify their behavior.
Is Congress abusing this mechanism -- oh boy, are they. But giving more power to the President as a way of dealing with this isn't the way to resolve it, especially not with this president.
And there's the question of the slippery slope. If any below-bill-level Presidential veto is approved here, what comes next?
"I agree that Congress should start acting like adults, but the prevalent attitude in Congress is a bi-partisan agreement that they'll exploit all the loopholes in the Senate concerning the budget so votes don't have to be cast on specific earmarks and so not a lot of scrutiny is given to the billions of dollars of pork that both parties jam into the budget. And while some on each side of the aisle have tried to buck that habit, its going to take at least over 50 Senators to do anything about it, and that's not going to happen."
We've had fiscal discipline before, we can have it again. Indeed, maybe we can start on the road to it as soon as the next Congress. So why do this now? Timely public posturing?
"Meanwhile, because the debate focuses around parliamentary procedure and the complex rules of the Senate, the public at large simply has no comprehension about the necessary reform of the budgetary process. They can't pressure their lawmakers to follow the rules--1) because technically they are, and because 2) the lawmakers know more about the rules than the public does. But the public can pressure their lawmakers to pass measures that guarantee a reduction of pork barrel spending. A line-item veto would be one of those measures."
See above.
A budget-line-item veto could be used as a means to reduce spending by eliminating unnecessary pork-barrel spending. It could also be used to eliminate other spending, and in either case could be used as a weapon by the President.
"From your second sentence, it seems to disagree with the President having any veto power. Say there's a piece of legislation moving forward with enough votes to pass but not enough to over-ride the veto? The President can axe that with no problem. What's the primary difference, or the huge power shift, between allowing the President to veto smaller appropriations mark-ups as well?"
Huh? Consider context.... and the word "item"
It's a line-item veto that I'm opposed to. And one difference is that Congress works on the basis of putting together bills that can include more than one thing, and that do include multiple things that are the results of compromises. Letting the President effectively undo these deals by selectively vetoing individual items not only changes this system, but it undermines effecting any difficult tit-for-tat compromises in these (affected) bills. Plus, if a President is struggling for votes on another issue, he will have a powerful weapon in the ability to veto a (some, any, all) budget item that a Congress-person whose vote the President wants to influence (on this other issue) is particularly interested in.
Moreover, this is a fundamental change in the level on which, and the granularity with which, the President may operate (he would individually "own" any veto-able budget item that couldn't withstand a veto), and it reflects a shift in power from Congress to the President -- at an especially bad time -- and to deal with a problem that could substantially diminish fairly soon. Besides, the President already has the power to veto the whole damn bill, and if there are items in it such that enough Senators won't vote to save them as part of the whole bill, then the President can in one fell swoop get rid of the whole lot. And yeah, I know that here are timing issues that Congress takes advantage off. Other Presidents have dealt with it -- let this one -- and let any future President do so also.
"Or, to phrase it another way, what is the great benefit of allowing Senators to continue business as usual and wait until the last second to jam thousands of earmarks into the budget, then send it to the White House as a bundle with no public scrutiny whatsoever?"
Well, there's always preserving the Constitution. And it's not as though this is the only possible way to deal with the problem. Indeed, a good start would be to change Congressional leadership.
To wrapup this response, I believe this bill is in no small part a cynical gesture on the part of certain legislators who believe that it will be struck down by the Supreme Court. However, if a strike-down doesn't happen, then the door will have certainly opened to further expansion of Presidential veto power, if not by the then-sitting court, then by another one.
You don't like the Constitution, amend it.
Oh, and I corrected some of your spelling, which was a necessary liberty in order to easily correct my own.
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