Iran will reply to nuclear proposals by Aug 22

[Eugene]

Iran will reply to nuclear proposals by Aug 22

Reuters
Wednesday, June 21, 2006; 8:33 AM

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran will respond by August 22 to an international package
of proposals seeking it end uranium enrichment, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
said on Wednesday.

"We will assess the proposals and, by God's will, by the end of (the Persian month
of) Mordad we will announce our opinion," he said in a speech broadcast live on
state television.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062100471.html

Also: Iran Won't Respond to Offer 'Til August - AP

[shadowknows69]

1. Right on script

5,000 troops deploying out of our base in august. A friend of a friend said that one of their kids in Iraq just came back and after about a 4 month break is going to IRAN. With an N. No vouching for reliability of this source but IMO I think the game is still on as scheduled. How convenient is it that Iran just drew their own "line in the sand" for us.

[alcuno]

2. There are twice as many people in Iran than in Iraq.

I actually think that the Auguest 22 offer from Iran is kind of funny. We'll get back to you, but in the next two months, we'll still be working on our nuke stuff. And you KNOW Iran will come back with a counter-offer. It's horse-trading 101.

[Strelnikov_]

3. Agree. Step 2) Reject Counter Offer In July-August Timeframe

Step 3) Bang war drums up until 3 weeks before Nov. elections.

Step 4) Drop bombs one to two weeks before election. This timing is key so that the 'Mission Accomplished' euphoria will still be washing over the electorate and the expected blowback will not have gained momentum.

Iran: Consequences of a War
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/IranConsequences.htm

An air attack on Iran by Israeli or US forces would be aimed at setting back Iran’s nuclear programme by at least five years. A ground offensive by the United States to terminate the regime is not feasible given other commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and would not be attempted. An air attack would involve the systematic destruction of research, development, support and training centres for nuclear and missile programmes and the killing of as many technically competent people as possible. A US attack, which would be larger than anything Israel could mount, would also involve comprehensive destruction of Iranian air defence capabilities and attacks designed to pre-empt Iranian retaliation. This would require destruction of Iranian Revolutionary Guard facilities close to Iraq and of regular or irregular naval forces that could disrupt Gulf oil transit routes.

Although US or Israeli attacks would severely damage Iranian nuclear and missile programmes, Iran would have many methods of responding in the months and years that followed. These would include disruption of Gulf oil production and exports, in spite of US attempts at pre-emption, systematic support for insurgents in Iraq, and encouragement to associates in Southern Lebanon to stage attacks on Israel. There would be considerable national unity in Iran in the face of military action by the United States or Israel, including a revitalised Revolutionary Guard.

One key response from Iran would be a determination to reconstruct a nuclear programme and develop it rapidly into a nuclear weapons capability, with this accompanied by withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This would require further attacks. A military operation against Iran would not, therefore, be a short-term matter but would set in motion a complex and long-lasting confrontation. It follows that military action should be firmly ruled out and alternative strategies developed.