BREAKING: NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE RECOMMENDS SCRAPPING TOUCH-SCREEN VOTING SYSTEMS!

[BradBlog]

COMPLETE STORY: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3860

NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE TO RECOMMEND SCRAPPING DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC TOUCH-SCREEN VOTING MACHINES!
Says Machines Should be Decertified! Also Says So-Called 'Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT) Should Not Be Used' in Voting Systems!

Huge news. Michael Hickens of InternetNews.com has the scoop. Here's the highlights…

A federal agency is set to recommend significant changes to specifications for electronic-voting machines next week, internetnews.com has learned.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is recommending that the 2007 version of the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) decertify direct record electronic (DRE) machines.
…
According to an NIST paper to be discussed at a meeting of election regulators at NIST headquarters in Gaithersburg, Md., on Dec. 4 and 5, DRE vote totals cannot be audited because the machines are not software independent.

In other words, there is no means of verifying vote tallies other than by relying on the software that tabulated the results to begin with.

The machines currently in use are "more vulnerable to undetected programming errors or malicious code," according to the paper.

The NIST paper also noted that, "potentially, a single programmer could 'rig' a major election."

This is incredibly tremendous news!

Appropos of the point we tried to make loudly in an article here at BRAD BLOG earlier today (http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3857), in which we tried to make clear that paper trails on touch-screen machines (versus paper ballots as used with optical-scan or hand-counted systems) are not an adequate solution to the nation's — or even Florida 13's — current voting dysfunction, NIST agrees that paper trails no longer cut it...

<snip>

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win?…

Stay tuned.

COMPLETE STORY: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3860



---
Brad Friedman
THE BRAD BLOG - The uprising continues...
http://www.BradBlog.com
VELVET REVOLUTION's Election Protection Strike Force!
Of the people, by the people, for the people...
http://www.VelvetRevolution.us/ElectionStrikeForce

[DoYouEverWonder]

1. Can we have a big party

and just take all these machines to the toxic dumps?

[don954]

29. na.. lets use them as skeet shoot targets

it would be oh so very satisfying... :evilgrin:

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

63. NIST not recommending decertification of DRES

This is what I gleaned from the executive summary

NIST is not recommending decertifying all DREs.

NIST is saying that paperless DRES should not be certified to 2007 standards.
NIST is recommending that 2007 standards for DREs require VVPATS
NIST also plans to write standards for independent verification systems.
NIST considers DREs with the VVPAT to be SI (software independent).


Some of the many acronyms used in the paper
DRE – Direct Record Electronic, used in this paper to refer to current “blackbox”
IDV/IV – Independent Dual Verification, shortened to Independent Verification
SI – Software Independence or Independent
DRE-VVPAT – A DRE with Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail voting system

NIST says systems should be Software Independent (DRES with VVPAT qualify)

(page 4)
Consequently, NIST and the STS
recommend that VVSG 2007 should require voting systems to be of the SI “class,” whose
readily available (albeit not always optimal) examples include op scan and DRE-VVPAT....

NIST says current paper based approaches can be approved and paperless systems
could also be developed:

The STS believes that current paper-based approaches can be improved
to be significantly more usable to voters and election officials, and that other kinds of allelectronic
IV (software IV) and E2E cryptographic systems may possibly achieve the goal of

(page 5)
secure paperless elections. However, for VVSG 2007, the STS judges that designs for these
new systems are still immature and that developing testable requirements for these
approaches is not yet feasible....

NIST describes current systems that are software independent:

3.1 Types of SI Voting Systems
There are several types of software-independent systems, however those that are readily
available today are paper-based. These are as follows:
1. Op scan using manually marked paper ballots
2. Op scan using an EBM, which can produce a richer user interface including support
for accessibility and alternative languages
3. DRE-VVPAT

(page 6)
These systems produce voter-verified paper records and are classified as software
independent because their electronic records or counts can be independently audited for
accuracy against the voter-verified paper records....

DRE-VVPAT works in somewhat the opposite way: the voting system creates an electronic
record of the voter’s choices at a touchscreen device and then prints a summary of the choices
on a sheet or roll of paper. The voter can then inspect the paper record to verify its accuracy
before finalizing the electronic record, and the paper record remains as an unchangeable
voter-verified audit trail that can be used in audits...

NIST says the DRE VVPAT, while not perfect, did ok in 2006 election

(page 8)
While some paper-based systems such as DRE-VVPAT are ripe for improvement, it appears that
the November 2006 elections did not have widespread problems in general with paper-based
systems.

NIST considers paperless SI methods, says there are two that
meet the requirements of SI :

(page 10)
4. Current Issues with Paperless SI Approaches

The pursuit of secure paperless SI approaches to voting systems has become an active
research goal and has resulted in several commercial devices14 that to some degree meet
requirements of SI. As described earlier, there are at present two types of paperless SI
systems: software IV and E2E....

NIST says should set 2007 standards for paperless verification systems
so that vendors will "innovate":

(page 11)
...
4.1. The Innovation Class

Requiring SI voting systems in VVSG 2007 effectively leaves only voter-verified paper-based
approaches for now. It is important, though, that new and innovative approaches to voting
systems be pursued, especially with regard to secure paperless approaches. But, secure
paperless and other approaches are not likely to be pursued by vendors if testable
requirements and a certification path for them are not included in VVSG 2007....''

NIST says paperless DREs could still be purchased, but none
would be certified after 2009/2010, and in the near future only
methods with VVPAT would be certified. Leaves door open for black box on
top of the black box, and encryption.

(page 12)
5. Ramifications of Requiring SI

The most obvious ramification of requiring SI in VVSG 2007 is that paperless DREs could
not be certified to VVSG 2007. Purchase of paperless DREs would still be permitted,
but certification of new paperless DREs would be prohibited after, likely, 2009/2010 when
compliance with VVSG 2007 may be required15. This effectively leaves only voter-verified
paper approaches for certification in the near/foreseeable future, including op scan, EBM
devices, DRE-VVPAT, and, possibly, some E2E approaches....

http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf

[Fridays Child]

2. Let me be the first to recommend this post.

:)

Edited to add that Nancy Pelosi and the Dems had better jump all over this.

[blm]

3. What a relief. This can only get better from here.

Thanks Brad.

[proud patriot]

4. hallelujah

:woohoo:

[Botany]

5. I worked on election day 2006 in Columbus, OH

Put those E.E.S. machines in the landfill now.
Not starting in the A.M., not zeroing out,
breakdowns, printer errors, and no paper trail
that the voter can take with hi,/her.

I saw so much crap w/ them that it was not funny. And if
Deb Pryce gets back into the House I have a feeling that
E.E.S. machines helped her along.

[mod mom]

11. Hey Botany:

Received this comment from a reporter who I forwarded the Dispatch article for comment:

The total of 1,800 doesn't sound right. I thought each machine was to accommodate 100 to 300 voters.
Also, did you hear about Fairfield County problems? Supposedly their machines were programmed wrong to count Issue 1 (which was knocked off the ballot) and it messed up counts elsewhere.

-----Original Message-----

Subject: Dispatch: 30 e voting machines in Franklin Co NOT counted Election Night

Were others aware of this (tucked in within a Pryce/Kilroy story)?

-snip

Damschroder said one post-election discovery will add to Monday's official tally.

Votes from about 30 electronic machines in 12 county precincts weren't counted on election-night, he said, because poll workers didn't shut them down properly.

That would add another 1,800 or more votes countywide — and an unknown smaller number in the Pryce-Kilroy race — if those machines matched the average number of votes cast per machine across Franklin County.

-snip

http://www.columbusdispatch.com/news-story.php?story=228255

ANY COMMENTS?

[Botany]

18. Kilroy's people & lawyer are very aware of the 30 machines.

The "finding" 30 machines 2 weeks after the election does not pass
any sort of smell test.

The machines had to be tallied @ the end of day with their #s posted
in a public place for all to see ... if this was not done then a red flags
should have gone up PDQ. Also the Yellow master EES recording
computer had to have been sent to the BOE w/ the paper tape from
the machines too.

I was in contact w/ the reporter who wrote the story because I thought
the headline was very misleading .... "Pryce Lead Over Kilroy Grows."

The Kilroy people are still hopeful if we get all the thrown out ballots
counted that she wins.

But "they" better enjoy this last stolen election .... Jennifer Brunner &
Marc Dann will not put up with this shit ... and they are saving the data
from 04 too.

Kilroy's Polls had her winning, Cook political report had her up by 12 points,
and Fox News called the race for Kilroy @ 8:30 PM by their exit polls.

Something really stinks in the Kilroy v Pryce race.

[mod mom]

58. Didn't you love how the Disgrace just placed it in the middle of the

article "Pryce Lead...".I'm glad Brunner & Dann are in charge but even more thankful that Conyers has subpoena power!

[Boxturtle]

82. Is this race settled?

I haven't seen anything about this race lately, so I assumed that Pryce won. Is this the case, or is there still no declared winner? I really hope Kilroy is contesting the election, as Pryce is probably one of the worst remaining Republicans in congress.

[Botany]

85. Pryce's margin of victory is 1,000 votes (down from 3000)

So there will be an automatic recount.

The cook Political had Kilroy w/ a 12 point lead
Kilroy's own polls had her out front too.
Fox news exit polls called the race for Kilroy @ 8:30 PM.

I don't give the recount a very good chance because the head
of the Franklin County BOE is Matt Damnschroder who is very
dirty .... he shorted the machines to dem districts in 2004.

If Pryce did win then it was by cheating, vote suppression, and
the "magic" of E.E.S. voting machines.

[partylessinOhio]

6. Please add:

Scrap Bush!

[coffeenap]

7. YES!!!! THANK YOU, ALL OF YOU WHO DID THIS FOR US!

:grouphug: :yourock: :patriot:

[eliphaslevi]

8. They are just a bunch of conspiracy crackpots!

:sarcasm:

:woohoo:

[cui bono]

9. They're finally realizing what is obvious. Hooray!!! n/t

[JudyM]

10. The NIST paper also noted that, "potentially, a single programmer could 'rig' a major election."

Beautiful!

This may be just the shot in the arm we need to get them banned here in VA. Which will undoubtedly help us keep the very slight tinge of blue we've gotten lately.

:toast: :party:

[Stevepol]

37. How do you know it's a "slight tinge of blue"?

If you're basing your opinion on the voting machine results, you could hardly have a less reliable basis for such an opinion.

The exit polls and pre-election polls are probably better indicators of the political leanings in VA as they are almost everywhere else in the country.

I believe Webb won in VA by a larger margin than he was credited with having and I think a fair vote count would show that to be true.

[femrap]

49. George Allen didn't call for a Recount because

he knew he would lose by a much, much larger margin. He (and Karl) didn't want the voting public to learn how these machines can be manipulated.

Can you imagine Allen giving in if he knew he could win????

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

65. No way to recount Virginia, its 70% paperless

thats why Allen didn't call for a recount.

You find very little at all with a re run of
electronic ballots.

Allen waited for the canvassing, which could
show if voter turnout and ballots cast were off,
and then checked that.

In canvassing, it is sometimes discovered that
not all ballots are downloaded.

Some ballots turn up that way, it happened in
Warren County in the May primary.

Canvassing turned up a discrepancy, and the
problem was found.

But Virginia has mostly paperless DRES, and Allen knew the
record was going to play the same way each time.

[JudyM]

64. I hope you're right though the pre and post polls were close, as well. n/t

[emlev]

12. About NIST's role in the election system in the U.S.

From their http://vote.nist.gov">website:
NIST and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
The 2002 Help America Vote Act has given NIST a key role in helping to realize nationwide improvements in voting systems by January 2006. To assist the Election Assistance Commission with the development of voluntary voting system guidelines, HAVA established the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) and directs NIST to chair the TGDC. NIST research activities include:

* security of computers, computer networks, and computer data storage used in voting systems;
* methods to detect and prevent fraud;
* protection of voter privacy; and
* the role of human factors in the design and application of voting systems, including assistive technologies for individuals with disabilities (including blindness) and varying levels of literacy

http://vote.nist.gov/work.htm">More

Great news! And a great moment for that Gandhi quote! ("First they ignore you...")

Gandhi, not Condi!

[Hekate]

13. ...Breaks into "Hallelujah Chorus" and "Ode to Joy"...

:bounce: :bounce: :bounce:

:woohoo:

omigod omigod omigod please please please

babbling incoherent prayers to Lady Liberty,

Hekate

[AzDar]

14. Wonderful!!! n/t

[BlueCollar]

15. Kick and Recommend

NIST is the Gold Standard....when these guys say it's right...it's right

Pelosi and company need to get on this yesterday...

:kick:

[Pawel K]

16. Those guys at NIST need to take their tinfoil hats off!!!

:sarcasm:

[DBoon]

59. Those guys at NIST need to stay off small planes

and (in a less paranoid statement) I hope the Democratically controlled Congress ensures there is no retaliation for this. NIST is an executive branch department, after all.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

66. NIST recommending paperless verification systems

so there is no huge victory here, just that DRES
will have to have VVPAT to be certified to 2007 standards,
but paperless DREs can still be purchased.

Thats what NIST is recommending.

Here is the 12 page executive summary

http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf

[Digit]

17. yesyesyesyesyesyes! n/t

[mopinko]

19. wwwoooohhhooooooo! but

i am getting sick of being right. aren't you?

[KansDem]

20. You mean Republican-owned voting machines with secret Republican codes...

...developed by Republicans who donated heavily to Republicans while publicly claiming the commitment to give votes to Republicans, resulting in less-than-satisfactory and outright bogus election tallies favoring Republicans, are not working?

Who would've thought?

[IndyOp]

21. Halla - FUCKIN' - lujah!

I'll be busy sending this off to all my friends on the Boards of Election!

Woo-hoo! :bounce: :woohoo: :bounce: :woohoo: :bounce: :woohoo:

[Old and In the Way]

22. Can someone explain this?

"also Says So-Called 'Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT) Should Not Be Used' in Voting Systems!"

Isn't that a good thing? Having a printed record of your vote that you can check and then use as an independent check against the machine results? Or is there concern that the machines could still rig elections outside the recount margin of error?

[emlev]

23. I think this great piece will answer your questions.

http://www.votersunite.org/info/LegislationRecommendation.asp

What we need is paper BALLOTS. VVPAT is glorified toilet paper (hence the graphic in the OP). Check out the link and post again if you have more questions, okay?

[sce56]

74. In Nov 2000 I voted in Hawaii we used a machine that showed the options you selected then it printed

out on 8x11" standard printer paper which after checking the ballot to verify your vote was properly printed it was then taken to the scanner which scanned the ballot and if it passed the scan with no over or under votes it was accepted with a green light and automatically dropped in the ballot box for later recount if needed. If there was a problem it would kick back the ballot as unacceptable so you could correct the error. I thought it was a great system and if there was open software to see that their was no malicious code in it then this would be a great system as long as their were audits with a neutral observer making the calls as to which precincts to audit after the election so as to insure the vote was accurate. If we can't have that then lets go back to paper ballots period.

[BradBlog]

24. Read the full article...

It gives reasons for why VVPAT is no good.

Perhaps more to the point, is this article I ran earlier today explaining the difference between paper BALLOTS (good) and so-called "Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails" (not good, a scam). That artilce is here:

http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3857

America need a paper BALLOT for every vote cast. Period.

[petgoat]

26. Yay Brad! Take a bow, sir! When are you going to run for

Congress?

[BradBlog]

73. run for the hills? :-)

I'll run for congress when either:

a) The election system is corrected.
b) You guys set up, run and fund the campaign.
c) Hell freezes over.

Either way, I should have plenty of time to get prepared. Thanks for asking! :-)

Brad

[Make7]

33. Here is a link to the actual NIST white paper (draft version):

http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf

Hopefully that has a more detailed explanation for you.

- Make7

[Bill Bored]

50. You ask too many questions. See post #57.

Just let the false euphoria flow for a while and when the dust settles, it will become evident that they have other verification methods in mind besides the beloved PAPER BALLOT.

[suston96]

25. County by county, polling place by polling place....

No matter how it turns out, the most notorious county in the US in 2006 - FL 13 - has already decided to trash the touch screens and go back to the opti-scans. Well, that's a start.

There are 3,141 counties in the US. (US 2000 Census). One by one they must do the same. For starters, get rid of the touch-screens. Then, the tabulation systems must also be discarded if they are still run by Microsoft softwared PCs. You got to be kidding? Windows software counts our votes?

Tomorrow, I will call my County seat or go there, and ask where that one touchscreen with optional use, came from I used and I will ask when they will get rid of it. The rest of the equipment was optiscan with er - PC type modem transmitting votes, tabulated on the opti-scanners.

We need to get to work. Call your county board of elections. Asking questions is cheap. The great feeling you get when you make a difference is indescribable.

[Deb]

27. Thank you!!!!

I'm trying not to get excited but the tears are just streaming. This is getting shared with everyone I know, Dem Committee members and other people who care.

[babsbunny]

28. PARTY!!!!!!!!!!!!

:beer:

[Benhurst]

30. Recommended #60

:bounce: :bounce: :bounce:

[mom cat]

31. Fabulous!

That would be a damned good start!

[phiddle]

32. We should adopt Vote-by-mail, as in Oregon.

It's voter-friendly, and results in an automatic VVPB. In Oregon it has led to higher turnout (87%!), reduced costs by 30%, centralized the counting mechanism into a few counties rather than dispersing it in many precincts, and avoided major snafus by giving officials more lead time to deal with issues. The first count issued on voting night 2004 was nearly 50% of the total vote, AND IT PROVED AN ACCURATE INDICATOR OF THE TOTAL VOTE. (No more late-hour shenanigans.)

See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40032-2004Dec31.html

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

77. good luck, heres VBM in Colorado

Facts about how it went,
the truth about cost savings
the truth about voter turnout.

http://www.ncvoter.net/downloads/VBMCoSpgs_2003_mail-in.pdf

[lpbk2713]

34. Damn Right!!

This Floridian agrees wholeheartedly.

[kestrel91316]

35. Unfortunately, I think the next headline we can expect to see is:

"Citing Misconduct and Fraud, Bush Disbands National Institute of Standards and Technology"

[sweetheart]

36. hammers are a good way to vote

Just an unforgettable 'press' to the button, and
the machine counts no more votes.

[livvy]

38. Now this makes my day. Wow...this is incredibly good news.

I think this calls for....



Thanks for the great news!

[BadGimp]

39. THANKS BRAD!!!

[annabanana]

40. This is wonderful!

How long have we been wailing in the wilderness.. abused as lunatic-fringe, tin-foil wearing, loony tune sore losers..

It is like finally exhaling..

[lonestarnot]

41. Oh hell yeah!

dance dance dance :bounce: :bounce: :bounce: :party: :party: :woohoo: :woohoo: :woohoo: yeaya baby!

[nicknameless]

42. WOO-HOO!!!

K&R

[SharonRB]

43. This is amazing news

But will the laws actually change or will the states scrap what they've spent millions on? I'm skeptical anything will come of it, but I'm hopeful.

[Hepburn]

44. OMG.......be still my heart!

I feel as freaking giddy over this as I did when I got my first proposal of marriage!

:bounce:

A HUGE thank you to all of those who have worked so hard to get things to this point!

Edit to add: I am proud to be #90 K&R!!!!!

[Bill Bored]

45. Nice try but this won't affect an election until at least 2009. nt

[In Truth We Trust]

46. K&R Hand Counted Paper Ballots NOW!

[RestoreGore]

47. It's about time...

Those in Congress who keep calling for "all the votes to be counted" better now walk the walk after talking the talk on this. Only, I didn't notice election reform was anywhere on their agenda... it better be now. PAPER BALLOTS is the only acceptable way.

[freedomfries]

48. thank you brad!

thanks for all you've done to save our democracy!
:patriot:

[Greybnk48]

51. Thank you Brad and everyone else who worked so hard

to make people listen. This is such a relief!! :applause:

[buddysmellgood]

52. Rig and election? Go figure. kick

[Kablooie]

53. OF COURSE! Democrats have the upper hand so ...

The Republicans want the rigged machines scrapped. The only reason they exist is for Republicans to steal elections.
This was fully expected.

[hootinholler]

54. Woot! 100th rec! n/t

[bleever]

56. Ha! It was you!

:toast:, my friend.

[bleever]

55. I wanted to be the 100th rec., but somebody tied with me.

S'okay, I'm in a very sharing mood!

K&R.

:woohoo:

[hootinholler]

62. Musta been us then...

it was 98 goin in and 100 coming out.

How ya been?

-Hoot

[bleever]

71. I've been getting better,

on this front, and feel like I need to catch up on counting my blessings, so that I can make sure they're applied properly.

(I was at 99 going in, and 101 coming out).

Here's to a straight deal for everyone.

[Bill Bored]

57. Sorry, no ban on touch screens. Read the paper!

OK, I don't expect everyone on DU to be a techie nerd, but those of us who follow this stuff "for a living" know exactly what it means, and it's NOT a ban on DREs or touch screens and probably had nothing to do with the excellent letter by VotersUnite.

Here are some facts you may wish to consider:

From the definitions on the first page of the NIST report:
<http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf>

"- DRE – Direct Record Electronic, used in this paper to refer to current “blackbox” DREs that provide no transparency to its software, e.g., open source, etc."

Note: this is NOT the same as "DRE-VVPAT."

From page 6:
"There are several types of software-independent systems, however those that are readily
available today are paper-based. These are as follows:
1. Op scan using manually marked paper ballots
2. Op scan using an EBM, which can produce a richer user interface including support
for accessibility and alternative languages
3. DRE-VVPAT"

From page 13:
"NIST and the TGDC must continue to work on usability and accessibility requirements for systems
such as op scan and DRE-VVPAT. There is good reason to believe that much more can be
done to make these systems more usable and convenient for voters and for election officials"

Note: Does this read like a ban on touch screens?

From, page 15:
"2. Focus attention towards improving the usability and accessibility of paperbased
SI voting systems: HFP and STS should continue to work together to
incorporate requirements to make op scan, EBM, and DRE-VVPAT more usable,
accessible, and convenient to audit. If this work requires more time than allocated
for VVSG 2007 development, some method for continuing this work should be
investigated."

Translation:

• No ban on touch screens.
  
• Possible ban on DREs without VVPATs.
  
• Ban will NOT take effect until 2009 when the 2007 standards will go into effect.
  
• No paperless independent verification systems in the 2007 standards, but this may still be an area for future development.

See what happens at the Dec. TGDC meeting where this will be discussed. Meanwhile, it's a modest improvement because it acknowledges the need for independent verification using paper. But it does NOT ban touch screens nor does it require paper ballots in lieu of VVPATs.

Where the report is disappointing is that it considers DREs with VVPATs to be software-independent because the VVPATs can be audited independently. What it does NOT seem to point out is that the software is still required to produce the VVPATs. This is one of the points that VotersUnite and others who oppose DREs have correctly tried to make.

Now try not to shoot the messenger.

[Old and In the Way]

67. Thanks Bill!

I'm still trying to ken this issue: "What it does NOT seem to point out is that the software is still required to produce the VVPATs."

OK, there's printer software drivers that records your vote to the paper register. Where's the problem? The voter can see that his/her paper results match his/her vote selection. If it didn't, I assume there's a method to void and recast. On audit the receipts ought to match the registers...if they don't, paper would obviously take precedence. So where is the potential for election fraud?

I certainly prefer paper ballot (works just fine up here in Maine) and not trying to be obtuse; there's probably something I'm not understanding about the VVPAT aspect of electronic voting.

[BradBlog]

72. Old and In the Way...Here's what you need to know...

VVPAT's do not work. Period.

They are not accurate, they jam, they mismatch the internal count almost every time anybody bothers to audit them, and voters don't actually check them in many cases.

In Toledo in 2005 and in Franklin County (as I recall) in 2006, VVPAT rolls came in completely empty. Why did nobody notice? Not voters, not elections officials.

Those were both Diebold touch-screen systems, which have an opaque plastic door over the view window to the VVPAT. (see photos here: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=2578)

If you happen to be informed enough to lift that door, you'll then find a magnifying glass which Diebold includes with every machine.

Then, you'll have to hope your ballot isn't long enough that the results scroll by the window before you can "verify" it. If you happen to know to do so.

Of course, you have to be informed enough to know you're supposed to lift that door and check your paper trail. That only works when poll workers DON'T instruct folks to NOT lift that door (watch a poll worker do exactly that in California on PBS News Hours' report on CA's primary here: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=2968)

Audits of the paper trail v. the machine count continuously find they don't match. And then what? In California, for example, the paper is NOT the "ballot of record".

Oh...so many reasons why VVPAT simply does not work. Not the least of which is that nobody bothers to actually count them. The machine counts are used instead.

I'll let other folks continue to explain as needed.

America needs a paper BALLOT vote every vote cast. Period.

[Old and In the Way]

76. Thanks...I checked your links out.

Seems to me that the paper should be the ballot of record. I agree that the design of the these paper registers discourages the voter from checking his actual results. I've used enough ATMs to know that a receipt can be printed rather easily with the voting results clear enough to compare with the electronic record. But I also know that's not what the criminals who foisted HAVA on us want.

The fact that the actual paper records don't match the computer totals ought to be enough to declare them unreliable.

Thanks for the feedback.

[slackmaster]

94. VVPATs in their present form definitely suck

That does not mean they cannot be made reliable and usable. The NIST draft paper does not share Brad's conclusion that they are hopeless.

They are not accurate, they jam, they mismatch the internal count almost every time anybody bothers to audit them, and voters don't actually check them in many cases.

All true, but those are not insurmountable problems.

If you happen to be informed enough to lift that door, you'll then find a magnifying glass which Diebold includes with every machine.

Then, you'll have to hope your ballot isn't long enough that the results scroll by the window before you can "verify" it. If you happen to know to do so.

I voted on a Diebold machine with a VVPAT in California this year. It did not have the opaque door you describe. The VVPAT scrolled exactly in sync with the ballot review on the GUI, and even with my 48-year-old eyes I had no trouble at all reading it. I would agree that the print was small enough to be a problem for some people. Again, not an insurmountable problem.

Audits of the paper trail v. the machine count continuously find they don't match.

Sure, and consecutive hand-counts of a stack of hundreds of ballots done by different individuals often don't match either.

And then what? In California, for example, the paper is NOT the "ballot of record".

In the event of a machine failure in which the memory is lost, the paper becomes the ballot of record.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

78. it would allow completely paperless systems

NIST recommends exploring end to end encryption systems,
and there probably wouldn't be a paper ballot.


there might be a receipt, and you could "check it"
if you trust the computerized system that you
used to check it with.

Again, more black boxes being dreamed up to add to black boxes.

And NIST did not recommend banning DREs, it said that
2007 standards should only certified DRES if they have VVPAT,
or if other verification was available.

[Bill Bored]

79. I was just pointing out that the software-independence requirement

does not rule out DREs even though technically, VVPAT production is not independent of the software. If it's buggy or the DRE crashes, you may not get your VVPAT printed, and so on. But assuming all that works, the VVPATs can be independently verified if they are legible.

[Old and In the Way]

90. Next issue...printer runs out of ink

You just know there's going to be some planned problem here....

[BradBlog]

70. Oh, Bill...Why so doubtful? ;-)

Always seing the glass half empty, my friend? :-)

(I jest, of course, because in this game, one is wise to. Nonetheless...)

The paper is also critical of VVPAT's as they're currently implemented, recommending machines no longer be allowed for purchase with the toilet-paper roles (VVPATs).

As well, in re: the 2009 date for the standards -- A few things you may wish to keep in mind:

+ Folks in Congress are not likely to pass legislation that won't hold up to the 2007 standards (to kick in in 2009. So folks like Rush Holt will likely have the political cover they need to remove DRE/VVPAT from bills like the upcoming new-session revision to HR550.

+ What jurisdiction would be dumb enough to waste tax payer money purchasing machines which would be unusable by 2009 (of course, that presumes they are a state which follow Fed standards).

+ Need further evidence for your elections officials that DRE's are "Game Over"? The NIST just gave it to you.

Looking for a silver bullet? So far, I don't suspect we'll be seeing any. But reports like this are about as close as we're likely to get. I'd suggest this development is gold for those who give a damn about Election Integrity.

[Bill Bored]

80. It's a positive development, but all the old stuff will be grandfathered absent legislation.

And since it doesn't ban DREs with VVPATs (non-toilet-paper type), Holt may not ban them either. (HR 550 already bans toilet paper VVPATs.)

Hey, I'm all for standards. I just don't see this as the death knell for DREs as long as they have proper printers like they're supposed to have in NY (which is one reason why we haven't certified any yet).

[slackmaster]

93. Thanks Bill, I'm glad I read the actual paper before responding

:toast:

[Warren Stupidity]

60. Remind me again why we are all a bunch of tinfoil hat loons?

Barking mad they say. Lunatic left. Shutup about your stolen elections. Blah blah blah blah. Except we keep being right and way ahead of the curve.

[petgoat]

68. Conspiracy theories, don't ya know..... People need some sense

that there's meaning to the chaos in life, even if it's a malevolent
force they have to imagine. Something like that.

[AtLiberty]

61. THERE IS A GOD!!!

!!!

[Vidar]

69. Glad to hear it.

[rumpel]

75. What Great News, Brad!

:toast:

[krispos42]

81. Graphic displays of Diebold's reaction to the story:

[NotGivingUp]

83. yeeee-haaaaaa!!!

[whistle]

84. Great, paper ballots and supervised counting at each precinct

....with total back-up documentation. X marks the spot! Clean, simple and permanent.

[NoSheep]

86. YAHOOOOOOO!!!!!!!

:woohoo:

[KAT119]

87. HOORAY & HALLELUJAH!!!

[nolabels]

88. Honestly, did it really take a federal agency to figure this out?

Like having to admit the obvious makes sense, but having putting this out now because their agency might now get some scrutiny should seem even more obvious

[oc2002]

89. Why not just have a law banning secrete proprietary software for federal elections?

That would mean the government agency creates the specs, and open software is used to ensure there was no tampering.

[MasonJar]

91. It serves those crooked companies just right. They lost a lot of

future business by being traitors.

[Zorra]

92. You don't have to be an MIT grad to figure out that evoting

is about as stupid an idea as putting square concrete wheels on your car.

[sonias]

95. Best news of the year

The tipping point I hope.
:applause::applause::applause:

Sonia