7/7 inquest verdict: Emergency services cleared but MI5 under fire

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Source: The Guardian

None of the 52 people who died in the 7 July terrorist attacks could have been saved even if help from the emergency services had arrived earlier, an inquest into their deaths has ruled.

But confusion in MI5's system of assessing terrorist suspects and questions over the security services' record-keeping continued to cause concern almost six years after 7/7 attacks, the coroner said.

Four bombs exploded in central London on 7 July 2005. Delivering verdicts of unlawful killing for all the victims, Lady Justice Hallett ruled that no failings from any of the emergency services involved had contributed to the deaths.

"The medical and scientific evidence in relation to all 52 victims leads to only one sad conclusion," she said.

Read more: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/may/06/7-july-inquest-verdict-mi5

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1. Coroner's Inquest concluded UK counter-terrorism agency botched use of double-agents and

was unable to properly assess the danger that they actually pose. "MI-5" is the British FBI. "Supergrass" is British slang for informant, or opposition agents who have been "turned' and their handlers assume are now under government control, but actually are still working for the opposition.

As one reads this, one might as well apply the same recommendations to the CIA's mishandling of the Flt. 77 hijackers, al-Midhar and al-Hazmi, listed al-Qaeda terrorists whom the Agency apparently treated as double-agents, which allowing them to enter the US on January 15, 2000, withholding a warning cable that would have otherwise led to their being more closely watched or arrested by the FBI.

Most of the following, in quotations, is verbatum from the Coroner's Report, a public document (not copyrighted material), as linked: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/may/06/77-inquest-coroners-recommendations?intcmp=239

July 7 inquest: coroner's recommendations

Lady Justice Hallett has produced a series of recommendations under rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984

The coroner in the July 7 inquests, Lady Justice Hallett, made several recommendations for the emergency services and MI5.
Following are the main recommendations made by the coroner after she returned an unlawful killing verdict for the 52 victims of the London bombings in 2005.

Security services

The inquest recommended that MI5 improve procedures aimed at getting the best intelligence from supergrasses, and that the service keeps better records of how it assesses who poses a threat to national security.

Hallett found MI5 could not have prevented the attacks in 2005, but used her powers to ask Britain's domestic security service to learn further lessons. She warned of potential "dire consequences" if her recommendations were not acted upon.

The first of two recommendations for MI5 concerned undercover photographs taken before the attacks of the ringleader, Mohammad Sidique Khan. Some had said MI5 had enough clues before Khan struck to assess that he was a dangerous terrorist, which the security service has denied.

Pictures of Khan and another of the bombers, Shehzad Tanweer, were obtained by MI5 in February 2004 as part of an investigation into another major terrorist plot.In April 2004 copies of the pictures were sent to the US to be shown to a terrorist-turned-supergrass, Mohammed Junaid Babar. But the coroner said the quality of the pictures was dreadful, with one of Khan not even being shown to Babar. This was potentially important because Babar had met Khan at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan.

Hallett ruled: "I recommend that consideration be given to whether the procedures can be improved to ensure that 'human sources' who are asked to view photographs are shown copies of the photographs of the best possible quality, consistent with operational sensitivities."

In her findings Hallett said: "On 6 April 2004 Babar was shown one of the pictures of unidentified male D (Tanweer) that had been taken on 2 February 2004 at Toddington Services. However the photograph had been cropped in such a way as to render him virtually unidentifiable.

"A photograph of E (Khan), cut in half, was not shown to Babar at all and thus no opportunity was presented to him to identify him."

The inquest heard evidence from a senior MI5 official, called witness G, who had defended their actions.

Hallett's findings said: "He speculated that the cropped photograph of E (Khan) was of such poor quality that it was not deemed worth showing to Babar. This, of course, begs the question of why the photographs of D and E were cropped in this way. They were dreadful."

Hallett found that Babar failed to identify Khan and Tanweer when he was later shown better quality photographs, meaning the original error "had little or no practical effect".

But she said: " I have expressed my concerns, given the serious possible consequences of any failings in this respect and I have been assured through counsel that the point is well understood by the Security Service."

Hallett's second recommendation for MI5 concerned how it prioritised the level of threat posed by terrorist suspects and the records kept of how it reached those decisions.

Hallett found confusion about the level of priority given by MI5 to investigating Khan, but crucially refrained from criticising it for not treating him as more of a threat.

She found that inadequate recording of decisions risked "dire consequences" if potential errors could not be picked up by supervisors at MI5.

"There was very limited recording of the decisions in relation to D and E available to any reviewer and I heard little if anything from witness G on how the system has improved in this respect.

"Given the importance of these decisions, and the uncertainties and inconsistencies in the evidence, there may well be a case for a better recording of decision making ...

"I feel unable to accept Mr Eadie and witness G's assurances that all is now well, without more.

"In this respect, therefore, I still have a concern. I should like the director general to allay that concern given the possibly dire consequences of a flawed decision which cannot be properly supervised."

Hallett's findings, which will be sent to the head of MI5 and the home secretary, said: "I recommend that procedures be examined by the Security Service to establish if there is room for further improvement in the recording of decisions relating to the assessment of targets."