Full text: Conclusions of Senate's Iraq report

[seemslikeadream]

Report on the prewar intelligence assessments Updated: 12:54 p.m. ET July 09, 2004Below are the Senate Intelligence Committee report's conclusions on pre-war intelligence failures in Iraq, as released. (Portions of the conclusions were blacked out, by the committee, prior to public release.)

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE

REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ

CONCLUSIONS

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS - WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(U) Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.

(U) The major key judgments in the NIE, particularly that Iraq "is reconstituting its nuclear program," "has chemical and biological weapons," was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents," and that "all key aspects - research & development (R&D), production, and weaponization - of Iraq's offensive biological weapons (BW) program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War," either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting provided to the Committee. The assessments regarding Iraq's continued development of prohibited ballistic missiles were reasonable and did accurately describe the underlying intelligence.

(U) The assessment that Iraq "is reconstituting its nuclear program" was not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee. The intelligence reporting did show that Iraq was procuring dual-use equipment that had potential nuclear applications, but all of the equipment had conventional military or industrial applications. In addition, none of the intelligence reporting indicated that the equipment was being procured for suspect nuclear facilities. Intelligence reporting also showed that former Iraqi nuclear scientists continued to work at former nuclear facilities and organizations, but the reporting did not show that this cadre of nuclear personnel had recently been regrouped or enhanced as stated in the NIE, nor did it suggest that they were engaged in work related to a nuclear weapons program.

(U) The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons" overstated both what was known and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons holdings. The intelligence reporting did support the conclusion that chemical and biological weapons were within Iraq's technological capability, that Iraq was trying to procure dual-use materials that could have been used to produce these weapons, and that uncertainties existed about whether Iraq had fully destroyed its pre-Gulf War stocks of weapons and precursors. Iraq's efforts to deceive and evade United Nations weapons inspectors and its inability or unwillingness to fully account for pre-Gulf War chemical and biological weapons and precursors could have led analysts to the reasonable conclusion that Iraq may have retained those materials, but intelligence analysts did not have enough information to state with certainty that Iraq "has" these weapons.

(BLACKED OUT) Similarly, the assessment that "all key aspects - R&D, production, and weaponization — of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War" was not supported by the underlying intelligence provided to the Committee. Intelligence showed that Iraq was renovating or expanding facilities that had been associated with Iraq's past BW program and was engaged in research that had BW applications, but few reports suggested specifically that the activity was related to BW. Intelligence reports did indicate that Iraq may have had a mobile biological weapons program, but most of the reporting was from a single human intelligence (HUMINT) source to whom the Intelligence Community (1C) never had direct access. It was reasonable for intelligence analysts to be concerned about the potential weapons applications of Iraq's dual use activities and capabilities. The intelligence reporting did not substantiate an assessment that all aspects of Iraq's BW program "are" larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War, however.

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http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5403731/


Josh Marshall

I've always thought that if Washington's Iraq War were a history play or perhaps a tragedy, on the model of Shakespeare, that the folks in Doug Feith's made-to-order intel shop at the Pentagon would be the dingbat comic relief, the antic if malevolent
players who provide the theatrical diversion from the main rush of the drama's forward motion. And on this point the mammoth Senate intel report does not disappoint. Pages 304 to 312 of the report provide some enlightening, depressing and even entertaining reading on that count.

From those pages, there's one point that caught my attention.

You'll remember that in recent days and weeks we've been harping again and again on this October 20, 2002 column by Jim Hoagland in the Post in which Hoagland praises the administration's mau-mauing of the CIA that had finally gotten Langley's analysts religion on Iraq, al Qaida, WMD and the rest of it.
In the course of that column, Hoagland notes that there were still some hold-outs against the new party line. And he gives the following example ...

Such misjudgments have continued until today. After four months of inconclusive debate following Sept. 11, the agency produced a new analysis last spring titled: "Iraq and al Qaeda: A Murky Relationship." It fails to make much of a case for anything, I am told. It echoes the views of Paul Pillar, the national intelligence officer for the Middle East and South Asia, and other analysts who have consistently expressed doubts that Iraq has engaged in international terrorism or trained others to do so since 1993.
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http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/

[acmavm]

1. This who report think is just Twilight Zone crap. The CIA tried to warn

bush* about exaggerating his 'intelligence'. I specifically remember reports about inclusive data, etc. right around the start of the shock and awe insanity. And I also remember that it was Feith and Cheney's office that was forcing Chalabi down everyone's throats as being a source of the intelligence. He provided the Iraqis that gave us all the fabulous tidbits that was used for justification for the attack. But what really makes this ugly is the UN inspectors were in Iraq reporting that they couldn't find any evidence of weapons or weapons programs. It was the bush* administration that had them yanked out of there so that the attacks could begin.

This report is so unbelievable ugly. Of course you would expect a republican senate to try to cover for their fearless leader, but not to this extent. In fact, I feel that this makes the accessories to war crimes. In legal terms, it's almost a conspiracy, the elements being that the bush* administration lies and commits the US to a war for which there was not justification and then these clowns lie to try to cover the crime. How did we ever get to a point in our country where it is so morally bankrupt that an entire political party has no qualms about sell their souls to the devil and throwing the American people in as part of the bargain. I can hardly recognize this country anymore, and I most certainly don't recognize the people who are running it.

[al bupp]

2. TPM Permalink

Since the Josh Marshall piece will end up scrolling down the page in coming days, thought I'd post a permanent link to the article:

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/week_2004_07_04.php#003142

I heard Roberts & Rockafeller on NPR discussing the report. Unfortunately, I think for the general public, who wont pay too much attention to the details, the GOP has the plausible deniability they need on the question of who's to blame for faulty intelligence.

I did like Rockafeller's statement, near the end of the interview, where he says that clearly, the admin made it's mind up right after 9/11 (though many say even before) to invade (sorry, liberate) Iraq. After that it was mostly a matter of getting the "evidence" they needed to back them up on a justification.

http://www.npr.org/display_pages/features/feature_3262021.html