How Niger Uranium Story Defied Wide Skepticism - NYT

[TacticalPeek]

SENATE REPORT

How Niger Uranium Story Defied Wide Skepticism

By JAMES RISEN

Published: July 14, 2004

WASHINGTON, July 13 - Soon after the Central Intelligence Agency heard in 2001 that Iraq was seeking to buy uranium from Niger to build nuclear bombs, the first doubts about the account were raised. But the story was included in President Bush's State of the Union address last year despite sustained skepticism by the State Department, disclaimers by another intelligence agency, assertions that key documents were faked and a dearth of evidence that eventually led C.I.A. officials to grow wary.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, in a report released Friday, has provided the most comprehensive review of what went wrong in the Niger case, which became a major political issue last year after documents that described the uranium deal were discredited as forgeries.

The Senate report disclosed deep concerns among intelligence agencies about the credibility of the information. It concluded that the C.I.A. had failed to aggressively investigate the Niger matter, described the agency's assessments as "inconsistent, and at times contradictory" and noted that the agency had allowed the uranium claims into intelligence reports to policy makers - and the president's speech shortly before the war - without proper vetting.

The C.I.A. first began looking into reports that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger in October 2001, much earlier than previously disclosed. A foreign intelligence service, which is unidentified in the Senate report but which is believed to be Britain's, had said Niger was planning to ship several tons of uranium ore - called yellowcake - to Iraq. The foreign service told the C.I.A. that the Iraqi sales agreement dated to 1999, and had been approved by Niger's president, Tandja Mamadou.

more
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/14/politics/14nige.html

[grytpype]

1. Nice tick-tock on the Niger Connection.

[fearnobush]

2. Is this a big deal?

Instead of assigning a trained intelligence officer to the Niger case, though, the C.I.A. sent a former American ambassador, Joseph Wilson, to talk to former Niger officials. His wife, Valerie Plame, was an officer in the counterproliferation division, and she had suggested that he be sent to Niger, according to the Senate report.

That finding contradicts previous statements by Mr. Wilson, who publicly criticized the Bush administration last year for using the Niger evidence to help justify the war in Iraq. After his wife's identity as a C.I.A. officer was leaked to the news media, Mr. Wilson said she had not played a role in his assignment, and argued that her C.I.A. employment had been disclosed to punish him. The F.B.I. is investigating the source of the leak about Ms. Plame, which was classified information.


If true, and Plame suggested her Hubby, It would be obvious for the White Hosue to out her - But, that's a serious crime. 12-15 yrs.

[DoYouEverWonder]

14. There's all kinds of nepotism in the Bu$h ranks

It's okay for folks like Powell to have his son become head of the FCC, but Plame can't recommend a family member for a mission, who also happened to be the most qualified person for the job?

It's not like there are a 1000's of diplomatic experts on the country of Niger, with the connections that Joe Wilson had.

[PurityOfEssence]

3. If the CIA failed, why didn't Powell raise the Niger Uranium at the U.N.?

The speech was just a matter of days after Ninnyboy's State of the Union Address.

None of this stands even the slightest scrutiny. The Intelligence community didn't start the hubbub about Iraq, and the didn't fuel it either. Hell, the monarchists even had to come up with an Office of Special Plans to come up with enough to frame Hussein.

[shockingelk]

10. "reporting was weak."

This is from the report, p 56. It's talking about how the CIA recommended the White House not to make the claim in Bush's October speech, a few months before the SOTU:

On July 16, 2003, the DCI testified before the SSCI that he told the Deputy National Security Advisor that the "President should not be a fact witness on this issue," because his analysts had told him the "reporting was weak."

Although the NSC had already removed the uranium reference from the speech, later on October 6, 2002 the CIA sent a second fax to the White House which said, "more on why we recommend removing the sentence about procuring uranium oxide from Africa: Three points (1) The evidence is weak. One of the two mines cited by the source as the location of the uranium oxide is flooded. The other mine cited by the source is under the control of the French authorities. (2) The procurement is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide in their inventory. And (3) we have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them that the Africa story is overblown and telling them this is one of the two issues where we differed with the British.

[Tellurian]

16. Well, I hope the 'original' fax is safely hidden in an undisclosed locatio

The smarmy nyt is not only trying to confuse everyone with who did what when but also raising questions of reasonable doubt.

Good point though, to see Cheney's name in print, knowing he's within arm's reach tying him to the order outing Plame. The one aspect they cannot shed is "motive"...

[wtmusic]

4. Way overanalyzed

This has been through the ringer SO many times...

The simple answer is this: Junior/Potty Mouth knew it was bullshit but thought they could squeak it by on a technicality to their war on. All there is to it.

[shockingelk]

11. I must register an objection

There is new info, bolstering the fact the claim never should have been made.

Some people still believe it was reasonable for Bush to make the claim. The more stuff there is about how it never should have been made, the better!

[StandUpGuy]

12. You either wish.

Or you are grossly under-informed

[wtmusic]

18. OK smart guy

Inform me, or counter what I have to say with facts. Throwing out insults is just...weak.

Weak.

[StandUpGuy]

19. Your Theory assumes...

That bush and cheney thought they could get away with it. You present no facts for your theory.

My theory is that you either want to believe your reason or you are grossly under-informed. I also presented no facts to back it up.

So lets call it even instead of weak.
:toast:

[Snazzy]

5. INR

"...only a State Department intelligence analyst thought the report was "highly suspect," the Senate found. The State Department analyst did not believe that Niger would risk selling uranium to Iraq, in violation of international rules, and also knew that a French consortium controlled Niger's uranium industry, making it nearly impossible for Niger to make large shipments on its own."

Still wonder about the guy who 'jumped' from the roof of Foggy Bottom.

The INR footnote (the one Condi mentioned in the Senate, footnote to the Iraq NIE) was significant--even if you must say the CIA is to blame, as is the bandwagon, there is more to the intel community. INR was briefing Special Plans. Management of INR, like Tenet, has split the scene. There's more to the story, the press doesn't have an appetite for intel acronyms beyond the ever popular CIA. So we hear squat. Niger was an area of State Dept. expertise.

[Snazzy]

6. The actual footnote

INR’s Alternative View:
Iraq’s Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes

Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought are, by all indications, bound for Iraq’s missile program. Other cases are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-production line whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some efforts involve non-controlled industrial material and equipment—including a variety of machine tools—and are troubling because they would help establish the infrastructure for a renewed nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use. Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious.


--------

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/nie-iraq-wmd.html

[fearnobush]

7. Agreed, however, it looks like this entire bogus Senate Intel report

was created just to further smear the messenger, Joe - despite what they did to his wife (a treasonous crime), they will nail him to coffin over the reports claim that "she had suggested that he be sent to Niger." Which sounds like bullshit, but even if so - they, the Wilson's were correct - No Uranium from Niger to Iraq.

[Snazzy]

8. I read it, or tried to

Hard to really say what the heck SSIC examined because that section is heavily redacted. Stuck me as politically redacted--so heavy in that section. I'm talking about the initial Niger section around pages 50-80 I think.

The conclusions are another matter, highly political, like you say.

I need to watch the CSPAN feed of Rockefeller essentially saying it's a bunch of crap and then a reporter asking him why he voted for it.

The bit on who suggested Wilson, as you know, is a red herring. And comes from one CIA guy (report called him the CIA Counter Proliferation Reporter, I think). For sure we can assume that there are indeed bad guys and good guys ("less bad") in the George HW Bush CIA.

[Snazzy]

9. INR dissented at least twice

Although NYT doesn't call our attention to that explicitly:

"In January 2003, the State Department's analyst sent an e-mail message to other analysts saying that he believed that the documents obtained in Italy were fake. The "uranium purchase agreement probably is a hoax," he wrote.

But by that time, the White House was already working on Mr. Bush's State of the Union address, and wanted to include some mention of Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium, the Senate report said. On Jan. 27, the White House gave Mr. Tenet a draft copy of the address to review."

What NYT doesn't point out is the footnote that I also posted in this thread. That's in the NIE, in October. INR kept dissenting. Powell vs. Bushco. for one thing.

Hersh:

A few months after George Bush took office, Greg Thielmann, an expert on disarmament with the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, or INR, was assigned to be the daily intelligence liaison to John Bolton, the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, who is a prominent conservative. Thielmann understood that his posting had been mandated by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who thought that every important State Department bureau should be assigned a daily intelligence officer. “Bolton was the guy with whom I had to do business,” Thielmann said. “We were going to provide him with all the information he was entitled to see. That’s what being a professional intelligence officer is all about.”

But, Thielmann told me, “Bolton seemed to be troubled because INR was not telling him what he wanted to hear.” Thielmann soon found himself shut out of Bolton’s early-morning staff meetings. “I was intercepted at the door of his office and told, ‘The Under-Secretary doesn’t need you to attend this meeting anymore.’” When Thielmann protested that he was there to provide intelligence input, the aide said, “The Under-Secretary wants to keep this in the family.”

Eventually, Thielmann said, Bolton demanded that he and his staff have direct electronic access to sensitive intelligence, such as foreign-agent reports and electronic intercepts. In previous Administrations, such data had been made available to under-secretaries only after it was analyzed, usually in the specially secured offices of INR. The whole point of the intelligence system in place, according to Thielmann, was “to prevent raw intelligence from getting to people who would be misled.” Bolton, however, wanted his aides to receive and assign intelligence analyses and assessments using the raw data. In essence, the under-secretary would be running his own intelligence operation, without any guidance or support. “He surrounded himself with a hand-chosen group of loyalists, and found a way to get C.I.A. information directly,” Thielmann said.

http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/031027fa_fact

If you sort through that famous column--though apparently lost on the rest of the media--you learn how OSP ignores INR (they're in DoD, but are dependent on INR for analysis--set up as an alternative to the DIA by Rummy and our pals, neocons-R-us). They take that raw intel, cherry-pick and stovepipes the whole deal. They tamed CIA, probably in no small part due to Plame. They locked out INR, but took their source data. They were in DoD but divorced from DIA. Well that's it, you've done an end run around the three most significant analyzing agencies. Toss in some Chalabi and stir.

[Tellurian]

17. great info, snazzy! nt

[UpInArms]

15. wasn't that John Kokal?

never heard another word on that one.

[farmbo]

13. The story "defied skepticism" because the NYT's Judy Miller...

...trumpeted it on the front pages of The Gray Lady from April 2002 to June 2003...when she finally entered journalistic rehab.

She...and the NYT... made the lies possible, indeed, fashionable.

[struggle4progress]

20. kick

:kick: