The Prime Minister has been cleared of wrongdoing by Lord Butler's report into use of intelligence before the Iraq war.
But his eagerly-anticipated findings came down heavily on the "serious flaws" in the gathering and quality of intelligence. Clearing Tony Blair in his conclusions, Lord Butler said there had not been any deliberate distortion of information used as a basis of going to war.
But, he said, in attempting to justify the Iraq war the dossier had taken to the "outer limits" the intelligence available.
And it condemned the inclusion in the document of the highly-publicised claim that some Iraqi weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes.He likened some information gathered by intelligence agencies to a "Chinese whispers problem".Agents were having to work with a paucity of sources and, in some cases, outside their areas of expertise.
Lord Butler also said the Prime Minister's statement to the Commons on the day the dossier was published may have led the country into believing there was "fuller and firmer" information behind the reasons.
KEY FINDINGS
These are the key findings of the Butler report into the use of intelligence in the run up to the war in Iraq:
:: In March 2002 the intelligence available was "insufficiently robust" to prove Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions.
:: Some of the human intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was "seriously flawed" and "open to doubt".
:: The Joint Intelligence Committee should not have included the "45 minute" claim in the Iraq dossier without stating what exactly it referred to.
:: There was no evidence of "deliberate distortion" of the intelligence material or of "culpable negligence".
:: The language of the Government's dossier on Iraq's weapons may have given the impression there was "fuller and firmer" intelligence behind its judgements than was the case.
:: Tony Blair's statement to MPs on the day the dossier was published may have reinforced this impression.
:: The judgements in the dossier went to the "outer limits", although not beyond the intelligence available.
:: John Scarlet, the head of the JIC in the run up to the Iraq war, should not resign.
:: It would be a "rash person" who claimed that stocks of biological or chemical weapons would never be found in Iraq.
:: There was no evidence the British Government initiated military action in Iraq to secure continued access to oil supplies.
:: The report raised concern about the "informality and circumscribed character" of the Government's policy-making procedures towards Iraq.
http://www.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30000-1143155,00.htmlIn quotes: Blair and Iraq weapons
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3054991.stm