Eric Reeves provides an estimate of the death toll that is, as usual, extremely grim and well documented:
Darfur mortality update III.
My own rough sense is that on the low end, 30,000 to 50,000 dead due to violent bloodletting is probably not grossly inaccurate. Reeves figure of 80,000 involves extrapolations and inferences of the sort that msf (Doctors Without Borders) isn't willing to back up (
Crisis in Sudan, NewsHour, 08122004).
The CDC, in collaboration with UNHCR, WFP, WFP, WHO and Chad's domestic agency, CNNTA, recently completed a
study of mortality among Darfuri refugeees in Chad which included a count of missing persons. If one assumes that the missing have died violently--dubious but perhaps not entirely unwarranted--and then extrapolates to the entire population of the displaced, about 1.2 million, that would mean that approximately 29,000 people died in acts of violence between November 2003 and June 2004. This is a smaller timeframe than the one Reeves uses in the extrapolations that yielded his estimate of 80,000, which was not completely explained. Reeves' figure of 40,000 killed by arms between September 2003 and February 2004 would appear to be based on conservative assumptions, but the CDC survey, if I'm reading it correctly, would suggest that the level of violence recorded in the Mornei region is more of an anomaly than Reeves allows.
In any case it appears that the official Sudanese estimate of 5,000 dead is not even close to the truth. 30,000 to 50,000 is more like the truth. That doesn't include deaths to malnutrition and related diseases. All indicators seem to confirm that Dr. Nabarro's worst fears are being realized (
350 a day could die in Sudan, UN says), and then some. Reported rates of global acute malnutrition and severe acute malnutrition bear out USAID's predictions, as Reeves notes:
The overall conclusion must be that US AID's "Projected Mortality Rates in Darfur, 2004-2005" has been confirmed to a very high degree, both in predicting mortality and malnutrition, and that in the days and weeks and months ahead is likely to offer all too telling a measure of daily human destruction.
How many have been killed, all told? Take a conservative estimate of 30,000 violently slain, add Nabarro's figure of 50,000 dead due to the effects of starvation. Add in an estimate for the last 45 days. Given that the populations in the camps have swollen, that aid rations have been cut and that aid deliveries have been obstructed and inadequate to begin with, that sanitition has become a serious problem and outbreaks of hepatitis and malaria have been reported, and that violent attacks have continued, and using Nabarro's figure of 350 per day, an estimate of an additional 15,750 dead on the conservative end does not seem unreasonable. 45,000 dead, which would assume that global acute malnutrition is indeed taking its toll, seems rather extreme given that there have been some "successes" by relief agencies, and the level of violence by all accounts is not as bad as it was earlier in the year. Nevertheless, that figure of 45,000 may prove to be closer to reality than the figure of 15,750.
In any case, by the time the UN security council meets to decide what to do or not do about the crisis, any estimate of mortality offered which is less than 100,000 is likely to be deceptive. Measured in numbers of human lives lost, the cost of the 30 day delay provided by the security council has to be at least 10,000. Extreme rates of malnutrition suggest that further delays will be even more costly.