By Melvin A. Goodman
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.cia06dec06,0,915322.storyU.S intelligence agencies have concluded in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in fall 2003 and that Tehran is now "less determined to develop nuclear weapons." The new findings will make it more difficult for the Bush administration to gain domestic and international support for the use of military force against Iran. The findings also will complicate efforts to arrange a third round of U.N. sanctions against Iran and could open the door to a policy of diplomatic engagement.
The new estimate comes at an important juncture in the bureaucratic battle between the White House and the Pentagon over the possible use of force against Tehran. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have been making the case for military power, with the president warning in October that a nuclear-armed Iran could lead to World War III and the vice president promising "serious consequences" if Tehran did not abandon its nuclear program. Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney were aware of the new findings before they used their provocative language.
At the same time, senior military leaders have been arguing in public against the need for force against Iran, which they didn't do prior to the Iraq war. The new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, and the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, Adm. William J. Fallon, have sought to play down speculation about striking Iran's nuclear facilities. General officers in Iraq have noted that Iran has cooperated in stopping the flow of roadside bombs to Iraq and that Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who has support from Iran, has begun to rein in his militia. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, though silent during these exchanges, must have lent tacit support.
The latest intelligence estimate indicates the intelligence community has learned some lessons from the Iraq debacle in 2002 and 2003, when it politicized the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in order to support the administration's campaign for military action. Before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the CIA prepared a specious NIE on Iraqi WMD - a skewed, unclassified "white paper" that was circulated on Capitol Hill prior to the vote to authorize force against Iraq, and a flawed speech for then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that was given at the United Nations a month before the war.