The bear is back

[bemildred]

Some clearing of the fog of war here ...

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A week of war

The Russian 58th Army with its headquarters in Vladikavkaz was on alert and responded reasonably quickly and effectively to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia on August 6 and 7. The use of massive artillery and multiple rocket barrages against the largely open and undefended city of Tskhinvali has been well documented, though little hard evidence has emerged of ether ethnic cleansing or genocide by either side elsewhere in this conflict.

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Within a matter of days, virtually the entire Georgian command and control system had been severely degraded, along with radar stations, air defense and what remained of the air force at bases such as Alekseevka and Marneuli.

Georgian army infantry units including the First Brigade from Gori, supported by the T72-equipped Independent Tank Battalion and probably reinforced by elements of the Fourth Brigade from Vaziani, were quickly routed or ordered to withdraw to save what remained of their fighting capability for the possible defense of Tbilisi.

The Second Brigade at Senaki appears not to have put up a fight when a column of Russian troops on a short-lived punitive raid pushed deep into Georgia from Abkhazia on August 11.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH16Ag01.html

[bemildred]

1. The end of the post-Cold War era

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The killing of thousands of people in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia will turn out to be a landmark moment in post-Soviet Russia's relations with the West. Friday's Georgian attack on South Ossetia was intended as a provocation. The attack killed 13 Russian soldiers and injured 150 and took over 2,000 civilian lives, mostly Russian citizens. The South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali has been all but razed. Over 30,000 refugees have crossed the Russian border.

The crisis in the Southern Caucasus has been slowly building since Kosovo, the breakaway province of Serbia, declared independence in February. By August, 45 countries have been persuaded by the United States to accord recognition to Kosovo, including major European powers France, Germany and Britain. Russia was expected to retaliate by fostering secessionism in Georgia and Moldova, but, contrary to expectations, Russia adopted a shrewd policy of garnering worldwide opinion against political separatism.

Tactically, it suited Moscow that the Georgia harbored the hope that with Russian "goodwill", a settlement could be eventually worked out with its breakaway provinces. In other words, Moscow hoped to work on the diplomatic plane by getting Georgia to reciprocate the Russian "goodwill" and spirit of accommodation. Simply put, Moscow expected that as quid pro quo, Tbilisi would be sensitive to Russia's interests in the Caucasus.

A significant body of opinion always existed within the Kremlin that Georgia was never quite irrevocably lost to the US following the "color revolution" of November 2003, and with patience and tact and a judicious play of the factors of history, culture and economic ties, Tbilisi could be made to appreciate that friendly relations with Moscow were in its long-term advantage. Indeed, a similar train of opinion also existed in Tbilisi - in a muter form, though - that Georgia's future cannot be on an a antagonistic path with regard to Russia and a course correction by the President Mikheil Saakashvili regime was in order.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH13Ag02.html

[Daveparts]

2. Two of Three

oil pipelines that lock Russia out of international markets have been cut.