McChrystal's fatal error
By Robert Grenier The fault of General McChrystal and the military leadership in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is that they honestly believe they can succeed, and are thinking - and acting - accordingly.
One is put in mind of the press accounts of the first briefing provided by General McChrystal at the start of the latest Afghan policy review. When on the first presentation slide McChrystal indicated that his objective was to "defeat the Taliban," the statement was greeted with shocked silence by the civilians viewing it at the Washington end.
It apparently had not occurred to them that the general, at that late date, might still be pursuing the objective given to him by his president not six months before.
The fact that he might still believe now in what he is doing, and might be a little resentful of those who fail to back the stated policy of their own administration, ought not to come as a great surprise to those who lack McChrystal's forthrightness.
Make no mistake: I believe that the strategy championed by General McChrystal is deeply, indeed fatally, flawed.
Despite my profound personal respect for him, I view his confidence that he can successfully conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign, on a massive scale, acting as a proxy for a hopelessly compromised and inept government, and do so with conventional military forces ill-suited to the task, as disastrously misplaced.
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/06/201062372643325993.html