Watch the
shiny happy spin:
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice said Friday she agreed with the Sept. 11 commission's findings that the nation is safer nearly three years after the terrorist attacks, but it is not yet safe.
The the word "safer" only appears four times appears in the report. I haven't read it in it's entirety so it may somewhere say America is safer without using that specific word, but that's certainly not the impression I've gotten so far. And the thought doesn't jive with Commission Chairman Thomas Kean's statement when releasing the report,
"Every expert with whom we spoke told us an attack of even greater magnitude is now possible and even probable. We do not have the luxury of time.''. Indeed, the Report recommends dozens of protections and strategies the government has failed to yet implement.
Here are the four times the word "safer" appears in the report:
We hope that the terrible losses chronicled in this report can create something positive - an America that is safer, stronger, and wiser. (Preface, xvi)
The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him to run out the door. (p 39)
Neither Israel nor the new Iraq will be safer if worldwide Islamist terrorism grows stronger. (p 377)
This is the part the spinmeisters seem to be latching on to and misrepresenting (p. 383):
In the nearly three years since 9/11, Americans have become better protected against terrorist attack. Some of the changes are due to government action, such as new precautions to protect aircraft. A portion can be attributed to the sheer scale of spending and effort. Publicity and the vigilance of ordinary Americans also make a difference.
But the President and other officials acknowledge that although Americans may be safer, they are not safe. Our report shows that the terrorists analyze defenses. They plan accordingly.
Firstly and least significantly, it doesn't read
"America is safer", it reads Americans
"may be safer".
Secondly, this appears as an introduction to a section recommending its meaning is
"Bush acknowledges we may be safer, but terrorists plan around our protections and here's tons of stuff nobody, including the President, hasn't done."In fact, the Report is subtly but clearly critical of major aspects of Bush's "War on Terrorism" - that the strategy is the proverbial hammer that makes everything look like a nail, (p. 363) (some emphasis added):
The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.
Certainly the strategy should include offensive operations to counter terrorism. Terrorists should no longer find safe haven where their organizations can grow and flourish. America’s strategy should be a coalition strategy, that includes Muslim nations as partners in its development and implementation.
Our effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military. The strategy must focus clearly on the Arab and Muslim world, in all its variety. Our strategy should also include defenses.
The report is also is (much less subtly) critical of the way the "enemy" in the "War on Terror" has been framed (p. 363),
What should Americans expect from their government in the struggle against Islamist terrorism? The goals seem unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be terrible.
With such benchmarks, the justifications for action and spending seem limitless. Goals are good.Yet effective public policies also need concrete objectives. Agencies need to be able to measure success.
These measurements do not need to be quantitative: government cannot measure success in the ways that private firms can. But the targets should be specific enough so that reasonable observers—in the White House, the Congress, the media, or the general public - can judge whether or not the objectives have been attained.
Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and its affiliates are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. The American people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent, unslayable hydra of destruction. This image lowers expectations for government effectiveness.
It should not lower them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile, dependent on a few key personalities, and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes...
So we know Condi agrees with her own twisted interpretation of one sentence in the Report, but I'm wondering what she (and the rest of our government) thinks of the whole of the report. It will be interesting to see.
What's disappointing to see is the lunatic contingent at democraticunderground swallowing the spin hook line and sinker, seemingly because it doesn't say "Bush did it! He made it happen!" it's a whitewash for some. There are a few things I've been surprised seem absent from it, such as the wire transfers to the hijackers from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but on the other hand, it doesn't mention Iraq in the context of the "war on terror".
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