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propose the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life," an aim that would include pursuing other international terrorist organizations in the Middle East.35
Rice chaired a Principals Committee meeting on September 13 in the Sit-uation Room to refine how the fight against al Qaeda would be conducted.The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone supporting al Qaeda would risk harm. The United States would need to integrate diplomacy, financial measures, intelligence, and military actions into an over-arching strategy.The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against al Qaeda.They concluded that if Pakistan decided not to help the United States, it too would be at risk.36
The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with thePakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistan's military intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed.Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps:
· to stop al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Ladin;
· to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for allnecessary military and intelligence operations;
· to provide territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence andother personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda;
· to provide the United States with intelligence information;
· to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts;
· to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits fromgoing to Afghanistan; and,
· if the evidence implicated bin Ladin and al Qaeda and the Talibancontinued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government.37
Pakistan made its decision swiftly.That afternoon, Secretary of State Powellannounced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism.The next day, the U.S. embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. "Pakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us," the embassy noted. "Musharraf said the GOP
was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer.To counterbalance that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions."38
At the September 13 NSC meeting, when Secretary Powell described Pak-istan's reply, President Bush led a discussion of an appropriate ultimatum to the Taliban. He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan againstWARTIME331Final 10-11.4pp 7/17/04
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page 332 9/11 Commission Report
the Taliban.The President wanted the United States to strike the Taliban, step back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if they did not. He made clear that the military should focus on targets that would influence the Taliban'sbehavior.39
President Bush also tasked the State Department, which on the followingday delivered to the White House a paper titled "Game Plan for a Political Military Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan." The paper took it as a given that Bin Ladin would continue to act against the United States even while under Taliban control. It therefore detailed specific U.S. demands for the Taliban: surrender Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants, including Ayman al Zawahiri; tell the United States what the Taliban knew about al Qaeda and its operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.40
The State Department proposed delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban:produce Bin Ladin and his deputies and shut down al Qaeda camps within 24 to 48 hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to destroy the terrorist infrastructure. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to comply. Therefore, State and Defense would plan to build an international coalition to go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO
and other allies and request intelligence, basing, and other support from countries, according to their capabilities and resources. Finally, the plan detailed a public U.S. stance: America would use all its resources to eliminate terrorism as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other
actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any people, religion, or culture.41
President Bush recalled that he quickly realized that the administrationwould have to invade Afghanistan with ground troops.42But the early brief-ings to the President and Secretary Rumsfeld on military options were disappointing.43Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command(CENTCOM), told us that the President was dissatisfied. The U.S. military, Franks said, did not have an off-the-shelf plan to eliminate the al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view, amount to such a plan.44
All these diplomatic and military plans were reviewed over the weekend ofSeptember 1516, as President Bush convened his war council at Camp David.45Present were Vice President Cheney, Rice, Hadley, Powell, Armitage,Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Mueller, Tenet, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Cofer Black, chief of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center.
Tenet described a plan for collecting intelligence and mounting covert oper-ations. He proposed inserting CIA teams into Afghanistan to work with Afghan warlords who would join the fight against al Qaeda.46These CIA teams wouldact jointly with the military's Special Operations units. President Bush later
praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking.47
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