Why don't "we" build an 'open source' voting machine company??

[Rosco T.]

I mean, jeeze louise, this isn't 'rocket science'. Isn't there a Dem (or group of Dem's) that has the money to bankroll a company to build an absolutely, transparant, open source voting machine system that can undercut, underprice and out preform Diebold, et.al.???

The 'voting machine' can be touch screen, but built with STOCK, OFF-THE-SHELF COMPONENTS, a very simple LCD touch screen, Intel/AMD system box runing LINUX (open-source) with the source code (open-source). The 'voting machine' does NOTHING but present the candidates/offices, collect the voter preference and PRINT three (3) copies of the 'official ballot' with their choices.

copy 1 - goes with the voter
copy 2 - goes to the counter
copy 3 - stays with the machine (machine level audit)

The printed ballot would have HUMAN-READABLE and MACHINE-READABLE data (machine serial number, date/time and the votes). So that if it were a SMALL PRECINCT they could count by hand or if large enought a scaner/counter would simply ... duh... scan/count. And still have human readable copies for the recount...

ALL of the hardware OFF THE SHELF (literally go to CompUSA, FRY's or whatever and get the parts to repair/replace) - no, SECRET HARDWARE.

ALL of the software OPEN SOUCE, from the OS to the machine/counter sofware...

Kids, we're talking DIRT for a machine here.. if I can build up a friggin Athalon 64 4000+ system w/1gb of ram for $300, these could be build in quantity for... well.. a darn sight less than what a Diebold could..

are there any patriotic entrepreneurs in the house???

[libertypirate]

1. Because paper ballots hand counted would be cheaper and more secure

[Rosco T.]

2. No arguement.. but people have 'machines in their mind'...

.. so build a machine that does NOTHING but print the 'paper ballot' (read again, that's what I suggested.. the 'machine count' is optional..).

[Eric J in MN]

8. In the 2004 presidential primary, I voted on a plain piece of paper.

Which was hand-counted in the room I voted in.

This was fine by me.

As far as I know, it was fine with everyone else.

[Rosco T.]

12. You just don't get it...

.. I agree 100%, but too many people are going to push for 'automation'.. so make 'automation' that can be verified/secured/trusted...

NOTHING is kept in the machine.. NOTHING.. the PRINTED BALLOTS are the VOTE OF RECORD.

[Eric J in MN]

20. OK, if people need automation, then how about

using optical-scan ballots, but demanding a recount by hand on Election Night at the precinct?

[Rosco T.]

23. what I propose would have that as an OPTION..

the BALLOT printed would be HUMAN-READABLE (hand count) or SCANNER-READABLE (opti-scan type), hell, it could have three sets of data..

Human-readable
BarCode (string of digits corresponding to the vote in a given race)
Opti-Scan type.

If you print the ballot, you can PRINT it in as many different ways as possible.

[Eric J in MN]

28. What is the point of electronic voting machines

instead of optical scanners?

[Rosco T.]

33. If you have a MACHINE print the ballot...

you avoid

- marking errors (not filling properly)

- undervotes (not filling an oval)

- overvotes (marking two ovals)

etc..

[Eric J in MN]

39. People can make a lot more mistakes with electronic voting

machines or have the machine make more mistakes:

machine doesn't display all the races for that voter
voter clicks "Send Ballot" before voting in the races he or she wants to
voter presses Kerry, and machine records Bush

With a paper ballot, if the races aren't all there, the voter can say something before casting the vote.

Most people know how to fill in an oval on a piece of paper.

Problems are more likely on a machine they have never used before.

Eveyone should know to fill in one-oval per race.

However, the problem of pressing "Send Ballot" before voting in every race is a mistake almost anyone can make.

Also:

There are optical-scanners which can kick out a ballot if the voter voted in more than one race, to give him or her another try at filling out the ballot properly.

With regard to not filling out the oval all-the-way, or marking it with Xs, that is what hand-recounts are for.

[Land Shark]

104. "Open" source would be a big step forward, but still has invisibility

as a feature, and the average person can't understand it (and should never simply trust when it comes to elections), and you'd have to verify that each and every piece of code was the correct one on each machine, and that a virus never got on it at any time and self-destructed after operating.

But if there were an op-scanning system MODIFIED with parallel human counts by hand (to check the opscan machine) and the opscan code was open source, that could work.

would be a fig leaf for elections officials who've overspent on technology. and reassure them they won't have to WORK HARD to get more volunteers or workers for the real deal, hand counts across the board.

[Massacure]

109. Voting machines that aren't connected to the internet cannot get viruses.

Once tallied at the precinct level, you could just fax the results to the big guys at the state level.

[merh]

66. Exactly!

Make the machines verified, secured and trusted. Write legislation that provides for the machines that can be verified, secured and trusted and then push that legislation.

You have the perfect answer. :thumbsup:

[Tigress DEM]

75. Still depends on who is counting.

:crazy:

Simple machinery sounds goood.

However, I'd also like to combine that with a security code like you do with a bank card and the have votes themselves out on a secure web or kiosk listed under a basically annoymous voter number so a person could periodically check their own vote to make sure it didn't change.

Combine that with a self reporting process for voters to notify either their own party, or specified election officials who have no conflicts of interest (read money in pockets from special interests or Blackwell disease - Corruptitis)... if their vote EVER changes after it's recorded... and some sort of flag people could select on the site so people just looking could see the extent and location of any problems.

[dhinojosa]

5. Disagree

we just had some yahoo this year here in Albuquerque take medical info out into the parking lot and the wind took all these medical records all through out the city (soc. sec. numbers, prescriptions).

With good encryption enforcement that won't be a problem and transferring will be secure and cheaper. :)

[oscar111]

22. Wind? not if countd AT precincts. ballots never move

other than out of the ballot box onto the table right under the upturned ballot box, as it is emptied.

The count is posted right there. For many folks to then relay to some central HQ.

[dhinojosa]

25. A couple of cans of gas, and a gun, and there goes those ballots.

but with a redundant combination of data transfer, paper printouts, and in house database storage, we can have ourselves some quick counting and safe encrypted storage, and in the mean time keep some right wing terrorist groups from coming into a precinct and burning it all down.

[oscar111]

29. ? a gun, and all databases go out the window

ho ho.

your vision would not leave much intact. With that small army around, the whole enterprise is lost.

[dhinojosa]

30. If after each vote it gets automatically wired out of the precinct?

ho ho ho yourself Santa Claus. That could work. :)

[oscar111]

32. elec. wire-out each vote:tricks abound there

ho ho ho ho, and a long white beard with cheeks like a bowl full of cherries.

sending votes over a wire admits a ton of tricks.. a magnet over the wire, another wire inputting at a downtown splice, the terminal hacked, et et et

ho ho ho ho

[merh]

67. How do you prevent ballot stuffing?

Just wondering?

[Festivito]

94. Each precinct watcher can have a stamp.

The stamp can be marred to make it unique. As that person watches the days proceedings, the machine reader stamps each read ballot with the unique stamp of the watcher. Replaced by another watcher's when someone goes to lunch.

In case of voter count not matching ballot count, a tedious review could begin. There could also be a time-stamp placed on each read ballot along with the stamping.

This allows the individual voter some anonymity of his vote while allowing questionable ballots to be separated and forensically reviewed.

[merh]

96. "a tedious review could begin"

And who does the review?
How are the reviews funded?

[Festivito]

105. Volunteers and paid volunteers.

I recall that during the Florida recount some of the poll workers were paid to review the ballots.

Watchers representing the contending parties are allowed to watch. Whether the contender asks a volunteer or hires someone is up to the contender. The party might help fund, or supply free volunteers.

I ask rhetorically: How'd you think it happend?

[merh]

110. Who funds the paid volunteers?

and who provides the volunteers? (I have a problem with the term "apid" volunteer to be honest with you.) If you recall the Florida recounts, hand counting in this fashion is a circus and no one is guaranteed of the results.

The candidate supplies or the party supplies? Don't both have to worry about winning the campaign, so wouldn't it be a given that anyone they provide would have their "vested" interest at heart?

Go work with some election officials in counties with large populations, discover for yourself the blessed truth and come down out of the clouds to the reality. Then we can work from there.

[Festivito]

112. I understand the concern when there is pay.

However, also consider unpaid voluteers might be funded in nefarious ways. Imagine if only unpaid persons could be used and thus only persons who were wealthy enough could count votes!

The candidate's choice in a recount should trump his party's choice for watcher, should he choose to defy the party.

Of course there should be two watchers and at least one counter. Paid or not, each has their job.

In a civil case, a judge could order the government to pay for the recount. After prior judgements, law might be written to avoid court expenses.

After years of overseeing elections my friends have never been a part of a recount. I have a call in to find out more.

[merh]

113. Since you have been involved in overseeing elections, how easy

has it been to get reliable volunteers? So each candidate had a volunteer at the precinct. (3 volunteers - dem-repuke-independent) then you need, you say, 2 volunteer overseers or watchers, so that means 5 volunteers needed at each precinct, and then the 1 counter, but of course the parties may dispute the loyalties of the overseers and the counters, so there is that headache. How many precincts are in your county?

Imagine that table and the stress on the one counter. All hand counts, damn the time it takes to count them.

[Festivito]

117. My friend oversaw.

Unfortunately he is too ill to continue. Plus they were to be subjected to hours of unnecessarily long training for this and the future elections.

There are fewer volunteers, however, they've had no problems in my area. I would suggest that with baby boomers begining to retire, volunteers might be plentiful.

As to the watchers, they are supplied by the contenders, not the election commission.

[merh]

118. And it was the "contenders" watchers that caused such a problem

in Florida in 2000 and that was not then entire state, that was just certain precincts.

Reverting to hand counts "only" would not be practical, imho.

[Festivito]

119. Not so much the watchers. Republican judges were the problem.

Heard of one Republican watcher who objected to every Gore ballot. But, he relented. Possibly when he realized that they would continue going over each ballot until a decision was made.

Gore lost FL by not counting overvotes, that is voters who punched Gore AND wrote Gore's name in the write-in spot. (Note: of course voters doing the same with Bush would be counted, BUT the UC study showed Gore would have won.)

The recounts were not so much stopped by Republicans shouting outside while ballots were being counted. The critical element was time loss caused by having a state judge not look at suit for a week, and after Gore agreed to Republican suggested state-wide recount, SCOTUS saying the vote should be counted, however, only giving about an hour to count those six-million votes.

SCOTUS is corrupt. So, Gore conceded as I see it.

Excuse me, I think you are wrong about hand counts. They are necessary, and more accurate than machines. Only problem, is that they are astonishingly SLOW.

[libertypirate]

41. I am a software engineer who started out as an

systems administrator. I know how all this works and I don't trust it.

If you want to keep getting fucked keep voting the machines. If however you want to know something you provably don't. There are over 10,000 lines of code written to run one database voting program.

The bulk of my day is spent figuring out how people who don't know dick about computer systems did what they did when writing an application. It's one big headache after another but I learned to spot bullshit when I see it.

I could write that POS voting software in less than 1000 lines. What does that tell me? One of two things is going on, either they hired dumb ass course trained software developers who took as long as they could (economic reasons) or the more plausibly is there is extra code in there on purpose.

Now coming from a guy that does this shit for a living. I would rather have something that I put my finger prints on!

[yowzayowzayowza]

42. Do the freaken math.

US elections have races for federal, state, county, municipal and initiatives on a single ballot: gotta average at least 20 races per major election. Hand counting is going to require reviewing each ballot by two people, so...

115,000,000 voters X 20 races X 2 = 9,200,000,000 individual votes to count

To put in Sagan-terms, thats BILLIONS AND BILLIONS AND BILLIONS AND BILLIONS. Not an option.

The problem is not the machines, but a lack of quality control in the WHOLE PROCESS.


On edit: I'd be dangerous if I could multiply!

[merh]

53. What is dangerous is the folks who haven't a clue what it takes

to run an election. Ignorance is not bliss - it is deadly to our democracy. These folks need to take the time to find out what all is involved in running elections.

[libertypirate]

73. Exactly...

At this point in time...

Is there any value in trusting the machines?

[merh]

79. Well, let's put it this way.

The clerk of my county has had optical scanners since 1999. They have had 4 contested elections. As a result of the contested elections, there have been the recounts by hand of the precincts as requested by the candidates. Each hand count matched the opti scan results 100%. So, yes, if properly audited, opti-scans are reliable. The clerks have to know the equipment they are operating and they have to take all measures to be sure that the machines are properly secured, operated and inspected.

Opti-scans do work.

[libertypirate]

102. So how do we weed through who is going to do it right

and who is going to screw us?

[yowzayowzayowza]

108. You don't necessarily.

You fight for a system that has sufficient checks and balances (auditing) to guarantee a valid result.

[merh]

49. Now see, that is where you guys miss the practicalities of

conducting elections.

If you had an election for one office on the ballot, hand counting paper ballots would work. BUT, our elections are not run that way. We have all major elections on the same day. Federal, state, county, district, taxing and bond issues, initiatives and propose amendments to state constitutions. The paper ballots are several pages long and hand counting them is too costly and time consuming to be practical.

That is why folks moved away from hand counts to more automated ways.

I like the OP's suggestions. Why can't we pursue that?

Also, we need to pursue legislation that provides better funding for elections and we need federal elections to be held on one day, state elections on another and county elections on another, et cetera. With proper funding that affords those officials responsible for conducting elections, they can have the necessary manpower to secure the ballots and count the ballots.

[A Simple Game]

54. What's the hurry?

Give me a week, I,ll give you an honest ballot count!

[merh]

55. How are you going to fund the recount?

How are you going to provide the necessary people to conduct the recount and/or provide security for the ballots?

[A Simple Game]

60. There doesn't seem to be a problem

getting people for recounts.

Both major parties provide people for counting and security. It's being done now, there would be very little change.

Canada does national elections on paper, they usually have a count done the same night. Local election results take a little longer.

[merh]

65. Canada's population compared to ours?

Doesn't the total voting population of Canada compare to the total voting population of California? Aren't those the numbers?

Stop comparing grapes to oranges.

Both major parties provide the people for counting and security? Are you mad? That worked well during the recounts in Florida, didn't it? Or have all of you hand count fanatics forgotten about that horrendous catastrophe?

You just don't have a clue about how elections are actually conducted and/or the ballots counted, do you?

We can't get folks to turn out to vote, how can we get them to volunteer to spend days counting? How can we even ask them to give up their job for a week to count? Or, should we just bring in the unemployed and let them do it?

Again, you have all elections on one ballot in the good ole USofA -- federal, state, county, district, bonding and taxing initiatives, proposed constitutional amendments. The logistics of hand counting all of those pages of ballots is overwhelming, which is why election officials looked for automated means to conduct and count the ballots. You are not going to get much cooperation for the folks that are the ones that run elections if you suggest reverting to hand counts only.

Do you realize that the rethugs believe that John F. Kennedy won his election because of ballot stuffing! That is what "hand counts" allow. Hired operatives feigning being "concerned patriots" stuffing the ballot boxes or adding ballots to the mix.

How hard is it for folks to take the time to research the history and the evolution of elections to understand why automated counting was developed and how reverting to hand counts is going back wards and will be opposed by most folks that have had to run elections? Go do the research and you will see that most legal cases discussing election fraud deal with hand counts and ballot stuffing and dead men voting.

[A Simple Game]

70. So California uses the same number of counters that

Canada uses. Everyone else uses however many they need. If the Democratic party pledged 100 vote counters, do you think the Republicans could match them?

No I am not mad, unless you are talking about my feelings for Jeb. He is the one who allowed the unlawful stopping of a vote count, not me. The tone of your post makes you sound angry, I won't resort to name calling.

Not all elections need to be on the same piece of paper.

Hand counts didn't allow ballot stuffing, the count comes after the stuffing. Pulling a lever or touching a screen replacing drawing an X doesn't prevent dead people from voting. The honesty in voting starts before the vote count.

[merh]

71. Go back and what the footage from the Florida recounts.

Just imagine if every election had that organized chaos. Just remember how you felt as you watched day after day as the counting was done, the bickering over the ballots was had and that poor "disinterested" 3rd party and the "election officials" had to make calls or referee the circus.

Hand counts are not practical. Take the time to review the evolution of elections and why automated means were invented and are desired.

Like I said, you can't get all dems out to the polls to vote, how the hell you gonna get folks to volunteer to count for days if not weeks?

[A Simple Game]

72. My saying give me a week was hyperbole.

Most vote counts don't take very long. Recounts on the other hand can take a while. Thankfully recounts are rare.

You want people to make a machine to process votes then print a ballot.
I want ballots printed to process votes.
You want machines to count the votes, but leave a paper trail that people can count if necessary.
I want people to count the votes.

We aren't that far apart in our thinking, you want a verifiable paper ballot and so do I.

I'm just a believer Occam's Razor, or as we said in the old days, the KISS theory.

[merh]

74. You must be living in another realm of reality.

If recounts take so long, why won't hand counts take just as long?

Please explain that reasoning for me.

I want voter verified papers ballots. With proper auditing and truly random recounts, optical scans are the safest and most accurate way to count an election. The trouble starts when the votes are sent via electronic means to a central tabulator. I would also add that the tabulator needs to be as secure as Ft. Knox because after all, our votes are more precious than gold." ~Andy Stephenson, 4/29/2005

Don't be confused, I don't want these touch screens. I don't want the DREs

I recognize (having worked hand count elections years ago) that in order to be successful, the election reform advocates have to embrace those that have the sworn duty to run honest and accurate elections. The election officials have been running elections and their experience, their expertise, must be respected. You have to understand all that is involved in running an election. It is not just getting ballots printed and counted. Ballots are not just a printed page with names, they are now pages and pages of names and initiatives.

We want the same thing, the difference is, I know what it takes to run an election and I know that if we do not work with the officials that have the experience, then we are shooting ourselves in the foot and all of our efforts will be for naught.

Go to the largest county in your state, find the clerk or elected official that is responsible for conducting elections. Sit down and talk to them ask them if reverting to hand counts is feasible, is practical. Ask them what they think it will take to correct the problems that we now have with elections. Go to the true experts and learn all of the practical aspects involved in conducting an election. Then get back to me.

[A Simple Game]

82. Ok, last one for the night.

Why do recounts take longer than the initial count, I don't really have to tell you do I? And didn't a machine create those hanging chads in Florida? And wasn't the confusing ballot resulting in Buchanan getting Al Gores votes displayed on a machine?

Who pays for the security of the central tabulator? I don't mind a central tabulator, but I want no modems hooked to it, just a numerical keyboard will do. The phone line can be hooked to the phone next to the tabulator.

Ballots are not just a printed page with names, they are now pages and pages of names and initiatives. Most elections would only be about five or six pages, off years would probably be less. Ok, I start with piles of ballots, and end with piles of ballots. You start with a machine and blank paper,and end up with piles of ballots. We both need booths, mine have a table, your have a machine. I can afford many booths and tables, you can afford a few booths and machines. I eliminated the problem of voters having to wait too long. We both need the same amount of space for paper, unless your printout doesn't look like your screen, but that wouldn't be a good idea.

I live in the largest county in my state, it is also, the last I knew, the largest county east of the Mississippi river. Alas it is also one of the least populous in the state. They might not agree with you. We can't afford expensive machines, or the maintenance and security that goes with them. Most of our local elections are in the off years, our ballots are rarely very long or complicated. We presently use lever machines, have for as long as I can remember(early 70s).

By the way, I,m not anti-technology. I worked in IT for 5 years. Never met a computer or server that couldn't be screwed up, and usually by a well meaning user.

[merh]

83. Excuse me - hand counts take longer than recounts.

Recounts provide that only a portion of the precincts are counted to see if the numbers differ from the final tally reached by either the original hand count or the opti-scan.

When I say largest county in your state, I mean the largest county relative to voting population, not in square miles. That you make such a silly statement clearly illustrates how far removed you are from the realities of the election process. Again, grapes to oranges.

If you live in a county that has a minimal voting population, then you are truly ignorant to what is involved in the election process for those counties with large voting populations. You should try to go find out about those counties and then you will realize that reverting to hand counts is not practical and promoting the same is harmful to the election reform efforts.

[A Simple Game]

84. Take 10 deep breaths.

You seem to be getting angry again.

I am talking about full recounts, you apparently are talking about spot checking.

The problems I mentioned for my county are not silly, they are true and real. I have to deal with what is relative to me. I'm sure Nassau county can afford sufficient machines, St. Lawrence county(my county), and most of the counties in New York State and New York City can not.

Ok, i'm ignorant. I'm also tired. Do larger populations have more money? Do they have more dog catchers? Yes we do have dog catchers, mayors, councilmen, local initiatives, etc., etc. We vote for most people that are normally appointed in a city. Can they afford more machines? Didn't sound like the Democratic parts of Ohio could afford enough machines. Probably just low population areas weren't they? Larger population equals more of the same in most cases.

Reread our posts. I have tried to educate you to the problems some, not all face on election day. You have called me names and given me no solutions, just circular logic. Machines are the answer, because, well because they are.

Good night. Truly time for me to leave, I'm getting sarcastic, and I don't like to do that.

[merh]

85. Again, your ignorance of election laws is showing.

No election contest provides for full recounts. Even the Florida recounts were not recounts of all precincts. Only those in question.

Geeze, let's see do larger counties have more money, yes, but they need more money for their larger population.

You cannot educate me because you are ignorant of everything that is involved in conducting an election. Try to go find that out, then maybe you can try to educate me.

:hi:

[claudiajean]

90. Actually, In Washington state, a recount is a full recount of all ballots.

All of the ballots are re-tabulated a second time. Every last one.

[merh]

95. Like you said, you live in a county with a small population.

That type of recount is practical. It is not in the counties with larger populations and again, I give you the example of the Florida recounts.
:hi:

[Egalitariat]

103. Hand counts are not accurate. If you gave one person 1,000 ballots

and let her count them 5 different times, she'd get 5 different answers.

I like hand counting as a method for validating the vote, but there are far better methods for the primary count.

[aquart]

3. I thought a bunch of geeks were already on it.

[Rosco T.]

6. Maybe we should hit Soros for a grant :)

Let them scream! If every bit of it is 'open' and 'verifiable' there is no way to call foul!

[Tiggeroshii]

13. I think we should get all the grants we could. Maybe we could be ..

really loud about this idea throughout du?

[oscar111]

10. Still, PAPER BALLOTS HAND COUNTED

"a mach. that prints the ballot" is clever, but i still prefer the stack of paper idea.

some whiz will find a way to use the machine you propose to somehow fix the printing on site idea...

to shoo in the GOP.

Machines create complexity.

ban complexity.

Use canada's idea. PBHC. as in my title here.

[Rosco T.]

15. If the CODE is open, and the voter has to approve the printed ballot...

.. FIXING BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE.

With OPEN CODE, OPEN SOURCE it gets damn near impossible to hide worms to fix things.

[oscar111]

31. Genius exists to surprise you with new tricks

nullify all complexity.

but nice try, rosco. I admire your dilligence. I will mull over your idea. Dont give up.

[foo_bar]

58. it's a shell game

Paper ballots can be stuffed, dumped into the river, or designed by Therese LePore. "Keep it simple stupid" is a good engineering principle, but it can't be so simple that you have no idea if you're missing a box of ballots or not.

[Pobeka]

38. The voter has to approve the printed ballot.

This is key to a legitimate system.

If I was going to attack this system, I'd purposely make it create errors in the democrat's favor in republican precincts. Some would slip through, and more deviously, if enough are messed up, not enough people would be able to vote because the lines would get too long. And we know from experience that blocking voting access in certain precincts can get you into the whitehouse.

See my response to the original post about another possibility, that includes automated counting...

[aquart]

64. I agree. With publicly-witnessed counting.

Seriously, I want people to serve as counting witnesses like we have to do jury duty, and sworn in, so that false witness has penalties.

[July]

107. That's how it's done in Spain.

You are called for election duty and can get in real trouble if you don't show up.

Ballots are paper, and the election tables (serving 300 voters each) must agree before sealing ballots in an envelope and confirming the count.

There is no voter registration problem, because the national ID is used to verify you are a voting-age citizen. You just show up (if you want to vote) at your table in your precinct.

I believe the agreed-upon numbers are sent by phone or computer for central tabulating, because results for the whole country come in very fast (I've watched election results coverage on Spanish TV), but the actual ballots are also sent to a central location. Any discrepancies, the envelopes must be opened and recounted.

[carnie_sf]

4. That's a great idea

I would be glad to volunteer my services. I've done programming in JAVA, c++, and SQL. Contact me if you're serious.

[dhinojosa]

7. You like java too eh...

that's my life right there.

[Rosco T.]

9. Java & SQL.... no 'binary' code to hide in...

make MD5 sums of the master code, compare it at beginning/ending of the vote.. no hidden code..

[dhinojosa]

27. You are soooo correct....

I would also make message digests of the vote to ensure that they weren't fixed during transfer. :)

[Rosco T.]

34. that's what the third copy (machine audit) is for..

[Tiggeroshii]

11. I think a nomination of this post is good. kickin'

[Eric J in MN]

14. It's the exisitng companies who have the contracts and lobbyists.

Buying one of the big companies would be a more effective way of ensuring an accurate election than starting a new company.

[Rosco T.]

18. Not gonna happen if they won't sell (and you think they would), a new..

.. company, comes out with a SIMPLE, OPEN SYSTEM, undercuts their prices (even if the company has to lose money), they wouldn't stand a chance.

You don't think this could get adopted in blue states so fast your head would swim?

Open souce.
Open audit.
Save money.

[Eric J in MN]

24. Sequioa was for sale several months ago, and

I posted at DU and at my blog urging a liberal billionaire to buy it, but alas, no liberal billionaire came forward and it was sold to another company.

[skids]

16. There's a project in the works.

See first link in my sig, and check out the additional links page on that project for some good starting points.

[jsamuel]

17. I would provide my services as well

I am proficient at Visual C++ (Windows), C/C++, JAVA, SQL, databases (esp. MySQL), graphics (OpenGL).

Let me know :)

[ArkDem]

19. Maybe it would be safer if, instead of printing, it would output

clay tablets. No worry about water damage in this case.

[Rosco T.]

21. Geeze.. why didn't someone tell me I misspelled source in the 1st message

eek!

[oscar111]

26. Rosco, idea is good #2 choice if we cant get PAPR..CNTED PBHC

Another advantage of PBHC, is cost.

ANother is .. it is ready right now.

as to cost.. your machines have storage + guard costs. None with paper, pure paper.

but i like the idea you have, as a fallback choice. Pursue it as a touted and labeled second choice.

The big problem i see in some areas is a GOP chosing what to do. She decides whether to buy Diebold or not. There is the logjam. The Vote Czar.

[Rosco T.]

35. Logjam's can be broken with $$$

.. if these could be done so they are.. oh... 1/3 the cost of a Diebold machine.. they would have a hard time selling Diebold to the people (and you KNOW there would be BLUE folks that would make an issue of it).

[Rosco T.]

37. #1 Choice to GENERATE THE PAPER BALLOTS...

.. that's what I keep saying and people keep ignoring..

Make the BALLOT PRINTER (ie. voting machine) and the BALLOT COUNTER (the scanner) two TOTALLY SEPERATE ENTITIES.

You want hand counts, more power to you, just get the BALLOT PRINTER.

You want speedier counts, get the BALLOT PRINTER and a BALLOT COUNTER. You STILL have the HUMAN READABLE BALLOTS for the recount.

[WhoWantsToBeOccupied]

77. It's even better: Printer and Scanner MUST match... Automatic recount!

Printer keeps a count.

Scanner keeps a count.

If printer and scanner report same counts, that is an automatic recount.

If the printer and scanner reports vary, you know something is wrong and probably have a good idea what went wrong. If 1,000 people signed in to vote and the printer records 1,100 votes and the scanner reports 1,000 votes, it's quite likely the printer is miscounting, perhaps because it has been hacked or its code has been corrupted.

[alcibiades_mystery]

47. Release early and often...

and with a million eyes, all misspellings are shallow...

;-)

[mackdaddy]

36. There are Some open Source voting Projects in the works

Here are a couple of links.

http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/

http://open-vote.org/


My personal preference would be to have hand counted ballots too. But, I just do not see being able to make that fly at this time. One of the big pushes for Computer involvement is access for voters with special needs, which can be addressed with this type of software.

The Open Voting Consortium does have an on-line model of their software which will even print out a sample ballot. It looks to me like the software is done, and all one would have to do is offer a contract to local BOE's to service the hardware on an on-going basis once it is accepted into a state.

[phiddle]

61. Both of these companies are doing good work.

However, there is a different emphasis. Open-vote is trying to develop a touch screen machine, whereas the Open Voting Consortium already has developed Linux-based software which works on any off the shelf PC, hooked to a printer and bar code reader. This, together with procedures such as chain of custody seems to me to be the best bet for quick action. I noticed on their web site that they need some money, so I gave.

[WhoWantsToBeOccupied]

81. Drive hardware cost to $0 with KNOPPIX-style bootable CD

Why not create a bootable Linux CD that could run on a wide variety of desktops or laptops (as KNOPPIX and its many variants do) but specialized for electronic voting? You wouldn't even need any new hardware. You could borrow ANY computer--even someone's Windows machine--and turn it into an electronic voting machine without touching the machine's hard drive. Plug in a printer. Your entire "hardware" cost would be paper and toner/ink.

It's a powerful argument:

1) Totally reliable vote-counting

2) Absolutely no cost

The only possible flaw I see is someone creating a modified disk with malicious vote-counting code. But such a disk would have a different md5sum, so each precinct would have to run an md5sum test on the CD before using it. That's quite feasible, even on a Windows machine. (There's a great freeware program, winMd5Sum.)

[Pobeka]

40. Another possibility, using automated counting equipment.

(Don't get nitty gritty with me here, this is still a concept.)
------------------------
Part 1, ballot counting:
------------------------
Build a machine, and all it can do is count the voter marks by rows A, B, C, D, ... That is literally all it does. (and it does that by a looking at a physical x-y location on the card, sort of like a punch card setup but optically performed.)

Before the election, candidates are randomly assigned to row A,B or C (and grouped together by race). Ballots are printed according to the outcome of the random assignment.
(Random assignment is actually the weak link here, but assume it's possible).

It seems impossible to me, that you could rig the vote counting at the machine, because the machine has no knowledge of which candidate is in which row.

Only the human beings know that column "A" is the dem candidate, column "B" is the rep, and column "C" is not used, or other. So the election officials perform the logical mapping of which candidate got how many votes. It is simple.

------------------------
Part 2, final tabulation
------------------------
You then would need to phone in the results to the next "level up".
This is done, as well as the results are posted outside the polling location.

At the next "level up", the subtotals are totaled, and all of their individual results are posted, and phoned in. It would be the responsibility of all the "lower levels" to insure that their individual results as posted by the next level up was correct.

You now have a system where "many pairs of eyes" can check and cross-check at every level in the system.

[interupt]

43. Already done in Australia

Aussies Do It Right: E-Voting
http://www.wired.com/news/ebiz/0,1272,61045,00.html

The commission posted drafts as well as the finished software code on the Internet for the public to review.

The reaction was very positive.

"The fact that the source code had been published really deflected criticism," Quinn said.

A few people wrote in to report bugs, including an academic at the Australian National University who found the most serious problem.

"It wasn't a functional or a security issue but was a mistake nonetheless, and one that we were glad to have flagged for us," said Quinn.

[eridani]

45. I'm told by an Australian correspondent of mine that paper ballots--

--are still used. The open source project there has not actually been tested in an election.

[interupt]

48. True

I believe certain Federal laws need to be altered and the Australian Electoral Commission are still fine tuning aspects of the program before it goes Federal.

But still, Open Source project on Linux. The way to go eh?

[kster]

87. Not in America

Snip.....All of the machines at the demo provided a VVPR and met HAVA requirements for the disabled. None of the vendors said they were willing to make their software source code public – they say it is proprietary, a trade secret. Open source code would be required by SB1683 which was introduced in the State Senate by Don Harmon on 2/24/2005.

http://chicago.indymedia.org/newswire/display/56327/index.php

[kster]

44. Give them companies one option

give us open source voting machines or we go back to Paper Ballots Hand Counted.

[Warren DeMontague]

46. I like the idea.

Transparency, Transparency, Transparency. And verification.

[garybeck]

50. there already is one:

Open Voting Consortium

http://openvoting.org



they're fighting an uphill battle. get on their email list if you can. good folks.

gb

[babylonsister]

51. Roscoe T, I like your thinking! Let's sell it to the country,

dammit! It'd be nice to think we all want honest elections!

[foo_bar]

52. absolutely

This guy started in the right direction, but I don't see a business plan:

People in the Open Source Linux/BSD Unix community have been dealing with electronic security issues for over a decade and appreciate the problems involved in this much more then anyone else in the industry. Security is actually improved by public scrutiny, it is maintained through networks of Trust, and the careful use of secret passwords and cryptography.

Methods and algorithms are established through open debate, and the rigors of scientific testing and trial and error on the open Internet. These allow the design to evolve in to a truly functional system.

E-voting needs the same open debate to its design. Its hardware should be make of COTS (common off the shelf) parts like consumer PC’s. Its software should be freely available over the Internet for all to study and experiment with and offer improvements. Many vendors should be able to supply the hardware and software, and any one should be able to verify its integrity and results.

This is a problem that affects much more then a few States, or even the United States of America, but every free country on Earth. The Open Source movement has been effective as harnessing the intellectual power of every nation on Earth in it effort. I feel that the methods they have developed would also apply to E-Voting.

With MailClad I am proposing an architecture, but more importantly encourage debate on overall system design and to offer working source code and a suggested system hardware design. Based on PC’s the system should be OS agnostic so as to operate on Microsoft Windows, Mac OS, Linux, and BSD UNIX or anything else out there. Source will probably be C or C++ and be relatively straightforward since the algorithm and physical measures ensures the security and not the code or hardware itself.

http://www.mailclad.com/

On edit: Freebold.com hasn't been registered. :D

[O.M.B.inOhio]

56. YES! (Beats my donut eating contest idea I had)

Slogan: The voting process should be transparent, not invisible.

No remote control. The code is offered for public inspection / discussion well in advance. "If you're against transparency, what are you hiding?" Results tallied in each locality (observed by reps selected by all parties on ballot, from Dems and Greens to Repugs and Right to Life) and

Combined with nonpartisan or bipartisan adjudication of non-machine ballots (SOS Ken Blackmail was able to choose which provisionals, absentees NOT to count, which really screwed us).

Funds? Well, I'll pledge my $100 to the effort, although one cxivic-minded millionaire would do the trick. Or I'll give $1,000 if we can save some effort and buy Triad, with all their data and internal memos.

[grannylib]

57. The automated teller machine at my bank is made by Liebold...and I bet

nobody would DREAM of using those things if they didn't print out a receipt. When I pay for gas at the pump, I get a receipt. When I use the self-serve checkout at Shopko, I get a receipt. It even asks me if I want an extra, how thoughtful.
So ya know, the technology does exist...
But with a bunch of computer fraud former felons on the payroll at the BBV companies, what do you suppose the chance is that we will EVER have a free and fair election in this country again, when the BBV companies are all tied up with Reich Wing Whores???

[boddhi]

59. another open source idea - voter registration analysis software

keep the open source voting notion alive and I'll keep watching it - it WILL be automated, so it should be non-profit

But another idea I recently discussed with a state legislator is the notion of voter registration analysis software developed with open source.

Right now, those with money can afford this kind of software and can target their volunteers and their efforts. Those who can't are left in the cold.

I realize this helps both sides, but the notion is to keep a balanced playing field without requiring money.

Thoughts?

[Stinky The Clown]

62. Good work, Roscoe! Nominated

I am as concerned about solid, reliable, verifiable voting as anyone could be. But ......

To all the PBHC people ..... think before you give a knee jerk reaction in the negative. The system proposed here is, indeed, capable of PBHC. But as an added benefit, it gives a fast, and presumably accurate electronic count.

Look again at the proposal ...... 3 copies of the voter's choice .... one to the machine, one to the counter, one to the voter.

If, after the election, everyone is happy, then the results stand. If there is a challenge to the machine count, the back-up is a hand count, or some sort of scan and **then** a hand count if need be.

The only difference between the proposed system and pure PBHC is how the voter's choice gets on paper. In this case, it is put there by a machine, but **verified** by the voter.

Why would any PBHC proponent be opposed to this. It gives the speed and elegance of electronic voting but with the ability to absolutely verify the count by human hands and human eyes. Poll watchers are there every step of the way with the actual paper ballots, presumably eliminating the chance for shennaigans with the paper ballots that support and verify the electronic totals.

I'm not a software/computer person, but this seems pretty damned good to me. Open source code that an idiot can read and verify. Paper to count or recount. Fast results transmission. Verifiable every step of the way. Cheap machines to build, to maintain, and to replace - all off-the-shelf.

Please show me a real (NOT emotional) shortcoming.

[MissWaverly]

63. can it be battery operated????

If people have wireless laptops why can't we get wireless voting machines, they are only used for 1 day and the system costs millions of dollars why not new batteries, under the current system, things are
spinning merrily along, there's a power failure or someone pulls the plug out and the machine goes back to default, w/o a trace of the votes
in working memory, personally, I think we should just have a thumb scan
and push a button that not only records your vote but gives you a digial photo receipt with the date and time stamped on it (not your name or ID)

[Rosco T.]

78. Just stick them on a 60 minute UPS and 'power blackouts' no loger matter.

[MissWaverly]

101. It has to be inside the machine

I heard someone from Pennsylvania say that every time Kerry was ahead
they just pulled the plugs on the machines to get them to default, they
will not use power strips if that's what they want to happen. Oh, look
-your vote count has dropped by 600 votes, oh it's a shame, you don't know how sorry we are. In Maryland in the last election, our Democratic candidate for the Senate was left off the ballot in 3 counties, fortunately the race was not close.

We're going to have an election in the land of the free.
And what a surprise, every vote will be for ME!

[kenny blankenship]

68. You need a buttload of money to

bribe state elections officials to select your system over those of already known (and paid up) commercial vendors.

[foo_bar]

76. you just have to underbid the competition (by a lot)

A $500 whitehat alternative to the $3000 Diebold ex machina would appeal to purse-strings as well as social conscience.

[Rosco T.]

80. if we had to, make it a $100 machine, lose money.. save democracy. n/m

[Nothing Without Hope]

69. Why not pursue something like the TRUVOTE SYSTEM OF ATHAN GIBBS?

You may recall, he was killed in a highly suspicous highway "accident" when he looked like he might make some major headway in actually making his fraud-resistant system accepted.

Here's one link:

http://www.onlinejournal.com/evoting/031904Fitrakis/031904fitrakis.html

Death of a patriot

By Bob Fitrakis
Senior Editor, The Free Press

March 19, 2004—The subject line on Tuesday’s email read: “Another mysterious accident solves a Bush problem. Athan Gibbs dead, Diebold lives.” The attached news story briefly described the untimely Friday, March 12, death of perhaps America’s most influential advocate of a verified voting paper trail in the era of touch screen computer voting.

(snip)

Gibbs was in Columbus, Ohio, proudly displaying his TruVote machine that offered a “VVPAT, that’s a voter verified paper audit trail” he noted.

Gibbs also suggested that I look into the “people behind the other machines.” He offered that “Diebold and ES&S are real interesting and all Republicans. If you’re an investigative reporter go ahead and investigate. You’ll find some interesting material.”

Gibbs’ TruVote machine is a marvel. After voters touch the screen, a paper ballot prints out under plexiglass and once the voter compares it to his actual vote and approves it, the ballot drops into a lockbox and is issued a numbered receipt. The voter’s receipt allows the tracking of his particular vote to make sure that it was transferred from the polling place to the election tabulation center.

(SNIP)

[Festivito]

93. I don't like the under plexiglass idea.

We should be able to hold our ballot and scrutinize it for as long as we want without holding up other people voting. Holding up voting would stop many from checking the printed ballot and thus opens an avenue for fraud.

[satya]

86. How do you prove that the published source code is what actually runs on

the machines?

(obviously my sig line reveals my bias)

[Rosco T.]

88. Simply put.. MD5

background here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Md5sum

using a MD5summing program, you can generate a hex-key 'hash' of the file.. be it source code, binary, whatever..

if so much as ONE BIT changes, ANYWHERE in the file, the MD5Sum will no longer match.

You couldn't even touch the whitespace in a source file.

from the above link -

Integrity checking

MD5 digests are widely used in the software world to provide some assurance that a downloaded file has not been altered, whether malciously or accidentally. A user can compare a published MD5 sum with the checksum of a downloaded file. Assuming the published checksum is authentic, a user can be confident that their copy of a file is the same as that released by the developers, protecting against Trojan horses and computer viruses being added to the software surreptitiously. However, it is often the case that the checksum cannot be trusted (for example, it was obtained over the same channel as the downloaded file), in which case MD5 can only provide error-checking functionality: it will recognize a corrupt or incomplete download.

-----

Have the master source/binary kept by (several) bonded security firms, each independently makes an MD5Sum of the souce/binary.

If they don't all match, something is illegitimate.

Before election day, MD5Sum EACH AND EVERY MACHINE by (multiple) organizations.. if the sum don't match the published MD5Sum.. something is illegitimate.

Do the same thing as PART OF THE POLL AUDIT/Closing. If it don't match, all ballots from that machine are SUSPECT.

Put it all in the open where many people can check/verify it.

[satya]

89. Thanks for the explanation;brings back memories of writing code to compute

'hash totals' to double-check the integrity of manual data entry in punch card systems (what a dinosaur I am!).

I like the idea of having the option of using a machine to print a ballot (and that's probably necessary to accomodate some disabled voters). I fear, though, that it would be hard to achieve the goal of MD5SUmming all machines. Many places already seem to have trouble following procedures and keeping software updated.

Federal elections must be kept separate from the state & local elections, to facilitate hand counting at the precinct level. Let high school honor students count the ballots, with party reps observing. Scan the ballots, too, to verify the hand count, but I still want all the ballots handcounted, every time.

I would like to see ballots handled with the same care as payroll checks, with serial numbers so missing or "extra" ballots will raise a red flag and a very well-defined chain of custody.

I think you've got some good ideas, but they might be best for state & local elections, where the ballots are more complex and hand counting is more error-prone. I prefer very low-tech, standardized federal elections.

[Rosco T.]

91. Real simple way to sum the machines... you don't...

.. you sum the BOOTABLE CD that has the os/application code. The basic machine is a dumb lump that can't do squat. The application may use a minimal HardDrive as scratch space, but by design it will wipe it on every boot.

No need to have a sequential number on every ballot. Make it a concatination of (off the top of my head)

a machine serial number (maybe on a simple eeprom card that is unique to each box).

date/time.

Instant unique number for the ballot.

(going into the idea further).

The machine would have TWO CD-Rom drives, behind a locked/sealed door.

Drive 1: the OS/Voting Application - absolutely the same across every machine in the country, no need to have different versions.

Drive 2: the 'ballot' descriptor - making the ballot a series of 'commands' that the application would read to generate the input screen/print the ballot.

OS/Application Disc: Summed at the 'federal' level and never changed. (let's get real cute, when the OS/Application is booting, it MD5sums THE DISCS ITSELF, and prints it (encoded) on EVERY BALLOT.

Ballot Descriptor Disc: generated at the state/county/whatever level. MD5Summed also and locked down so any change is obvious (and the source for the descriptor made as open as the application).

[Festivito]

92. Why is there no simple paper backup when machines fail, or

even when the machine is not trusted by the voter?

Simple 8.5 x 11 paper printed at home, or, printed or re-printed at the polling site. Random re-reads and random hand counts.

[indigonation]

97. David Chaum's solution - "Votegrity" a possible solution.....

Tilting at the Ballot Box
Entrepreneur David Chaum's e-money venture flopped. Now he wants to fix electronic voting. For once, is the brilliant inventor right on time?
By John Heilemann, September 2004 Issue

The legendary cryptographer David Chaum has just invented something amazing, and his timing is nearly perfect. At a moment when electronic voting has been turned -- by a confluence of clueless election officials, slipshod technologies, dodgy vendors, and ever vigilant geeks -- from a great leap forward into an abject fiasco, Chaum has unveiled an e-voting system that's everything the current gizmos aren't. It's incredibly secure. It guarantees anonymity. Its results are verifiable. It is, Chaum claims, "the first electronic mechanism that ensures both integrity and privacy." Indeed, as far as I can see, Chaum's invention has only one conceivable drawback: It won't be on the market in time to save us on Nov. 2.

(snip)

Then, out of nowhere, all hell broke loose. Computer scientists and security experts declared the current generation of machines easily hackable and prone to tampering. In particular, the critics complained that because the machines leave no paper trail, their results are impossible to audit. (Any recount would rely on the same software that might have mangled or manipulated the votes to begin with.) Voting activists dug up a pile of evidence of past e-voting irregularities. A populist campaign, "The Computer Ate My Vote," erupted on the Internet. Meanwhile, Diebold's CEO, Walden O'Dell, unwittingly fed a thousand conspiracy theories by hosting a Bush fund-raiser -- and writing to the invited guests, "I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year."

(snip)

In the face of all this, states are scrambling to figure out what to do -- both in November and further in the future. The solution that's gained the most momentum is known as "verified voting." Here a printer attached to the touchscreen terminal spits out a hard copy of the voter's choices and displays it under a transparent barrier. Once the voter approves the receipt, it's put in a sealed ballot box, from which it can be retrieved and tallied in the case of a recount. The problem, however, as Chaum points out, is that the receipts are as vulnerable to fraud as ordinary paper ballots. "They can, for example, be tampered with between the vote and the recount," he says."In a sense, ballot-under-glass is no more secure than old-fashioned punch-card systems."

(snip)

Chaum's system, Votegrity, produces a paper trail too -- except Chaum throws cryptography into the mix, and that changes the equation. With Votegrity, the printer attached to the terminal generates two strips of paper, each of which holds your vote in encrypted form. Overlaid on top of one another and seen through a custom viewfinder, the strips, through some cryptographic voodoo, reveal your choices in plain English. Once you've verified your vote, the strips are separated, you pick one to take home as a receipt, and the bar-code-like image on that strip is stored digitally. When the time comes to tally the votes, the images are decrypted (using a complicated Chaumian mathematical process that's all but tamperproof). Meanwhile, the encoded images are posted on the Web, so that you can go online afterward and confirm that your vote was counted by using a serial number on your strip.

(more...) http://www.radwin.org/michael/blog/archives/0,17925,683182,00.html

[kerry-is-my-prez]

98. We also need to have our own cnn or better yet - take over an existing one

one that will not be afraid to call the government on it's corruption.

[rucky]

99. Sorry, Roscoe. We don't discuss solutions here at the DU

Only problems. heh.

recommended.

[helderheid]

100. we have

http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/

[Mairead]

106. You managed to build a system, including monitor, for $300?

How? My dev system cost nearly 300 for the monitor alone (19" NEC) 2 yrs ago.

[Rosco T.]

114. Not counting monitor... but I did just buy a Samsung 977 for $99. n/m

[wtmusic]

111. Some good ideas

I had a "voting idea" post a couple of weeks ago and it generated a lot of good suggestions. The main vulnerability I see is that a company bankrolled by a strictly partisan group will not be viewed as a credible source for voting machines.

I like the idea of MD5ing everything, although how would one know that voting authority is actually using accurate information *into* the MD5 generator?

[Rosco T.]

115. Bankrolls and MD5's...

- Don't matter WHO bankrolls the system if it's so open and transparent that NO ONE can find any backdoors or tricks. They can whine, bitch, moan.. but then look like bozos when there's nothing there..

- The 'master' MD5's would be generated AWAY FROM THE VOTING AUTHORITY (for the application), done properly there would be the absolute same application everywhere (table driven). The MD5 in New York would match the MD5 in Crawford and the MASTER MD5. Multi-interlocking checks.

[Lannes]

116. Havent read all the posts..

Sorry if this has been expressed already.I believe the only way for elections with electronic ballots to be fair is for both parties(or any others) to have computer experts from both parties inspect the machines at the same time before the election.

To have monitors from both parties,maybe volunteers to cut down the costs to stay with the machines 24/7 in shifts and for another inspection to occur after the votes have been tabulated.Maybe something similar to a virus scanner in principle could be designed if it hasnt already that could detect any anomilies.

Its probably an expensive proposition and maybe someone has a method of making it less expensive but thats what I would be in favor of.That also goes for the main servers that tabulates the votes and the monitoring of the transmission of those votes by independent observers as well.Not to mention a paper trail of course.We need to have an expert observer at every point along the chain.Not letting someone near it for one second who isnt authorized.