What is the point of having a "paper trail" re. electronic voting?

[brentspeak]

If the machines can be programmed to record the wrong votes without a paper trail, why couldn't they be also be programmed the wrong votes on a paper trail? A person could vote "John Kerry", but some hardcopy spitting out on a printer somewhere will be simply say "1 vote for George Bush".

[yourout]

1. also need mandatory audits with .....

automatic HAND recounts of the paper ballots if the audit does not
match exactly.

[Imagevision]

52. because the paper receipt would record your vote which you keep!

to counter this pathetic voting system your real vote would have to be resubmitted after the problem count had to be verified.

[xray s]

2. you are correct

there are documented instances of optiscan systems tabulating votes incorrectly.

That is why I believe the only solution is a paper trail with a mandatory recount of a relevant sample of randomly selected precincts to insure the count is correct.

[brentspeak]

4. But how would that work?

If the paper trail merely is a hardcopy of wrongly-recorded votes, how would the paper trail verify if voting was done correctly or not?

[xray s]

6. optiscan uses an actual ballot

you need a paper ballot to recount. I agree with you, a paper vote total recount is pointless.

[karynnj]

3. Two possibilities

1) One method I heard of is that 2 copies (duplicates) are printed - one goes to you and one is saved.
2) The paper receipt comes out you see it, then put it back in

[GOPisEvil]

5. Voter verified paper ballots.

Stop using words like paper trail, that is a useless term. Don't let the voting machine companies distract you with that. Using machines to mark a ballot is fine, as long as the piece of paper is the instrument of record. You can hand count a piece of paper. You can't hand count a bunch of electrons.

[annabanana]

7. THAT'S the ticket...please repeat..

VOTER. VERIFIED. PAPER. BALLOTS.

(It's what Andy fought for and it's what his memory deserves)

[brentspeak]

11. I'm not sure how this would work

I'm referring to the ATM electronic voting machines, not the opscan machines. How some sort of a paper trail would verify the ATM-type machines is what I don't get.

[GOPisEvil]

12. I know what you're talking about.

You use the machine to make your vote. Connect a printer to the machine, the machine prints out a ballot. You look at it, make sure your choices are correct, then drop the ballot into a ballot box. Then, the machine can count the votes, but in case of a close election or when fraud is suspected, the ballots are in a secure box for manual recount.

[brentspeak]

13. It sounds allright on the surface

but how would the submitting of the paper ballots work? If people are asked to place their receipt in a box located inside the voting booth -- who's to say they're actually going to do that? And if voters are asked to submit their receipt in a box located outside the voting booth, what's to stop a bunch of (most likely) Republicans from placing a blank piece of paper (instead of their receipt) inside the box, thus foiling any later audit attempt?

[bpilgrim]

22. there is no 100% fool proof system

but VV paper trails make it HARDER to do on a large scale.

peace

[GOPisEvil]

41. We do that now.

Ever use an optical scanner ballot? Those ballots are dropped by the voter into a locked box. You also have to make sure the number of ballots matches the number of voters who signed in.

[Mayberry Machiavelli]

27. I think there should be a mandatory, random audit/count of the paper

ballots compared to the electronic tally in a certain percent of precincts.

The audit should be done by an accepted third party.

If there are discrepancies discovered, beyond some preagreed to amount, it should trigger mandatory handcounting of all paper ballots.

If there are problems beyond that, then a revote is needed.

The auditing is essential no matter what the system. To not audit is to assume the system is not corrupt. I think we're past that point.

[Eloriel]

8. NO!!! No to all 4 posts so far. Not paper trail, PAPER BALLOT --

Voter Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB).

You are correct as far as you go, Brent, but without a VVPBallot, there's no recourse. WITH a VVPBallot, the recount can go to the ballots, which the voter has already verified as an accurate record of how he voted.

I personally believe we should have NO technology between us and our votes, but I also recognize that as a tad unrealistic (not impossible, just more exacting that we're likely to be able to get in this day and age), so VVPB is the way to go.

It doesn't prevent fraud, it doesn't prevent problems, it simply ensures that there is a paper BALLOT that can be relied on under certain circumstances.

And then, to define those circumstances, we all have to get busy down (or up) at our respective state capitols, getting those election laws reformed and rewritten. And we also need a Right to Vote admendment to the U.S. Constitution. Why? Because there IS no right to vote, according to none other than the SCOTUS, and so we need one because judges keep overturning otherwise important and vital lawsuits because we don't have a right to vote anyway. :shrug:

[brentspeak]

16. The nation should use what they use in NJ

Or at least in the district that I live in. I'm not sure what they're called. The machines are electrical but are not computer-based, and are somewhat mechanical in nature. No way to program them for fraud, as far as I can tell.

[Eloriel]

35. Sure there is.

How do you think those ballots are COUNTED?

And how could they be electrical without software? In all likelihood there's some software somewhere, esp. in the tabulators.

AND, there's a way to program everything for fraud, even the old lever machines.

[Imagevision]

53. Paper Ballot, I totally agree!

[randr]

9. If they can count each and every cent we spend every day

they can sure as hell count the votes

[A Simple Game]

20. And give you a receipt. n/t

[wakeme2008]

10. there has to be a random audit with any paper trail..

But still minor vote changes COULD happen just not for major offices. If you got a receipt that you had to place into a locked box for auditing, you would check the major people/things that you voted for. But votes for offices like judges you probably would not check, so that is the place vote counting fraud could take place.

[FogerRox]

17. Ok folks let me bust this party up---

First--

VVPR

OR VVPB

Record or ballot--only-
paper trail ---try to find that in a law dictionary-- it aint there.

Secondly-
The voter doesnt touch the VVPR-- EVER--- ok?

It is viewed thru a window-- the voter -- if they verfy what they read on the VVPR-- they then "CAST THE BALLOT" the VVPR is cut--- and dropped into a box--- because it is DROPPED-- it is random.

Third--
most VPR law is for a mandatory audit of maybe 2 or 3 % of ballots-- this really sucks--

10% is better--- 6 % is all I will settle for after asking for 10%

[BeFree]

21. I'll Foger that

Verified Paper Record. It's what's for voting.

But the only way it'll work is for a bunch of us to become damn near experts on this newfangled way of voting. If you don't have anything better to do than save democracy you'll learn how your local Board of Elections is gonna keep track of your vote.

The auditing will be the key to keeping the e-voting honest, and as Mr. Rox says the number audited oughtta be at least 10%. Looks like we will have to eat the 3% for now as we look over the shoulders of the election officials from here on out.

They let it be stolen the last few times, ENOUGH!

[GreenPartyVoter]

14. And that is why a paper trail alone is

not good enough.

(You can vote about that on the poll on my site, if you like.)

http://timeforachange.bluelemur.com/electionreform.htm

[FogerRox]

46. Green party voter-- stop using the word trail---- OK

this is why-- trail is not in most law dictionaries-- OK--- the word trail has no legal basis no acceptable definition in lawyer land--- OK

Use the word record or ballot-- these 2 words have legal weight.

Those of us who have fought hard for election reform know why this SOOOOO freakin important

If the word trail becomes acceptable then Public offi8cals are more inclined to use the word trail in legislation--- we cant have that-- because the word trail has almost NO LEGAL gearing or weight.

[GreenPartyVoter]

51. Thanks for ths tip. I changed the wording on my site and poll.

[troubleinwinter]

15. No "paper trails", PAPER BALLOTS

Voter Verified Paper Ballots. Inherently voter verified, and can be recounted.

[bpilgrim]

24. but they ARE paper trails, too

vv paper trails, that count as official ballots, of course ;->

peace

[bettyellen]

36. so why not say "ballots"

or why not ballots?

[bpilgrim]

37. it's more common

and shorter you can explin the details later =)

peace

[FogerRox]

47. bpilgram you are wrong ---this is why

this is why-- trail is not in most law dictionaries-- OK--- the word trail has no legal basis no acceptable definition in lawyer land--- OK

Use the word record or ballot-- these 2 words have legal weight.

Those of us who have fought hard for election reform know why this SOOOOO freakin important

If the word trail becomes acceptable then Public offi8cals are more inclined to use the word trail in legislation--- we cant have that-- because the word trail has almost NO LEGAL bearing or weight.

Any legislation that uses the word trail is weakened by the word trail.

ANd we cant have that --- right?

[Ready4Change]

18. Here's my thoughts.

The paper vote record is to be read and verified by the voter, before being placed in a voting box.

If a recount is done, it is the paper records counted by hand. So, if the electronically recorded votes didn't come reasonably close to the voters desires, and the paper trail does, it's a clear sign that something is rotten.

And in that case, since the paper trail was verified by the voters, the paper trail is the one that takes precidence in any dispute.

Personally, I'd want a mandated hand recount of 10% of precincts, even if there are no disputes, just to keep things honest.

[bettyellen]

19. no point at all- a paper trail or receipt cannot show how you voted.....

that's illegal because it could lead to buying votes...
a voter verified paper ballot can show an auditor who was actually voted for.
there needs to be a certain amount of random audits, too.

[BeFree]

23. Bettyellen you are wrong, dear

It will be a Voter Verified record of your vote; in other words you will see your vote printed on a piece of paper. You may not get to touch it but you will see it. That's how it becomes Verified.

[RC]

29. Forget the ATM machines already.

Way too much chance for fraud. Way too easy to rig, before, during and after the fact.
Use the ballot itself. The ballot can be machine or hand counted. To help keep everyone honest a random 10% hand count after the vote has been counted, but before it has been certified, in public by certified honest people.

[BeFree]

40. We have a volunteer?

I hope so, I hope you will be down at the elections office in your hometown asking them these questions. Get involved. The democracy you save will be your own.

[bettyellen]

32. no dear, there cannot be a receipt or a paper trail that connects voter to

the vote. that's what i said is illegal, and both unlikely and unwise to change.
i'd prefer a ballot that can be verified myself, i think this whole atm type system is pretty easy to screw with. but yeah, receipts and paper trails are concepts that the people who don't want to fix the system are pushing to fool people when there can easily be a disconnect between the two. so, pardon me for being suspiousus of them.

[BeFree]

39. See FogeRox's post above

We are not talking receipts or trails, we are talking Voter Verified Paper Records. And that Record will not be connected to any voter.

It's ok to be confused, it is all very confusing.... just the way the election officials want it: that way they can screw-up left and right and get away with it, like they have for the last few elections. Your suspicion is well founded.

[bettyellen]

42. the only confusing thing is why you've replaced the word ballot

with the word record. why so anti-ballot?
what happens to the pieces of paper behind glass if the wrong name is selected?
where do they go then?

[FogerRox]

48. Betty-- VVPR or VVPB ----this is a printer--

YOu view the paper record or ballot-- depending if your state even has a law mandating a printer on a DRE----- you view the paper thru a window--
If you verify thats who you voted for-- you "cast you ballot" by hitting another botton--- the Paper is cut--- still behind the little window- and dropped into a box-- this is mechanically all a single unit--

If you want to change your vote-- press a cancel or void button. The paper is cut & drops into the box-- & you start over--

[nofurylike]

25. to placate us, and divide us, as you can see. paper ballots, hand

counted on a precinct level


period.


peace

[Warren DeMontague]

26. Here's a crazy idea. How about we do away with the SECRET ballot.

Yes, yes, I know, there's probably a laundry list of reasons why that's a terrible idea. Secret ballot, foundation of freedom and democracy, yadda yadda yadda.

But in terms of security; of every American knowing that their vote was counted, and counted for the RIGHT guy, that "phantom" votes weren't mysteriously added, that it all adds up and adds up properly...

why the hell not? Have a web page (or a series of pages) with 250 million names on it. And who they voted for. Anyone who disputes the election totals can add up the numbers. Anyone who wonders if their vote got recorded wrong, can check. Anyone who thinks that non-citizens, or dead people, or dogs were voting, there's how you check that too.

Yeah, sure, we should all be able to keep secret who we voted for. But I'm happy to announce and stand behind every vote that I've cast. For president, their names were Dukakis, Clinton, Clinton, Gore, and Kerry. But I have no way of knowing if those votes made it into the final tally, or not. As far as I can tell, the only way to truly be sure of something like that would be to take the secrecy out of the equation.

[Mayberry Machiavelli]

28. If it's not anonymous, your vote could be used against you by your

employer or whoever, and also it allows votes to be sold.

[Warren DeMontague]

44. Yeah, those are probably two of the biggest arguments against it

but, it would take the uncertainty out of the system.

[hootinholler]

30. All Together now...

Voter Verified Paper Ballots.

Got it? Good. Accept no substitutes.

Paper and Ballot are well defined legally speaking. The thing the machine produces on paper, must be a ballot.

If you allow the machine producing these ballots, the pieces of paper that are already the legally defined record of franchise, to also count the votes generated, then you must audit the polls by counting the actual ballots by hand for a significant random sample.

Jesus, did any of you hear Andy?

-Hoot

[troubleinwinter]

33. Yessirree!!!!

[bettyellen]

34. thanks hoot.

:hi:

[hootinholler]

38. You comin in the 24th? n/t

:hi:

[bettyellen]

43. i hope to. still up in the air,.

it would be nice to see ya again

[FogerRox]

49. right on HOOT-- Paper trial sucks big whazoo

this is why-- trail is not in most law dictionaries-- OK--- the word trail has no legal basis no acceptable definition in lawyer land--- OK

Use the word record or ballot-- these 2 words have legal weight.

Those of us who have fought hard for election reform know why this SOOOOO freakin important

If the word trail becomes acceptable then Public offi8cals are more inclined to use the word trail in legislation--- we cant have that-- because the word trail has almost NO LEGAL bearing or weight.

Any legislation that uses the word trail is weakened by the word trail.

ANd we cant have that --- right?

[wli]

31. paper trails are worse than worthless

Paper BALLOTS, not "paper trails."

[Cleita]

45. The accounting principle of having a source document.

Also double entry accounting enters into it. If you don't record a transaction from a source document in two ledgers that record debit and credit, it invites fraud. These people know that and that it would be really easy for them to cheat because an audit can't be done.
It's a very basic accounting principle, single entry invites fraud.

[Dynasty_At_Passes]

50. There is none whatsoever. That's why N.C. adopted voter verified ballots.

Paper trails are bullshit. Mississippi is trying for verified paper ballots also.

Only paper ballots, verified ballots can be RECOUNTED.

Only manual random audits can ensure fair or accurate VOTES.

Only non-DLC democrats it seems can ensure VERIFIED, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS.

Everyone else seems to make $$ off the scam.

[Mayberry Machiavelli]

54. What is a good link describing the legislation adopted in NC?

[BeFree]

55. Link to NC Law

I think it is ncvoter.org, best check in the NC state forum for the correct link and details on what NC is about to pass as law.

[cascadiance]

56. What I'd like to see if we do get electronic machines...

is to have someone vote on a touchscreen machine that is produced by one company (or better yet something that has open source code). That machine would spit out a paper ballot with both human readable text showing to the voter what boxes they picked as well as an electronic signature to validate it with.

Then that card gets taken to a "verification" machine that reads in that ballot (for the VOTER THEMSELVES!. This machine would be on a separate network and run by a separate company, and would show the voter what they voted for to allow them to double-check accuracy of what the first machine put on the card. This machine would also be used to send the totals to the accumulators.

Now this might get expensive, but if done right and done with standard machines (perhaps on bigger scales these could be cheaper), a double blind system like that (where you'd compare totals accumulated both on the touch screen machine systems and the ones sending up the ballots and showing them to the voter). If they didn't compare correctly, you'd know you had a problem and need to do some recounts of these paper ballots. With the electronic signatures on these hard copies, it shouldn't be too hard to tell what the voter originally voted for or if it had been tampered with, if it had both machine readable text for boxes checked and an electronic signature.

Such a system I would think with multiple places for voters to verify what they voted for on independent systems and having a backup paper trail, would be one that would be really hard for a fraudster to deal with.