As I have watched the reactions to my earlier piece on NiemanWatchdog.org,
"What’s wrong with cutting and running?” (http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask_this.view&askthisid=129), I recognize that one critical point does not come through to many readers. The problem may stem from the words "cut and run" in the title. In the minds of some, that seems to imply leaving the region for good. My argument is fundamentally different.
I believe that stabilizing the region from the Eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan is very much an American interest, one we share with all our allies as well as with several other countries, especially, China, Russia, and India.
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TOPICS COVERED:
The ‘Global Balkans’
A Missed Opportunity
Iraq as a Dead End Street
Withdrawal is the Precondition to Progress
"Staying the course" may make a good sound bite, but it can be disastrous for strategy.
Several of Hitler's generals told him that "staying the course" at Stalingrad in 1942 was a strategic mistake, that he should allow the Sixth Army to be withdrawn, saving it to fight defensive actions on reduced frontage against the growing Red Army. He refused, lost the Sixth Army entirely, and left his commanders with fewer forces to defend a wider front. Thus he made the subsequent Soviet offensives westward easier.
To argue, as some do, that we cannot leave Iraq because "we broke it and therefore we own it" is to reason precisely the way Hitler did with his commanders.
Of course we broke it! But the Middle East is not a pottery store. It is the site of major military conflict with several different forces that the United States is galvanizing into an alliance against America. To hang on to an untenable position is the height of irresponsibility.
Beware of anyone, including the president, who insists that this is "responsible" or "the patriotic" thing to do.Link:
http://niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=0063&stoplayout=true&print=trueLieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow with Hudson Institute and a professor at Yale University. He was Director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988. From 1981 to 1985, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Army's senior intelligence officer. From 1977 to 1981, he was Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Beware, indeed.