Iraqification—A Losing Strategy
by Fareed Zakaria
If the U.S. footprint is reduced, guerrillas will not stop fighting. They will probably step up their attacks on the Iraqi Army and politicians
NEWSWEEK Nov. 10 issue — Iraq, everyone agrees, is not Vietnam. In Vietnam the United States lost dozens of troops for every one it is losing in Iraq. The Viet Cong guerrillas had broad popular support. They were being supplied by great powers. And so on.
BUT THERE IS one sense in which the analogy might hold. Frustrated by the lack of quick progress on the ground and fading political support at home, Washington is now latching on to the idea that a quick transfer of power to local troops and politicians would make things better. Or at any rate, it would lower American casualties. It was called Vietnamization; today it’s called Iraqification. And then as now, it is less a winning strategy than an exit strategy.
Everyone seems to be in favor of Iraqification. The president has urged an accelerated training schedule for the Iraqi Army. Secretary Rumsfeld says that more Iraqi troops, and not Americans, would be the best answer to his problems. Senators and congressman from both parties cheer the idea, as do most columnists. On the political side, the administration has speeded up its timetable to transfer power. While once it spoke of a three-year process of constitution-writing and institution-building, now it wants to hold elections and turn things over in 18 months at most. American troops would be under 100,000 by next summer and fall under 50,000 by 2005. Even the French love the new, improved schedule. What could possibly be wrong with it?
This new impulse has less to do with Iraqi democracy than with American democracy. The president wants to show that Iraqis are governing their affairs and Americans are coming home in time for his re-election. But it might not work out that way.
Putting more Iraqi soldiers and policemen on the ground makes sense. By taking care of routine policing and security, they will free up the American Army to conduct raids, pursue leads and fight the guerrillas. But the desperation to move faster and faster is going to have bad results. Accelerating the training schedule (which has already been accelerated twice before) will only produce an ineffective Iraqi Army and police force. Does anyone think that such a ragtag military could beat the insurgency where American troops are failing?
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