Question for American Revolutionary War Buffs

[Yavin4]

Didn't England hold large quantities of American soil including New York city for most of the war? In the first eight months or so of the war, couldn't the Brisith army also say that things were going well? Didn't they have control for most of the early parts of the war like we currently have in Iraq?

[dobak]

1. yep...

The British very well may have won had it not been for our determination and the help of the French.

[illini]

2. You noticed that also.

You are correct.

[htuttle]

3. There are some other big differences, however

For one thing, during the Revolutionary war, most of the resistance (ie., us) used to come from (or were descended from) the invading country (ie., the British). They also had the same language, many of the same customs, religions, etc... Not to mention a fair number of British loyalists who often acted as spies for the British. In that sense, it was almost more like a civil war (at least at first).

In Iraq, the invading force came from half way around the world, speak a different language, different customs, etc... From an insurgency standpoint, the occupation of Iraq is a world apart from the Revolutionary war (and much more supportive of an insurgency).

[MessiahRp]

9. What people may not realize

is that the ethnic or religious differences that divide the various groups in Iraq, their hatred for America may actually unite them. Even if it is only until they drive us out.

Similarily there really wasn't any real terrorists in Iraq until we invaded them to supposedly stop Iraq from working with terrorists.

I find those contrasts to be deeply ironic in defeating Bush's "This is a better Iraq than it was before" argument.

Rp

[Yupster]

4. If you're interested, let me

recommend a book.

"Those Damned Rebels" by Michael Pearfon.

It's an examination (short and very readable) of the Revolution from the British point of view.

They had very few soldiers in the New World, they were also fighting France and Spain, How could they think they could possibly suppress the colonies?

The answer is that they depended on loyal civilians, and it worked pretty well right to the end. New York was Britsh-held right to the end.

Georgia, S Carolina and mostly N Carolina were British held for almost all the war. In those regions, the people were largely peaceful, and loyal militias patrolled the communities.

When Cornwallis struck into Virginia, he overextended himself, got cut off, and left the southern colonies defenseless.

What the British found was that their citizens were loyal until a rebel army came nearby. Then the loyal militias would return home and rebel militias would pop up. Therefore, while the people were considered generally loyal in those areas, it was deemed important that a British military precense would be within reach. That's why Cornwallis' invasion of Virginia was such a gaffe.

In short though, that's how Britain could have possibly thought they could win. By passifying a region, establishing a loyal presence backed by some British arms, and then biting off the next chunk. It took little British strength and it worked for years.

[legin]

5. By coincidence

I was reading this earlier this evening, it's from a Black Coffee Briefing at the AEI by Gary Baurer. (Be warned they have just re-instated these Black Coffee Briefings after stoping them just after the end of the invaison of Iraq. I think)

<<snip>>

But there are lessons learned from Vietnam that are worthwhile, and the truth is Americans know how to fight small wars, how to conduct counterinsurgencies. Vietnam was not the only experience we had in that, and much of what we know that is still useful and timely can be found in the Marines' small war manual that was published in 1940, which is something of a compilation of the American experience over 150 years of fighting counterinsurgencies and fighting small wars.

Now, what are the key ingredients for successful counterinsurgency strategy? Well, the first one is that your policy has to be coordinated; that is, you're not just conducting a military campaign independent of your economic and political reconstruction. They have to go hand in hand.

When you enter an area militarily, you also have to be entering an area with economic aid, reconstruction aid, and a good deal of political effort to reconstruct the politics in that region. One would have to ask the question in Iraq today whether, in fact, we have that kind of coordination, whether Mr. Bremer's office and the military officers there, in fact, have a coordinated team effort to do this sort of thing.

The second thing that has to happen is, which is one of the more difficult things for Americans to do, is you have to swamp an area. You have to take a lot of troops and put them in a particular area, root out the bad guys, stabilize the area, bring in all of your economic and political aid, stay there for a while, and convince the people in that region that the bad guys aren't going to be on their streets and that you're going to remain until things are settled.

EDITED BY ADMIN: COPYRIGHT

<<snip>>

http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.642/transcript.asp

[carpetbagger]

6. This is what a British victory might have looked like.

True, the British controlled most of America during large parts of the war, but the rebels always had control of sections, the ability to maintain an army, and the ability to congregate in open rebellion in significant chunks of the country. Even in the worst days, say the 1777-1778 days, we controlled most of New England, central Pennsylvania, most of Virginia, and most of the Carolinas outside the major ports.

The Iraq situation resembles what might have happened had the British Army defeated the Continental Army, and had King George gone out of his way to irritate the colonists.

[Yavin4]

7. IOW, British Troops Actually Were Stronger

in America during the early stage of the Revolutionary war than we are at the start of this war.

[rasputin1952]

8. The Revolutionaries were also radicals...

that were bent on changing things. If there were ever a bunch of Progressives in this country, they were the Revolutionaries.

They were dedicated to thier Independence, not just for political reasons, but economic ones as well. The notion of a coountry where there was no state sponsored religion was radical for the time, and the idea that people could form a Republic of elected officials nto represent them, was something that was old, but the new thing in it was, there was to no Royalty and privledge that comes with Royalty. The top was to be as accountable as the bottom.

The British may have held the ports and major cities, but they could not push thier influence into the "wilderness" any further, and this is where many of the people of tough will and stamina were.

The entrance of the French sealled the deal. But before that, the treasury of GB was being drained, and the English were pretty well sick of the loss of of its citizens on foriegn soil, regardless of empire.

:kick:

[happyslug]

10. Bush is in the same trap as Cornwallis was in 1780.

The trap was one of having more than enough troops to prevent the natives to drive you out, but not enough to prevent them from attacking you. Frederick the Great said "You can not rule a people 4000 miles away without their permission" and refused to help the British to put down the Colonist (Catherine the Great of Russian had the same opinion). Both knew of the problem of Transport and knew that Transport would kill the British attempt to retake America.

British transport problem was of two types, ship and wagon. The British had to ship everything over to America, a six week trip at that time (it was only 1 week from America to Britain but that was do to the Gulf stream, which help ships going to England, but had to be sailed around in Ships coming to America).

The Second transport problem was the shortage of wagons and horse. This restricted how far the British Army could go. The British never had enough wagons and horses to supply their army in the Field and sooner or later that Army had to return to the Coast for Supplies. The Americans knew this from the Previous War when General Braddock had problem getting the horses and wagons for his expedition to take what is now Pittsburgh from the French. Braddock had to ask Benjamin Franklin for assistance on this. Ben Franklin help Braddock by writing a pleading letters to the Colonists to sell their wagons and horses to the British or the British would send their Hussars to get them. The Hussars (eastern European light Calvary) had a bad reputation as ROUGH thieves in Europe so the transport was provided. During the Revolution Ben Franklin was trying to PREVENT the British from getting these same means of Transport and was equally effective. Unlike the previous war, the British NEVER solved the transport problem, always counting on obtaining the transport locally (Sounds like Bush looking for allied troops to help him occupy Iraq).

When the British evacuated Philadelphia these joint problems came to a head. The British did not have enough ships to ship the men and equipment to New York City, but did not have enough wagons for the Army to take their equipment with them through New Jersey. Thus the British Army divided their Army, the heavy Equipment (Cannon etc) going by Ship and the Infantry going by Foot. In Germantown Washington caught up with Cornwallis as he retreated to New York City and delivered a severe blow that showed that the US Army was capable of defeating th British (Cornwallis continued his retreat to New York City after the battle for At Germantown the British had no plans to even try to destroy Washington's Army).


A few years later when Cornwallis was in the Carolinas. The French had intervene by that time so free access by Ship was NO longer guaranteed. The British still had Naval Superiority but not the complete and total Superiority the British had prior to the French Intervention. This cut back the number of Troops the British could send to Cornwallis (Both through having to convey them AND the demands for Troops elsewhere in the British Empire to guard against French Attacks). Despite these problems the British still took Savannah and than Charleston.

The problem of Defending Charleston was left to Cornwallis who faced a slowly increasing Guerilla war against his British troops in South Carolina. Cornwallis decided the best way to defend Charleston was to take over both South and North Carolina (and destroy the Guerilla’s Supply base in North Carolina). Cornwallis’s problem was how to separate the Guerillas from their supply base (Referred to cutting off the revolt at the roots, once the roots of a plant is destroyed it will die, the same with Guerillas, once their supplies are cut off Guerilla activity will fall off)

After his invasion of North Carolina Cornwallis determined that the Rebel supply base was in Virginia not North Carolina (or more accurately has shifted to Virginia from North Carolina after his invasion of North Carolina). This lead to his plan to invade Virginia. Cornwallis’s plan for the invasion of Virginia was to destroy the Rebel Supply bases in Virginia and than return to the re-take the Carolinas (Cornwallis knew his opposition, lead by General Nathaniel Greene, would re-take the Carolinas once he had left, but Cornwallis felt it was more important to destroy the supply base of the American Guerillas fighting him than holding onto the Carolinas. Please note at the time the Guerillas were called “Partisans”, the term “Guerilla” is from the Spanish Peninsula Campaign during the Napoleonic Wars i.e. 1801 and we are taking about 1780).

Cornwallis knew he had to destroy those supplies. This became even more important after Ferguson's Loyal Americans were crushed at the Battle of Kings Mountain AND the destruction of Tarleton's Legion at the battle of the Cowpens. While both of these forces were much smaller than Cornwallis main Southern Army, their destruction left Cornwallis with no way to confront the American Guerillas up front. With those units Cornwallis had some ability to cut off the Supplies to the Guerillas, but once both units were destroyed, Cornwallis had no way to stop the supplies from coming in.

Thus Cornwallis decided to attack Virginia to destroy Greene’s Supply base and thus the Supplies to the growing Guerilla confrontation he was facing. Cornwallis divided his command, leaving just enough to hold Charleston (with most of his heavy equipment) and with the rest marched on Virginia. Greene watch him go by and marched south taking over the Carolinas and Georgia from the British. Thus by Summer 1781 the British had Quebec, Halifax, New York City, Charleston and Savannah (With the British having abandoned both Rhode Island and Philadelphia do to troop shortages in 1779) Cornwallis was fortifying Norfolk.

At that point the British made a fatal decision, they told Cornwallis he would be re-enforced from New York City and therefore to make preparations to fully invade Virginia. Cornwallis did so by abandoning Norfolk and taking Yorktown. Norfolk was a very defendable city, bordered on three sides by water and sitting on top of a hill looking down on the fourth side. The problem with Norfolk is while defendable, it is a bad location to try to invade Virginia from, you have to march SOUTH and than West. Yorktown on the other hand is an ideal place to large an invasion of Virginia from. All you have to do is follow the James River into Virginia (Which is what McCelland tried to do in the Seven Days during th e Civil War AND what Grant did when he took Richmond in 1864-1865).

While Yorktown is the best place to large an invasion of Virginia, it is a hard to defend location. The reason for this is that it is the reverse of Norfolk, i.e. the surrounding lands are all HIGHER than where Yorktown is. During the Civil War, Grant solved this problem by making sure he always had twice as many troops in Yorktown than any Confederate Force that might attack it. That is how you solved the problem. When the French and Washington’s army marched on Cornwallis In Yorktown, Cornwallis ended up acing an army only about 1/3 large than his. Had Cornwallis stayed in Norfolk, he would have been able to withstand the siege (Between the Geography of Norfolk and the Troops he commanded). Cornwallis’s problem was he was in Yorktown there the Geography worked against his troops to the degree he had to surrender.

If you look at the above you will see Transport was the problem the British never solved in the Revolution. Bush like Cornwallis, needs more troops to cut off supplies getting to the Guerillas. He does not have the troops to do so. Bush can ask for the return of the Draft (a kiss of death for his re-election) or call out even more of the National Guard (Another kiss of death). Unless he calls for those troops (which he will not, Bush wants to be re-elected) Bush, like Cornwallis has to either withdraw or attack. Cornwallis decided to attack9B ut had the Brains to not even attempt to hold the Carolinas). I fear Bush will also attack BUT WITHOUT WITHDRAWING TROOPS FROM IRAQ. Thus I expect a bombing attack against someone, Iran, Syria or both, ineffective except as a recruiting tool of Al Queda, but that will be preferred by Bush than to abandon his dream of total control of Mid East oil.

[TreasonousBastard]

11. The whole east coast...

except for Florida is a pretty big area to hold.

It's also a pretty big area to raise revolutionary troops from, if the colonies aren't all that united in the desire to kick King George out.

Early in the Revolution, Washington did get kicked out of New York-- first at the Battle of Canarsie, in Brooklyn, which he should have won but for bad intelligence and a bit of hubris.

He was then chased up through White Plains, Harlem, and across the Hudson to New Jersey and Pennsylvania where he spent years marching back and forth skirmishing with the Brits.

New York was perfectly happy with the money it was making at the time, and had little interest in the revolution. It made the British generals feel quite at home, and did what it could to stymie Washington.

New Jersey wasn't much better, and there is a strain of thought that Washington didn't so much win the war as the British didn't really want to fight it. IIRC, Howe spent more time with his mistress in NYC than leading the troops after GW. He also didn't like the idea of leaving his comfy digs in winter. If they had tried a little harder, they could easily have destroyed Washington's unsupplied, starving, and very small army several times and stopped the war in its tracks.

The situations aren't exactly parallel, since the colonists were largely British to begin with, and there were only around a third of them who actively supported independance.

But, yeah, dispatches back to London were full of good news.