Ok you BBV guys...how does this sound for a voting system?

[Gin]

Got this from verifiedVoting.org

Charlottseville VA. is moving to an all-DRE, single-vendor platform using the Hart Intercivic eSLATE (Hart Intercivic); there is no voter-verifiable audit trail. A FAQ on the register of voter's Web site addresses the security issues raised by computer professionals: "Actually, this system provides voters with much better confidence that their vote will be counted as they intended. First, the voting device provides each voter with a summary of all their votes, alerting them to any races they missed, and allowing them to make changes until they are satisfied. They have visual confirmation that they voted exactly as they intended. To ensure those votes are recorded correctly, the system programming is tested and validated before and after the election -- in the presence of witnesses -- to ensure that votes are counted and reported as they are cast, through a process known as logic and accuracy testing. There are many other built in security features -- both in process and in equipment and software" (Charlottesville, VA Registrar of Voters, Frequently Asked

[Noordam]

1. Read my piece

http://www.allhatnocattle.net/november92002.htm

on hardware to get around

" the system programming is tested and validated before and after the election -- in the presence of witnesses -- "

All you really need it the CORRECT TIME AND DATE

[BeFree]

2. "..many other built in security features..."

Why so much security? Are they afraid someone might steal the votes? <grin>

And how does a recount happen? Just read the same electrons all over again?

All this money being put through the ringer, when all we need is a paper ballot. Everybody can understand a paper ballot, and ya ain't gotta be plugged in or nothing!

[msmcghee]

4. Why do you call it a paper ballot?

I thought we were calling for a paper receipt - that we would place in a secure box after we voted and after we verified that our intentions were reflected on that paper reciept.

In case of a problem - those paper reciepts could be compared with the electronic vote totals.

To me that's not a paper ballot. Am I missing something?

[ijk]

6. no, you're right.

It's definitely more precise to call it a paper receipt. Keep it up.

[BeFree]

13. Precisely, incorrect

A paper ballot is the only thing worth fighting for.

Ballots should be counted by two opposing political party members. IOW, the paper ballot would be looked at by at least two people before it was tabulated. And if ever a recount need take place, just pull out the box and redo the count. How simple can it get?

[Noordam]

7. paper receipt

just like an ATM receipt....... no big deal.... unless you want to rig an election.

[lysergik]

9. We want a Voter Verified Paper BALLOT, not a receipt.

Receipts are not legally binding, a ballot is. A ballot is more than just a piece of paper with some printing on it, it is a tool which we use to cast our votes. A reciept is just a piece of paper.

The system mentioned above is lacking the ballot, so its no better than the other DRE systems available.

Go take a look at http://openvoting.org, they're currently designing an open source voting technology that can run on a regular PC and it doesnt have to be a NEW PC.. it can be a reclaimed PC from a government office for instance. Whats this mean in addition to the open source software? CHEAP hardware.

[Salviati]

12. 2 reasons why ballot is better than reciept...

Calling it a reciept can lead to the misunderstanding (intentional or otherwise) that what is needed is something you can look at and take with you to see that you inputed your vote correctly. In fact the purpose of the paper is to provide an unmistakeable record of the vote that can be verified by the person who cast it.

The other reason to call it a ballot, is that for the system to really work, it must be this paper ballot that has offical weight as far as counting goes, otherwise what's the point of it.

It seems to be that an acceptable system would print up voter verfied paper ballots in parallel with electronicly counting the votes. The electronic totals would be used unless the election fell within a certain percentage, then a recount would be performed using the paper ballots. After the election, there should be a random audit of elections, to check that the electronic count accurately reflects the paper records, and if they disagree, the paper results should stand. I also feel that anybody should be able to request a recount of the paper ballots in any election, as long as the labor is paid for.

[Cicero]

14. Good idea

Another one is to have the touch-screen systems only produce a paper ballot. No counting would be done internally with the touch screens. The paper ballot would then be counted using an optical scanner. That was you would have an absolutely verifyable paper trail.

Later,

[ijk]

3. How it sounds

I can't seem to find the article on verified voting - do you have a link? - but here's the FAQ described. It's not very detailed, for the purposes of really understanding the security question.

Voter verification is A Good Thing, of course. L&A testing is a good thing, but in the absence of other safeguards, it's a long way from foolproof. For one, it's not likely they actually mean they're going to test every single machine before every election; if frequent patches are being applied to the machines, as seems to usually be the case, it's impossible to guarantee that the machine being tested is identical to those not tested.

Even if they do mean to test every machine, there are plenty of ways to subvert the testing process, if you know what's coming; the machine doesn't have to behave the same way during testing and the actual election. Other typical vulnerabilities not related to the actual voting may or may not exist on this particular system; it's not clear.

The real point, of course, is that we know perfectly well how to design a system that's almost invulnerable to large-scale problems; it's a questionable decision, at best, to do anything else, even if some systems are better than others.

[newyawker99]

5. Hi ijk!!

Welcome to DU!! :toast:

[BeFree]

11. "...how to design a system...<overcome>...large-scale problems".

Yep, we sure do. And the simplicity of it is most remarkable. The system consists of two parts: A pencil, and a piece of paper.

The thing about these machines vs. paper, is that they shave a day or two off from counting the vote. Well, after a year of campaigns and the billions of dollars spent by the campaigners, it seems like we can just wait a day or two before the results come in. What's the rush? Why the hell are we in such a hurry to see who won? In most cases the elected don't take office until months go by.

The only reason I can see to have my vote counted by a machine is that it makes it easier to steal my vote.

[creativelcro]

8. Isn't it obvious ? It's scary...

"They have visual confirmation that they voted exactly as they intended." Right, but the visual confirmation is not what is counted. For what you know what is counted is different.


"To ensure those votes are recorded correctly, the system programming is tested and validated before and after the election -- in the presence of witnesses -- to ensure that votes are counted and reported as they are cast, through a process known as logic and accuracy testing." I see, so, if there are witnesses who have no clue what the machines are doing, that counts as a validation. And please, tell us what this freaking logic and accuracy testing is. It's people staring at a screen saying that the machine passed some test. nobody knows what the test is. Nobody knows if the machine will behave in the same way DURING the election. And so on...

I cannot believe that with all that has been written on this issue there are still people spreading this non-sense...

[Gin]

10. Thanks for the responses....it will be a struggle to get HR 2239 passed

they have a spin for any question...we have our work cut out for us...if there is no audit trail with a paper ballot...I will vote absentee...still is not a guarantee...but it will make me feel better.

[RedEagle]

15. Ballot, always

Hart Intercivic is no better then the other paperless DRE's.

Same certification proces that's worthless certified this system too. Don't let different PR make it sound like it's something else.

A screen representation is not a ballot.

It's a computer simulation.

A computer simulated ballot.

That ain't legal.

Voter verified paper ballot.

Because that piece of paper IS the OFFICIAL ballot and takes precendence over the electronic "record."