BBV: e-voting done right

[rman]

http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/03/11/25/213206.shtml?tid=103&tid=126&tid=172&tid=99
"The cryptographer David Chaum, through discussion with top cryptographers such as Ron Rivest, has designed a secure and verifiable voting system. One of the goals of his design is that anyone can verify that votes were tabulated correctly. It's good to see real security/crypto people working on this problem."


Secret-Ballot Receipts and Transparent Integrity,
Better and less-costly electronic voting at polling places
http://www.vreceipt.com/article.pdf

"Introduction
Current electronic voting machines at polling places do not give receipts. These machines instead require each prospective voter to trust them—without any proof or confirming evidence—to correctly record each vote and include it in the final tally. Receipts could let voters be sure that their intended votes are counted. But receipts have been outlawed generally because of the “secret ballot” principle, which forbids voters from taking anything out of the polling place that could be used to show how they voted to others. These laws are aimed at preventing “improper influence” of voters, such as vote-selling and various forms of coercion.

Introduced here is a new kind of receipt. In the voting booth, it is as convincing as any receipt. And once the voter takes it out of the booth, it can readily be used to ensure that the votes it contains are included correctly in the final tally. But it cannot be used in improper influence schemes to show how the voter voted."
(more...)

[RC]

1. The second article seems to be full of RW propaganda

For example:

"But receipts have been outlawed generally because of the “secret ballot” principle, which forbids voters from taking anything out of the polling place that could be used to show how they voted to others."
The paper record is NOT designed to be removed form the polling place, but put into a locked box for possible recounts.

"Courts can also surgically add or
remove the votes of particular fine-grained
categories of voters;"
Anyone see a problem here? If the courts can do this, why not a crooked poll worker?

And that part about the two part receipt where you separate the paper and give one to the poll worker to be destroyed and you keep the unreadable other half is not only too complicated but pure BS.
One printout dropped into a locked box is all that is necessary. I could go on, but I have to get ready for work.

Way too much space was allotted to the workings of the two part receipt in the article. Why? Voting must be kept simple and transparent to the average person. Voting this way gives peace of mind only to the ignorant.

[RedEagle]

2. Easy to Corrupt

Just run two sets of book.

Kind of like some of the Diebold stuff?

What you see looks fine.

What is actually used could be a whole other system.

And yet again, the ability to audit is restricted to a very same subset of citizens. VERY small.

What "looks" secure today could be hacked in a week.

Would you accept a "computer simulation" on a screen of your driver's license, knowing the possibility exists the next time you are pulled over for your license to not be in the system?

TRANSPARENCY = DEMOCRACY

Anything else is just a sales job for the next wing ding gadget.